



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
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


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AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY

FOR SOCIAL WORKERS
AND GENERAL READERS

BY
J. J. FINDLAY

SARAH FIELDEN PROFESSOR OF EDUCATION
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER

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PREFACE

THIS book does not aim to cover all the topics which would be included in a comprehensive text-book; it is just an Introduction, although the treatment is systematic since my motive in taking up the study was to strike a clear path for myself through the jungle of social questions. Some problems of great importance, as for example the institution of land-tenure, of marriage, are left on one side: others have received a more extended notice, probably because the upheaval of Europe during the recent years has thrust these into prominence.

The central theme of sociology, as here conceived, is the definition of social groups, their classification and their relations to each other. Taken apart such study is an intellectual exercise placing a number of conceptions in a rational order, like pieces on a chessboard: the difficulty which the task presents does not lie so much in the effort of thought as in the variety of sciences which the student has to turn for his materials. Anthropology, biology, psychology, history, to say nothing of politics, theology, education, all in turn have to be requisitioned. I cannot pretend to a mastery of these great fields of research and shall not hope to escape the strictures of those who are qualified to handle such disciplines. Some of the more obvious defects have been removed by the kindness of those who have read the pages in proof: the rest are on record.

Some readers may become impatient as they proceed at finding the same idea repeated as the exposition develops: when a point is once made they want to have

done with it, and they are inclined to regard repetition as mere padding. The fault, if it be a fault, arises out of the method: since our aim is system, a series of related thoughts, each advance must be seen *in relation*: each piece on the board must be known in all its bearings before the player can get the hang of the game. Every science exhibits at bottom a few large principles and a student's absorption in details is only designed to enable him, partly by subconscious processes of mind, to get familiar with these few but fundamental doctrines. When the student has got his system, his scheme of related laws or principles, fairly complete he can set it down and publish it. It then becomes a challenge to further thought, since every reader has to make a system of his own, fashioned with his own material. It may well be that an author's scheme (especially in a study like sociology which is not yet standardized) needs amendment: but that is not a serious matter for his readers: within limits his failure is as useful as his success. Teachers no longer rely upon the number of followers whom they can attract to a banner, but upon the keenness which the pupils manifest in working with their own minds. In all the social sciences (and one imagines the same is true in the physical sciences) this same demand should be repeated:—to get the student to forage for himself, seeking for those large principles out of which a system is created.

Now while on the one hand this exploration carries a student to the deepest sources of learning to which he has access, he will go astray unless at the same time he keeps his footing on the solid ground of experience—personal experience of life as he finds it. This demand indicates a second feature of method, and one which is of capital importance in social study. As we have seen, the sociologist has to turn to many fields of research in order to find the materials for his *subject*:

but what of the *subject-matter*? Here his method is the very opposite: it carries him right away from the study and the library. These chapters are illustrated by all sorts of trivial matters:—incidents, scraps of poetry and history, extracts from novels: they are inserted because the familiarities of the street and market place are the proper source on which the student of human affairs must draw if his study is to conform to the facts. The great books, both ancient and modern, have set us the example, and some of the authors quoted in this book, are masters of the method.

Here again there are risks to be run: there may be a lapse of style, a lack of proportion: in fact all the perils to which composition is exposed when illustration is sought from 'the common things that round us lie.' The method seems to be an affair of chance: quite un-methodical in fact. Any reader of this book will be able to substitute for the quotations and references to history and *belles lettres* other passages equally illustrative of the point at issue:—what principle of selection can be sought which will distinguish a scheme of thought from a medley of details? There is no principle, except for the writer, like the painter, *to let his mind flow freely in the atmosphere* and take his chance. If there is any attempt at effect, at laboured search for subject-matter or illustration, then the reader's taste is affronted by artifice. The writer (and still more a lecturer or speaker) must let his mood have right of way; if by so doing he appears to obtrude his individuality, well, that is the penalty which has to be paid when he decides to adopt the method; so long as he loses himself in his subject the reader will follow suit. His errors may be corrected, either by self-criticism or by the judgment of others who assist in revision: just as an actor, after the first-night performance, can improve his part, if he is modest enough, without losing grip of the impressionist quality which gives reality to

the original sketch. We cannot *base* philosophy on personal experience but unless we can illustrate and confirm it from 'the trivial round' it is not philosophy at all.

I dwell on these points of method partly because sociology is a comparatively new study (in spite of the labours of the Sociological Society), partly because young scholars are inclined to be too timid, afraid of making mistakes or of breaking with tradition. And the issue affects that wider circle of readers who are eager to study social questions but hesitate because of their lack, or supposed lack, of qualifications of an academic kind. There are many men and women, (those *e.g.* associated with the W.E.A. and many others who have not even a remote connection with Universities) whose mental habits are quite consistent with an approach to psychology or sociology, if they can be brought to realize that the subject-matter of these studies lies all round them, and needs only to be selected in the light of large principles.

One might go further: for it is now apparent that philosophy can only be created, and re-created, when its roots are spread abroad in the common soil, but to pursue this theme would carry us beyond the range of a preface.

I have to thank several friends for help in revising the proofs: my colleagues, Mr A. E. Heath, Miss W. Hindshaw and Dr Olive Wheeler, also Mr A. Redford and the Rev. F. H. Vaughan: last, but not least, Professor L. T. Hobhouse, whose encouragement led me to go forward and complete the study.

J. J. FINDLAY.

MANCHESTER,
11th February 1920.

CONTENTS

| | |
|-------------------|----------------|
| PREFACE | PAGE v-viii |
|-------------------|----------------|

SECTION I.—PRINCIPLES

CHAPTER I.—THE FIELD OF INQUIRY

| | |
|---|------|
| The starting point:—familiar facts of daily experience. Sociality one aspect or view of life. Each one person shares the life of many circles. Can the one and the many be reconciled? The place of sociology in the hierarchy of studies. A new science seeks a new terminology. But pedantry may be avoided | 3-23 |
|---|------|

CHAPTER II.—NUMBER, SPACE, TIME : AND PROPERTY

| | |
|--|-------|
| Number and size. A new condition for social progress. Space and Place. The political bias. Time. Corporate life creates—and destroys—institutions. Property as an institution. Public Property | 24-41 |
|--|-------|

CHAPTER III.—COMMUNICATION

| | |
|--|-------|
| The nerves, so to speak, of society. Progress relies upon an advance in communication. But the progress is chequered. And primitive modes of communication cannot be superseded. Publicity | 42-54 |
|--|-------|

CHAPTER IV.—GENESIS

| | |
|---|-------|
| From Herbert Spencer to 1914. Evolution can be traced in three directions. (1) The animal world and the lowest forms of life. From appetite to instinct. Macdougall's classification of instincts. The gregarious instinct a misleading term. Instinct in relation to control. (2) Early man: the evolution of a higher social potential. Man's relation to animals. Evolution of an inner life. (3) Evolution from the cradle. Genesis helps to an understanding of design | 55-88 |
|---|-------|

CHAPTER V.—POWER :—THROUGH UNIFORMITY AND DIVERSITY, UNITY, CONFLICT, FUSION

Social power. Increase of Potential. Uniformity and Diversity. Choice, Freedom, Opportunity. Diversity one aspect of freedom. Unity. Unity the source of power. Unity as public spirit. The sphere of conflict. Loyalty within a group implies conflict with other groups: And involves our standards of conduct. The individual cannot hold aloof. The state makes an overriding claim. No logical avenue of escape from the dilemma of conflict. Fusion . 90-118

SECTION II.—TYPES OF SOCIAL GROUPING

CHAPTER VI.—TYPES OF SOCIAL GROUPING : PRIMARY GROUPS

A scheme of classification. The Family. Men and Women: Period or Generation. Friendship. Secret Societies. Locality and Neighbourhood. Kinship and Clan 121-146

CHAPTER VII.—TYPES CONTINUED. THE UNIVERSAL GROUPS :—NATION, RELIGION, CLASS

The State. Attributes of the state. Evolution of the modern state. State boundaries. Internationalism. Sphere of the state. New principles to fit the new times. The demand of 'voluntary' groups over against the state. Involving a new attitude of the individual towards his state. Application to the problem of national unity. Re-statement of the position. Religion. Class. J. S. Mill, a 'middle-class' man. Ranks divide: classes may intermingle 147-188

CHAPTER VIII.—OCCUPATION AND LEISURE

Occupation. The economic basis. From Adam Smith to Arnold Toynbee. The effect of the War on the ethics of industry. Face-to-face intercourse in one's occupation. Welfare Work, so-called. Variations in capacity. Unions produce class consciousness. The problem of the future:—a redistribution of power. Leisure, as Pastime or Recreation. Leisure for thought and for personal development . 190-213

SECTION III.—ORGANIZATION

CHAPTER IX.—THE LEADER, THE OFFICIAL, THE
REPRESENTATIVE

| | |
|--|---------|
| Precise meaning of the term 'organisation.' The Leader (the stage of pre-organisation). Party as a product of leadership. Qualities of the leader. Union between leaders and led. Officials. The elements of organization. Representation. Aristocrats as representatives. A great Anglo-Saxon invention. The democratic principle not always effective. Methods of electing representatives. Representation in the state. The elector and the elected each play a special rôle. The state making use of other groups. Summary | 217-251 |
|--|---------|

CHAPTER X.—DISCUSSION, GOVERNMENT, LAW, SYMBOL
AND FORM

| | |
|--|---------|
| Discussion. Work of Committees and Conferences. The Platform. The Press. Government. Its distinctive function. The present-day problem in reconstruction. Rule and Law. Constitutional Law as a pattern for other groups. The supreme Law-Giver. Distrust of national law the herald of social dissolution. Enlargement of civic duty since the days of Burke. Form and Symbol | 252-280 |
| APPENDIX I.—A Note on Progress | 282-287 |
| APPENDIX II.—References | 288-296 |
| INDEX | 299-304 |

SECTION I.—PRINCIPLES

Now these instances, simple as they are, are typical of the life of society. They illustrate what is meant by the social fact as distinct from the biological and the psychological. They shew that in sociology what we have to deal with is the results that come about from the interplay of motives, the behaviour of men in the mass as they act and react upon each other. They shew, secondly, how the very nature of this interaction will call forth new forces previously latent in the individuals concerned in the affair, and they shew how the results so arrived at are incorporated in institutions. The interplay of human motives and the interaction of human beings is the fundamental fact of social life, and the permanent results which this interaction achieves and the influence which it exercises upon the individuals who take part in it, constitutes the fundamental fact of social evolution.—L. T. HOBBHOUSE, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 31.

Have you never felt when you have been swept into the interaction of some group of persons that you were being employed as part of a figure that without you would be incomplete? . . . Dimly you recognize that you have played some part in the creation of that figure, and that living for a moment, as you have done, in some force outside your own individuality, you have yet expressed that same individuality more nobly than any poor assertion of your own small, lonely figure could afford. You have been used, and now you are alone again. . . . You were caught up and united to your fellow men. God appeared to you—not, as you had expected, in a vision cut off from the rest of the world, but in a revelation that you shared and that was only revealed because you were uniting with others. And yet your individuality was still there, strengthened, heightened, purified.

And the vision of the figure remains. . . .

The secret of the mystery of life is the isolation that separates every man from his fellow—the secret of dissatisfaction too; and the only purpose in life is to realize that isolation, and to love one's fellow man because of it, and to shew one's courage, like a flag to which the other travellers will wave their answer.—HUGH WALPOLE, *The Secret City*, p. 180.

An Introduction to Sociology

CHAPTER I

THE FIELD OF INQUIRY

The Starting-point: Familiar Facts of Experience.— I was invited the other day to a club meeting. The members gather at frequent intervals; several of them are good friends of mine but I was not particularly interested in their activities, so instead of taking my part I sat quiet and reflected upon their behaviour. If the reader will follow my example he can very smoothly secure a standpoint from which to study the method of sociology.

These club members are persons, bodily persons, each with his own appearance and presence, but for the purposes of this club they are something which we call *mental* or psychical. They meet to exchange ideas, to express their feelings, to form resolutions: the give and take which is the purpose of their meeting is all in this mental (or, as some would say, spiritual) region: it concerns experience. Some thinkers hold that all this region of things, feeling, willing, reflecting, is of the same order of phenomena as the material objects present to our senses: that what we imagine to be mind or soul or spirit is just a finer result of brain activity: that by a clever illusion men have invented such terms as mind, experience and the like; in short, that psychology is a branch of physiology.

We shall not embark on this controversy; we shall assume the reality of mind, of mental entities, and shall not delay to discuss any theories of the relation between mind and body. Every science must recognize its own limits; the student of society must take over a theory of psychology ready-made, and assume data which modern psychology will supply to him. Here in the club room are these persons. A psychologist can describe, in the technique of his science, their general mental qualities, memory, reason, and so forth; after some slight acquaintance with the personality of any of them, he can give you a description of their experience—*i.e.*, of some of the stuff or 'content' on which these powers have been exercised: if he follows the latest exposition, he can deal with the sub-conscious, and discuss repressed complexes (1). He can go further: he can turn to something he calls 'social psychology' and can note how part of the content of A's mind has obviously been influenced, say, by B. For one noticeable fact about these men is that while each of them is a personality (living—mind and body—by and for *himself*), he is by no means self-made or self-sufficing; on the contrary, he is from start to finish, body *and* mind, a most wonderfully complicated product of *other* bodies and of *other* minds; he is 'heir of all the ages,' shaped by what we call social heredity, bearing within himself the impress of a universe working since the dawn of time to make him what he is.

Our psychologist, neglecting likenesses in the bodily frame, calls our attention to mental attributes and experiences which are shared by all these members, to the influence which one may exert upon another. When he fastens our attention upon this aspect of life, he calls his study 'social psychology.' Obviously this is only one aspect of a whole situation; every man is all the time both social and individual; if we unkindly criticize a member of the club as anti-social or unsocial because

he growls in his corner instead of cheerfully joining in the fun, we are using a popular term which has no scientific meaning : he is just as much related to and dependent on his fellows as the rest of us who share the laugh against him. As some one has said : 'It is not man that has made society ; society has made man.' And even this is not the whole truth, for society is a phenomenon far older than humanity ; we can, for example, observe animal society, since every form of living being is dependent, in its degree, on social intercourse. Wherever life is witnessed, there also is society : solitude is only a matter of degree : every item of living tissue seeks its kind.

It is not surprising therefore to observe that while each person of himself is different from his fellows, he is also very like the rest : many of his feelings, experiences, aspirations are identical with those of other people : and further, he *enters into the life of others*, he shares, as we say, actively in their pursuits. This is a distinct phenomenon : a new view of the man's behaviour : two or more persons become for the time being, and for certain purposes, one : not only are they more or less like each other in thought and feeling, but they *express* their minds in united behaviour. The proverb says that 'great minds think alike' : but proverbs seldom express more than half the truth ; minds great and small tend to share experience.

Now what does the psychologist do with *this* phenomenon ? Just as at the outset of his reflections he discerns and postulates an *individual* mind, distinct from individual body and discovers a host of facts, of principles, relating to the separate mind, so now he postulates with equal confidence, a *social* mind, an entity displaying, in its sphere, many of the qualities which he noted before in an individual mind. Just as a person is said to possess a mind, varying at each moment of consciousness but stable in its general disposition, so, it

is alleged, a group of persons display a social mind, varying in quality, from moment to moment, but capable of displaying stable characteristics, and persisting in time and in energy far beyond the capacity of any individual life.

Sociality one aspect or view of life.—Let us dwell upon this conception, for it is the starting-point of our whole study. If the very phrase ‘a social mind’ appears far-fetched, it is only because we have not transferred to society those conceptions of the individual mind which custom and practice since childhood have made habitual to us. We act, however, upon the assumptions of this social psychology with as much assurance as we display in crediting our own mental existence. Common speech is full of terms such as communion, co-operation, association, all implying the existence of this feature in experience. A disinclination to realize this conception may be felt in this modern age which would not have been shared by our ancestors, say in the Middle Ages, (2) for the civilized world of to-day is in some degree the product of personal emancipation: we have learnt to value personal religion, personal civic rights, personal property far beyond what was possible in earlier epochs. Hence many people will say that the individual is much more than society; they feel and know themselves in a way that they do not and cannot feel and know other people: the self, the physical and spiritual ego, is something different from any *alter*. This is of course true enough: but is not the *alter*, the sentiment of altruism, quite as real, quite as necessary to life, as the ego? It only needs reflection to agree that the conception of a social mind is not an abstraction of metaphysics, but arises out of a body of experience on which we rely in all our conduct. If a further excursion into history were within our province, it might be profitable to investigate the psychology of early man and search for the epoch at which man first became *conscious* of

‘self.’ Mr Cooley, to whom this book owes much, treats the same problem by examining the growth of the child, and avers (3) that the “I-consciousness” does not explicitly appear until the child is, say, about two years old, and that when it does appear it comes in close conjunction with the consciousness of other persons and of those relations which make up a social group. “It is in fact simply one phase of a body of personal thought which is self-consciousness in one aspect and social consciousness in another.”

The most forcible expression of this view of human life is found in an essay by F. H. Bradley. If the reader can study the entire essay all the better; I extract the following passage, since it is important at the outset to secure a balanced view :—

“Thus the child is at birth; and he is born not into a desert, but into a living world, a whole which has a true individuality of its own, and into a system and order which it is difficult to look at as anything else than an organism, and which, even in England, we are now beginning to call by that name. . . . For he does not even think of his separate self; he grows with his world . . . and when he can separate himself from that world, and know himself apart from it, then by that time his self, the object of his self-consciousness is penetrated, infected, characterized by the existence of others. Its content implies in every fibre relations of community. . . . He grows up in an atmosphere of example and general custom, his life widens out from one little world to other and higher worlds, and he apprehends through successive stations the whole in which he lives and in which he has lived. Is he now to try and develop his ‘individuality,’ his self, which is not the same as other selves? Where is it? What is it? Where can he find it? The soul within him is saturated, is filled, is qualified by, it has assimilated, has got its substance, has built itself up from, it is one and the same life with the universal life, and if he turns against this he turns against himself; if he thrusts it from him, he tears his own vitals; if he attacks it, he sets his weapon against his own heart” (4).


Individuality, therefore, is just one view, one aspect of our mode of life : sociality is not an antagonistic view, but complementary. Both are of course just aspects, the views of people who enjoy taking views : each considered by itself is partial and to that extent out of focus

and false (5). It is open to any man to say that we think too much about society and that he for his part does not wish to attend to the topic. There is no reason why he should reflect upon these problems at all: if, however, he is a student or wishes to appropriate the fruits of psychological inquiry, he must reckon with all the facts. There is no individual psychology which is not also social psychology, *i.e.*, there is no phenomenon of behaviour which can be fully interpreted until both its individual and its social aspects have been taken into account. "Mind is an organic whole made up of co-operating individualities, in somewhat the same way that the music of an orchestra is made up of divergent but related sounds. No one would think it necessary or reasonable to divide the music into two kinds, that made by the whole and that of the particular instruments, and no more are there two kinds of mind, the social mind and the individual mind. When we study the social mind we merely fix our attention on larger aspects and relations rather than on the narrower ones of ordinary psychology" (6). We may extend the analogy by reference to a gramophone record: here the complex of sounds is absolutely united by a mysterious physical process into a new entity which lasts for years and can be redistributed into its original portions at the will of any musician who hears the gramophone.

Each one person shares the life of many circles.—If the reader cares to think further on this line, he can pursue the parallelism between social mind and individual mind to almost any length, dealing in turn with cognitive, emotional and purposive aspects of experience: he may then extend the comparison even to the sub-conscious field. My friends at the club are engaged in revising the club rules; their general line of argument and sentiment is pretty clear and 'above board,' but we know that there are some feelings about behaviour and policy to which no one likes to give expres-

sion, although one or two will convey a hint of these in private conversation; such forms of communal feeling may however often shape policy more powerfully than the flow of public discussion.

One difference, however, between the individual and the social mind will at once be apparent. The secretary of the club belongs to the local association of the Liberal Party; he is also a churchwarden, and in business a prominent member of his trade organization: most of the other men are in general members of other clubs, and each of them is anyway a member of a family. In other words, each person belongs to many social groups, and he therefore only gives a part of him'self' to any one. A diagram may illustrate the situation:—



P stands for a person, the circles passing through the point P represents a few of the groups in which P shares; he behaves differently in each group, since the general qualities called out by any group demand from him a different response: at the same time he carries his individuality into each group. Some people are so greatly impressed with the influence exerted on a man by his associates as to hold that the individuality, or ego, is

merely the sum of these influences : that the point P is merely the intersection of various circles ; and certainly much that we shall observe as to the nature of influence shews how forcibly mankind endeavours to mould the individual, especially in childhood, to a social pattern.

We must, however, avoid pushing the analogy to extremes. What we all admit is that any man or any community is influenced, adapted, developed, by the mental environment, *i.e.*, by society, at least as much as by the physical environment. People use the term society pretty vaguely ; looked at from the personal standpoint it may be defined as the total mental environment that I experience at any given moment. We need some other term to indicate a single purposeful combination to which we can attribute distinct and continuous behaviour : for this purpose we shall speak of a *social group*, or more briefly, a *group*. Borrowing the terminology of physical science we say that the 'unit' in sociology is a group : "wherever two or three are gathered together" *there* is a unit for sociology. The group may embrace millions as in a Church or in a secular State : it may include only two in a family or the half-dozen children of a dame's school ; wherever found, the student follows the group to observe likeness and difference and to discover principles of corporate behaviour.

While adopting technical terms it may be well to note the conventional sense of the word 'corporate' which we constantly employ in these chapters. 'Corporate life' is a popular phrase suggested by analogy between mind and body, but transferred to the mental life, invisible, intangible, in-corporeal : it denotes that aspect of experience in which we share life with our fellows, members with us of society, by an analogy, useful though dangerous, with membership of sense-organs and limbs in the body. The psychologist carries us to the point where we discern this entity, this social mind,

so-called ; he analyses its characters, distinguishes it from an individual mind : when employing the comparative method he traces similar phenomena in animal society : by a genetic method he will note the stages of development in childhood or in early man : by the physician's method he will observe the aberrations of group behaviour when a crowd or other group display abnormal qualities (7), or, in the diagnosis of an individual, he will observe abnormal ways in which a patient reacts against his social environment, and still more important, the way in which social pressure has caused inner conflict (8). The sociologist begins where the psychologist leaves off : his business is with the new unit, the group. He depends on the psychologist to start him on his exploration, to define his units and trace their characters ; thus equipped he explores society and seeks for types, for inter-actions :—results in social behaviour which lie beyond the proper limits of psychology. No doubt the limits are not amenable to exact definition : no more are the limits between chemistry and physics quite easy to trace, but in the one case as in the other, when once the observer has got his conception of the unit fairly clear, he can go forward, confident that further study will, among other results, help to a finer conception of the fundamental units.

Some doubt may be felt as to whether any given company of persons are to be regarded as a group for our purposes, as a sociological unit. The inquiry is readily laid by reference to the psychological categories of emotion, intelligence, conation. Any accretion is an effective social group in so far as it consists of members who evince common sympathies, possess common interests, pursue common ends :—in other words, they not only respond alike to like stimuli but they execute a united response. This uniformity of reaction to identical stimuli is the comprehensive factor which enables us (a) to identify any individual as being a member of a

group, (b) to declare that the total is a social unit and not a fortuitous concourse. Just so far as we recognize uniformity in the mental make-up of an individual and describe him as evincing day after day such and such qualities, so we diagnose and describe the tastes, thoughts, tendencies of a political party or a golf club. The social group, of course, is limited in range so far as the composition and function of the group is limited, but its behaviour is a common quality, to which the term 'social mind' can be attached without confusion.

The psychologist can extend the contrast and comparison between the individual and the group in many directions, which we shall have to assume for the purposes we have in view. For example, as regards activity, an organized Group-Will, as described so finely by Graham Wallas (9), acts more slowly than the single mind :—hence the reformer finds it hard to be a democrat : he knows his own mind and wants to get to work, he is impatient at having to wait until he can convince his committee, or still worse, the general public.

Can the one and the many be reconciled?—We are aware that this scanty discussion of the social mind leaves out of sight many difficulties. Thus we have quoted from Bradley a challenge to the individualist to tell us where his mind is, his isolated self. But the challenge may be thrown back : where, after all, is this social mind ; has it a united experience, something separate from the experience of its members ? And if so how does 'it' come to life and achieve its ends, express its feelings ? A crowd perhaps can simultaneously shout its verdict and rush 'as one man' on the barricades : but even here the actual procedure is that so many persons, separated entities, move in a given direction and utter sounds more or less identical. It is only our ingenuity in thought, it may be said, which images those persons as one body, a crowd, with a single will, a single emotion. Undoubtedly we con-

ceive of the social mind, the common will, by an effort of thought; if we like to say so it is a figment of the imagination. And the only consolation is that our conception of personal life, of individual mind is equally a product of our cleverness in explaining the puzzles of existence. Both conceptions grow up somehow in the course of our development from infancy; neither of them appear to be within the psychical grasp of animal creation; as regards our ancestors it would appear that they appreciated and acted upon belief in the universal mind and the social mind long before they realized the importance of individuality. The difficulties in thinking out a basis for social psychology are not to be denied; and yet one has no scruple in leaving them unsolved because the task before us, in sociology, is sufficient for the day. What no one will question is the empirical fact that groups of persons, body and mind, do co-operate and do come into conflict; and that achievements do result from the interaction, such as cannot be fairly credited to any one person; in the last analysis no doubt you could find that every stone in the great cathedral was laid by a separate mason, who might or might not share in the gothic idea; and on that separatist basis you could deny that the inspiring structure expressed the common mind of an Order and an Age. But this denial, however justified by clever thinking, does not commend itself to common sense, which again is just the customary, universal view of experience which we rely upon because it *is* shared and is 'common.'

When, however, we have dismissed the paradoxes of philosophy, there is one practical difficulty in accepting the analogy between a single person and a group. The individual acts *as* one; he is the arbiter and despot of his own person; he may take time to make up his mind, but when the resolution is formed, there is no dispute as to who shall be entrusted with its execution: the

hands and feet, tongue and eyes are organs obedient to the despotic Ego. But in a group this executive department is not so easily arranged :—" who shall bell the cat? " was the difficulty felt by Speaker Lenthall when Charles I., an individual, quarrelled with the social mind of the House of Commons. And the illustration suggests the answer. Modern man spends his finest efforts in trying to express more and more adequately his social mind. The individual seeks his representative (see Chap. IX.), contrives new modes of organization and schemes of government, all with the hope of imparting to the group more and more of that unity which in the single person is so comforting. As we proceed in our analysis we shall see that unity, organization, representation, government are some of the chief topics which occupy the sociologist. Reverting for a moment to history is it not clear that the story of the Renaissance, the Reformation and the English Civil War illustrate such efforts? The individual of the Middle Ages first finds *himself* cut adrift from the overshadowing unity of religious fellowship, and by a re-formation seeks a better mode of representing himself before the majesty of God. Having solved that mighty problem his personality is clearer to him, he has become more of an individual; he stands on his own feet, and performs mighty deeds in the Golden Age of Elizabeth. No sooner is this emancipation achieved than he questions the constitution of his political ' mind ' : he had accepted the Tudor monarch as his leader and mouthpiece but the Stuart Kings do not act on his behalf : nay, they *mis*-represent both himself and the common mind of his fellows : so for a half-century or more individuals and groups contend until an agreement as to representation is reached. Whatever sort of group we form some one must act on its behalf and hence problems of government are of immense importance to human progress, not alone in politics but in every sphere; and they are important

to me as a personality because I can only express myself through my comrades. Doubly important, again, because sentiments of surrender, of loyalty are rapidly transferred to a group, and to the symbols, offices, holders of office which the group creates. Lovelace sang of

“The sweetness, mercy, majesty,
And glories of my King.” (10)

He meant it, literally, although he knew that Charles Stuart had faults in abundance. He simply did not distinguish between Kingship, a social principle of unity, and the holder of the office: he just surrendered his individuality to a leader as his ancestors had done for ages: to him the political mind of England could only be expressed and represented by the King. Thus the monarch was more to him than the holder of an office or the symbol of a supposititious social mind: the King was in very deed the instrument and agent through whom alone the subject could act as an Englishman. If to us this view of corporate life seems fantastic, we must endeavour to appreciate it as rational to many minds not only in that epoch but in ours.

After writing the above I have read again the philosophic exposition of sociology by Professor Maciver. He will not permit us to speak of a ‘social mind’ or a ‘collective mind’ and criticizes sharply the views of William James, McDougall and others who favour the hypothesis of super-individual “collective” minds. “A collection of trees is a wood, and that we can study as a unity; so an aggregation of men is a society, a much more determinate unity: but a collection of trees is not a collective tree, and neither is a collection of persons or minds a collective person or mind” (11). No careful student of sociology should fail to read Chap II. in *Community* and learn from it to avoid the

‘False Perspectives.’ At the same time I am convinced that Maciver’s objections to the popular use of terms like ‘common mind’ or ‘collective will’ are objections to forms of speech rather than to false reasoning. If the effect of using such terms is to lower the value we attach to personality then they must be avoided. But technical terms are usually derived from analogies : and Maciver himself is forced to use such analogies. ‘The mind of a people’ is in his view a misleading term, but he speaks of ‘the spirit of the people’ : ‘collective mind’ is forbidden, but ‘common will’ and common life are permissible.

These inconsistencies in terminology, these disputes between philosophers are really due to a greater difficulty, which always meets the intellect as a fundamental hindrance to such arguments when you carry them far enough. Logical argument always leads to irreconcilable paradox :—Mind and Matter, Time and Eternity, God and Man, One and Many, Ego and Alter :—who can systematize these conceptions? Who can claim to understand, to explain, the reality of his own existence? Our clearest forms of speech are but halting provisional attempts at exploration : our intellect by its very success in criticism serves but to demonstrate the limits of intellectualism.

The place of Sociology in the Hierarchy of Studies.—Students sometimes feel a further difficulty in definition. The social mind appears to be all-embracing : man-in-society is man all over the place !—in politics, in justice, in commerce, in the arts, in religion, in family life. In a sense this is true, for all institutions are social institutions, and yet it would be arrogant to insist that politics and religion are mere off-shoots of a single science, to be called ‘Social Science.’ This claim was formerly made ; a National Association for the Promotion of Social Science flourished for many years during the Victorian epoch, with Departments such as Eco-

nomy and Trade, Education, Health, Jurisprudence (12). We can see now that such an attempt at a hierarchy was in vain: that Association did something to help forward the public welfare in various departments but did little to unify them; it did not attempt to discover universal principles on which trader, lawyer, teacher can institute combined action. The more modern conception of sociology follows a different order of thought: we now recognize that every field of study has its dual aspect of concrete and abstract, the former is specific to each field, to each branch of science, the latter is more universal, abstracted not only from one department, but from many. In the present case we abstract a *very* wide view of man's behaviour, that, namely, in which he engages in concerted action: we witness this phenomenon in many departments of conduct and in each case we neglect the specific and attend solely to this one aspect; we inquire whether we can arrive at types, classes, principles in the manner customary to people who think in the scientific mode. Thus instead of claiming a place of supremacy among the social sciences (if politics, economics, and the like can be so described) or establishing itself as *the* social science, sociology takes a stand side by side with the others; it presents one facet of the diamond. If the study is successful it will not dispense with its allies but modestly hope to contribute to their advancement.

For, after all, a new study, even though very abstract, even though it were to hold itself quite detached from practical issues, must justify itself sooner or later by proving its value to men of affairs. Every science worthy of the name has arisen from practical needs, and however far it ascends to the heights of philosophy, it comes to earth again. This book is a case in point. The studies which are concentrated in these chapters are the outcome of thought extending over thirty years, to understand one type of social group, viz., the corporate

life of school; they have, however, been stimulated very forcibly by the extraordinary and rapid changes in the social order which the War precipitated. The evolution of mankind seems to suggest that social cataclysm leads some men away from the details of the conflict and compels them to contemplate, to abstract; to seek amid the ruins of a temple for a nearer approach towards the deity to which its altars were erected.

Such contemplation, since the dawn of consciousness, has taken two main directions, corresponding to the difference between matter and mind. The first of these may be illustrated by physics where man has elaborated out of 'matter' all sorts of new tools, to work his will both over the inanimate world and over his fellow men; similarly in the realm of mind itself, in that very structure by which man lives as man, he makes ingenious advances. The great epochs of human progress are marked by discoveries—or inventions if you please—which served as new tools, new devices for conduct. We call these sometimes by the term 'revelation,' especially when associated with the mysteries of religion, but in the light of evolution we may without irreverence place them with the material inventions of fire, of the printing press, the steam-engine, each of which has its import for social as well as for material progress. To us the warning of Socrates 'Know thyself' seems a commonplace: self-consciousness is now a common attribute of rational man; but what a revelation, what a rock of offence it was to his judges! And still greater, still more stupendous as an instrument of regeneration was the message of the Master: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Such utterances, whether the dicta of a great Seer or the vaguer discovery of many minds in a new age, mark the birth each of them of a new science, a new conception of the universe, a new step in an endless series of advances, of refinements, in obedience to that universal principle of complexity (13) to

which all nature is and has been subject since 'life' came to 'earth' (compare p. 62 below).

We should regard the study of sociology and of the psychology from which it springs—not as the idle pursuit of unpractical minds, of persons who have nothing better to do—but as one of the inevitable results of impulse. Age after age phenomena, animate and inanimate, are subject to greater differentiation (14); age after age man's power of control, over himself, his fellows, or his universe, becomes vaster; he cannot help thinking, adventuring, trying, and somehow one or another thinks ahead of the rest, others catch him up, and before they are aware a new 'science' has emerged, or a new principle of behaviour. When once discovered and adopted, it may be incorporated by succeeding generations as part of the routine of life, added to the mechanism by which the race proceeds to advance (or, if they choose, to fall back); what was once a chance variation becomes a confirmed habit.

So it has been with the science of sociology, if we care to claim such a title for the study. As elaborated by Herbert Spencer it appeared as if it were a branch of biology. Arguing from first to last by analogy with the evolution of plants and animals, and pre-supposing a theory of freedom inconsistent with common experience, this great philosopher nevertheless brought together a multitude of data of which his successors can make better use. The particular view of evolution which produced his Sociology no longer satisfies, but the impulse to reconcile the phenomena of social life with the general order of nature remains. Anyone who reads, for example, Graham Wallas's *Great Society*—or Hobhouse's *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (15) should admit that men are now creating a novel instrument of thought, a specialized tool for the impersonal consideration of social behaviour which mankind will use to some purpose.

It is, of course, open to any critic to say that the tool

is still very blunt : that the abstractions here outlined are mere abstractions, putting 'common sense' in long-winded phrases. If any reader of these pages comes to such a conclusion the writer will not dispute the verdict, but he prophesies with confidence that the book of revelation is not closed, that the paradox between statics and dynamics has not yet ended in the triumph of routine; and in an age when research is popularly supposed to be concerned solely with dominion over dust or flesh, he asserts that the most profound advances are yet to be made in the inner life of man himself; that indeed no true man of science can separate the two, for he is only half a man who is not somewhat of a poet :

“ As the bird wings and sings,

Let us cry ‘ All good things

‘ Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps souls !’ ” (16)

A new science seeks a new terminology.—To some readers, the question whether sociology can at present really claim rank as a science will be irritating; but others may regard it is a useful aid to definition; I suggest one mode of criticism which may be helpful. As a science emerges into clear view it finds the need for its own set of technical terms and its advance as a differentiated complex of thought may be estimated by this criterion. Inevitably we have to take our terms to describe the mental life from the life of nature, because when man first began to speak he was not conscious of himself or of society, but only of the world of gross sensation. So the philologists explain to us that as the race advances in intellectual power, and new sciences demand new terms, the old terms are modified to suit as best may be a new mode of experience. This is particularly convenient at first because much of the new thought begins by analogy. From St Paul to Herbert Spencer, the phraseology used to describe social behaviour is

adapted from biology :—St Paul dramatically pictures the conflict between the ‘members’; Spencer writes of the social ‘organism,’ social ‘structure’ and so forth. But as soon as the student breaks loose from analogy, and arranges his conceptions in an independent system, he becomes dissatisfied both with the analogy and with the language : thus Graham Wallas (17) rejects *organism* and substitutes *organization*. For while both terms refer to the solidarity of a complex instrument (organ), the members of an organism are, properly speaking, in physical union while the members of an organization may be physically apart and are conceived by the sociologist as united only in mind.

The student has therefore to examine his speech with care in order to be sure that he keeps within the new medium of language by which the new experience can best be apprehended. The safest plan is to employ wherever possible terms expressing a universal reference. Thus it is less confusing to speak of a ‘group,’ meaning thereby any number of persons sharing a social mind, than to describe our unit either as an organization or an institution. Certainly every social mind is more or less organized, *i.e.*, it acts as an organ or instrument to achieve a purpose, but purpose is only one of the qualities or characters which it displays, and the instrumental feature of its life is only one feature, a feature which tends too much to suggest mechanism and routine. ‘Institution’ again marks the character of stability, endurance in time, a quality which distinguishes most of the types of social mind (see p. 37 below) : but again, only one quality. Are we to exclude the crowd or the mob from our purview? The mob is unorganized; if in any sense a crowd (as for example the Sunday afternoon meeting in Hyde Park) can be described as an institution, such a description would have little meaning. Yet in the evolution of social experience, whether of children or of early races, the chance concourse of indi-

viduals has played its part; even in modern adult life the influence of the mob orator should not be overlooked; we must therefore include the crowd among the manifestations of corporate life.

While dropping 'organism' from our vocabulary we can keep 'organization,' using it pretty much as Herbert Spencer did. "Co-operation implies organization. If acts are to be effectually combined, there must be arrangements under which they are to be adjusted in their times, amounts, and characters" (18).

With all our efforts to reduce life, whether personal or social, to the precision of accurate speech, we shall expect to be baffled by the elusive quality of our theme, and students need to be forewarned against discouragement. We can name and classify many groups into types, but the best things in life will scarcely yield to rigid definition; these groups, however, are only manifestations or expressions of life and some of them, such as a group of friends (Chap. VI.) only exist when exempt from organization and routine. "To understand the whole reality of community we must keep in mind also the endless unformulated relations into which men enter, relations of every variety and of every degree of complexity, by whose means every man is brought into nearer or remoter contact with every other, joined in a solidarity and interdependence which none can ever fully estimate" (19).

But pedantry may be avoided.—To some students the precision of a clear-cut science, with its glossary of technical terms, is welcome. But there are not a few among those who contemplate the problem of evolution who mistrust the entire machinery by which these intellectual edifices are put together. So that the more exactly we aim at a uniform scheme of ideas, the more some will feel that we are narrowing the field of vision. For this, as we have seen, is the distressing quandary of all thinkers :—our instrument for advance in thought is the

intellect with its well-tried apparatus :—how else can revelation be apprehended except by the utterance of speech and the voice of reason? And yet, intuitions, primal impulses, sympathies were stirring the mind of man and of animals long before this instrument was discovered. And we ourselves are compelled in many situations to act upon intuition as fully as any creature of lower rank. And, the plague on't is, we trust our intuitions! In the present instance we begin our so-called science of sociology by postulating social minds : the majority of people who think about such matters at all will agree that in some way or other such community of mind with mind exists, and yet there is little to adduce by way of 'proof' on its behalf! A most thoughtful plea for *The Existence of Social Minds* (20) has recently appeared and readers who have a taste for psychology will be thoroughly repaid by reading it. The conclusion put shortly is that an unlearned observer, noticing his own behaviour, can be readily brought to accept this basis for sociology since he is a participant in social minds all the time : but that a learned observer will come to the same conclusion with difficulty unless he takes a pragmatist view of the universe, strengthened by a conception of continuity both in the world of matter and of (individual) mind.

While pursuing, therefore, with all possible accuracy, a consistent scheme of definitions, types, principles, aided by whatever powers of abstraction we possess, we are conscious all the while that the concrete situation is elusive : that the varieties of corporate life transcend our conception of time and space ; that we shall be constantly brought up against dilemma and must accept at times the limitations which beset all students who endeavour to reduce phenomena to system,

CHAPTER II

NUMBER, SPACE, TIME : AND PROPERTY

ANY phenomenon in the universe of thought can be contemplated in terms of number, of space and of time; quantity, position, duration. Let us see what we can make of these universal attributes, which apply both to matter and mind : the way will then be open to consider phenomena more distinctive of sociology.

Number and size.—It is a common complaint of ‘organizers’ that ordinary members of clubs do not take interest. The clergy lament the apathy of the people who merely attend; even students at times show little zeal. But if you ask the zealous agent whether he would not prefer to drop these lukewarm adherents he replies : ‘Certainly not : I want all I can get!’ Other corporations, such as limited liability companies, make no complaint on the score of apathy : all they require is your money, and a quorum at the shareholders’ meeting. No general laws can be laid down : the size of a club or union depends upon its purpose. It is a truism to say that ‘mere numbers do not count,’ for until a man gives something of himself to a group, his membership is only formal. How many Britishers for example have since August 1914 for the first time become actually citizens of our kingdom ! They were members before, but of their own will behaved as cyphers. A few men appear to hold that the individual life is so ‘sacred’ as to justify us in refusing to be partners with anyone : such men plume themselves as being indifferent to sympathy or opinion,

but they are only conducting an unhappy conflict with their own nature, repressing 'complexes,' to use the language of recent psychology (21), which any accident may cause to assert themselves (compare p. 114).

The chief phenomenon which arrests attention is the wide gulf which separates our modern life, since say 1800, from that of all earlier epochs. The swarm and press of population, jostling in street and tram and train, has created a new environment : men live close together but as strangers : they sit first as strangers at school desks, and in the pews of churches or chapels ; they then serve as 'hands' in huge factories or warehouses, coming and going like phantoms ; everywhere the person himself evades us : it is true that this change had been anticipated in earlier epochs : the citizen of Athens or of mediæval Paris learned to live in a crowd and to despise the solitary countryman who followed the plough. But the change in the nineteenth century was overwhelming in its rapidity : whereas in earlier times the balance between multitude and solitude was fairly even, our epoch has tipped the scale absolutely in favour of the city and the throng. A man of to-day who gets on in public life gains an intuitive skill in dealing with numbers ; he finds himself at home in The Great Society (22). If a writer he hits off the average taste ; if he buys he buys wholesale and pictures a universal market. Woodrow Wilson in *The New Freedom* (23) puts this change before his countrymen as the basal idea of the new politics. Thus in our epoch the man who desires to pursue a life in any sense adequate, has to establish two sets of relations, the first are the ancient ones, personal, with family friends and neighbours, involving what Cooley calls 'face-to-face intercourse' in Primary Groups (24). The second are the novel, impersonal relationships, into which we enter with those whom we seldom or never see : or, if we do see them, we only visualize them as items :—across the counter, in the tramcar, on the stage

or platform; they are so remote from us as to call forth feelings widely disparate from those stimulated by Primary Groups. So civilized man to-day has to balance his life between the two: he sometimes becomes a 'public man,' thinking in numbers and agenda papers, living much of his real life with committees and minutes. Now this impersonal life is not necessarily passionless or unprejudiced *because* it is withdrawn from direct intercourse: it is common, for example, to find a man furious with hate of Lloyd George or of the Kaiser who has never seen either of them. The lack of face-to-face intercourse does not of itself imply any diminution of social activity: you *can* organize, as did John Wesley, a society in which the whole world is your parish, and millions of people who never meet can thereafter be stirred by Methodist enthusiasm. What has happened in the nineteenth century is that very rapidly a large number of alert minds have taken up the task of organizing, adapting themselves to this wholesale impersonal habit, whereas in earlier days only a few leaders so acted. They exhibit a new mode of intuition, an ear for the multitude:—a habit unknown to small populations. The multitude itself very slowly and reluctantly shares such activities; the humdrum person, whether in town or country, still depends upon face-to-face intercourse, keeping himself *to* himself; he forms his mind by talk with his neighbour, by the chance phrases and suggestions round the tea-table or in the bar parlour. The successful organizer has to keep in touch, as the saying is, both with the multitude whom he organizes and with his fellow experts. On the one hand you find Mr Philip Snowden telling the House of Commons of the 23,000 letters he has received and read from his people in Blackburn. On the other hand we heard in 1915 that when the Cabinet grew too large for personal exchange an inner ring was devised, and while the nominal responsibility was borne by twenty-three, the destinies of

England were settled by four or five who could quietly talk things over, saying little because they already understood one another so well.

A new condition for social progress.—Let us see if this situation bears any relation to our conceptions of progress. That whirligig of time which we call evolution has dowered the races of man with new powers or tools, mental gifts, which have enabled him in successive ages to cope with new difficulties of environment :—memory, self-consciousness, language, music, may be cited among the list of epoch-making advances in the past. Using such glorious weapons along with many inventions in the material realm, the race has evolved (faltering often it is true by the way) to loftier heights of progress : at each epoch man regards himself, standing on a new pinnacle, as heir of all the ages. In our present epoch a new danger has to be faced, due to the very success of earlier struggles :—the nations have multiplied a hundredfold and are in peril of death : not death from famine as Malthus supposed but the deadlier extinction that comes from mental and spiritual decay, swollen with numbers. Ancient civilizations, such as Egypt and Babylon, grew rank with this disease, but they were frankly slave-holding communities, who deserved, to our way of thinking, the fate that befel them. Freedom, opportunity, choice, leisure, are elements in life which we claim to be in a measure the right of every citizen : it is possible, however, to manage the crowded millions of a modern state so that each can in any real sense lead a personal life? This it would seem is the central problem : both President Wilson and Graham Wallas are on the track : we follow their lead and seek to handle it as an exercise in sociology. If analogy from the past may help for the present, it would look as if man must evolve a new resource, a new mental faculty to meet this extraordinary climax : he must learn to be an *organizer* as well as a *sympathizer*; to be able, at need, to treat

his fellowmen as pawns on a chessboard, to find in fellow-feeling for an impersonal group as intense a pleasure as in earlier epochs he felt for his brood. If it be held that this faculty is of ancient date, and has been displayed by all great leaders of men, I should question the fact and be inclined to maintain my ground. This faculty is different from leadership (see p. 219 below), although some leaders have had it : its possessor may not have a trace of what is called magnetic personality : his virtue is to handle the social mind and anticipate its operations by policy and method rather than by intuition : he has not only to influence the social mind (for that is necessary in all debate), but the mind of groups of colossal size whose action is inconceivable to those who lack this gift. It may be granted that a few men of earlier epochs possessed this power and won their way to victory by its use : but sheer force of will, heroic example, cunning in personal dealing counted for more, as they still do in smaller circles. We hold that in the most conspicuous fields of service to-day this new type is prevailing over the older types : in finance, in war, even in politics where magnetic qualities still count for so much, the tendency is to give pride of place to the man who thinks wholesale.

If this be in any sense true at the top of the ladder, is it not still more evident on the lower rungs? Everyone to-day who wishes to be 'in the movement' wants to be an organizer, a good committee man, an official. The teacher cuts loose from the classroom where his function was to help individual development, and becomes an inspector or director managing a large impersonal machine : the physician becomes medical officer : the craftsman drops his craft to become foreman, patentee, capitalist, governing masses of men. Where is the line of progress to be discerned? In the opinion of many (25) society will be more and more divided into two types, a non-expert multitude, a herd governed by

social machinery which it does not understand; and a select administrative class who have learnt the novel art of social control. Just as in the Middle Ages a governing class ruled the minds of the common people by confining the Latin tongue to their own circle so the masses of modern men may possibly be held in leading strings by an official class, who learn the trick of social control and keep the new instrument in their own hands. The temptation to follow such a course is great because immediate results in efficiency can be gained by wholesale mechanical devices. Your expert always tells you that 'a committee of one' is best : for *his* purposes it is best. And in an epoch where masses must somehow be worked in unison it is fatally easy for the practical man, urgent to get things done, to rejoice in his new power and subject a nation to a Board or to a newspaper. For the great mass of men have as yet not learnt the new art and do not want to learn it : attendance at meetings bores them : to think out civic or national problems tires their brains : 'leave it to the chairman' is the best solution of a difficulty.

The situation received a tragic illustration during the War. The social mind of the German people displayed a portentous activity which willed the control of Europe in blind obedience to organizers. Its population increased rapidly decade after decade from 1870 and with each increase the individual became of less account as a man but more valuable as a machine. The schooling enjoyed by the professional class enabled them both to organize industry and commerce and to organize the sentiments of the humbler classes, whose capacity for self-government, for social management, was little more advanced than it had been in the days of Charlemagne. Thus the leaders of Germany had at their disposal an enormous compact mass of human endeavour, blind in its subjection. What could the free nations offer in opposition? Our population has also increased, but the conditions of

our social life have forbidden the gross triumphs of super-organizers. Only in certain fields of industry and finance has it been possible for the organizer to use social pressure to a dangerous extent. The result at first gave all the advantage to the German : but the astonishing feature about man is his capacity for learning new tricks, for breaking with precedent. The world has never witnessed such adaptations in social arrangements as this conflict called forth in Britain : we are still astonished at the devotion and energy which enabled the British Empire to create a colossal army : but this achievement is only one result of an effort in co-operation, in organization, of which the average citizen hitherto had had no experience. It is true in a sense that we 'muddled through,' but that is only because we had not learnt the new mental habit. What we have learned, it seems, is the possibility of conducting the affairs of an immense population not only with efficiency and with virtuous intent (that has been done before), not only with the consent of the people (that unhappily is too easily seduced), but *with their active, intelligent co-operation, their synergic*. A little people in earlier days, such as Switzerland or Scotland, has organized itself for victory, but the super-organization demanded when forty millions have to share in social thought is a new phenomenon. The conclusion, to my mind, seems clear. The new principle of progress is concerned with numbers, with the size of the unit ; the habit of organization, *i.e.*, of actively sharing in large concerns must be cultivated by all intelligent citizens and they must as a matter of course be entrusted with a share in the impersonal complicated machinery by which the life of city, of county, of state, is now controlled. We shall employ not less committees but more ; every citizen must be at times inspector and manager : while the leaders, the super-experts, will always claim our respect, they much democratize their function and share this new algebra with their fellows (compare p. 225 below).

Space and Place.—Every church has its temple : even the God of Abraham, the Eternal, found a dwelling-place in Jerusalem. Early man needed some seat, some settled gathering-place for his assemblies : for he thought only through such symbols. Many of our social groups to-day appear to lead a vigorous life with only a postal address as a resting-place ; a family will live in a flat and be ready to flit from Kent to Glasgow within twenty-four hours. This detachment of our mind from local habitation is mainly due to improved means of communication (see Chapter III.). The Industrial Revolution is often conceived as merely providing man with increase of population and of goods : it is overlooked that the great inventions in transport, steamship, railway, in communication by post and telegraph not only multiplied the efficiency of the factories, but endowed man with novel powers of social organization. A hundred years ago when my friend left me he was lost : now I can call after him, send him a letter and get a speedy reply ; I can link myself by intercourse with those of my kind the world over.

This view of group life reinforces the arguments of earlier paragraphs : the complexity of modern life has robbed us of much that was precious in the intimacies of the parish and the fireside : we are now organizers and live in public. And yet, how immensely our range of sympathy and activity is widened ! Something of the same process on a smaller scale was witnessed when the Roman Armies made roads which bound Marseilles with Jerusalem and enabled Greek and barbarian to greet each other as brethren. This alone made it possible thereafter for the revelation of Jesus to be embodied in a Church which spread its Gospel over the nations. The nineteenth century made new channels for communication and the twentieth will take a forward leap in social order. Then as now the danger will lie in a wide gulf between those who abide by the old order, content with

face-to-face intercourse in Primary Groups, and those with larger ambition who may pervert the new algebra of intercourse to anti-social ends.

The political bias.—This development in social capacity is a patent fact in the current life of our time, but adequate weight is not attached to it by the sociologists. They are still prone to centre their view of society round a local habitation in which each group can find a home, and they fall into this error because they view society from the standpoint of the politician or the citizen. Our British sociology has largely been an offshoot from politics : the great thinkers have either been by education and training disciples of Plato, or they have been concerned like Mill and Spencer to mend the ills of the body politic; they seek to determine the nature and needs of the State, in contrast perhaps to Church or Family, and this political basis colours their exposition of corporate life. Maciver appears to us to fall into the same error. "By a community I mean any area of common life, village, or town or district or country, or even wider area" (26); in other words a community is the common life of a group of persons residing within a political boundary. Such a community is greater than "an association which is an organization of social life." He thus establishes the State on a pedestal above all other groups, even above those which bind men together in religious or in family life. Now no one can dispute that the authoritative power of the modern State is a unique phenomenon and that the government and the law of this group affects the fortunes of every person residing within its area (see Chap. IV.). And yet it is equally obvious that the interests of many members in every state are more bound up with the life of other groups. It will be more in place to consider this position in Chap. VII., where we discuss the functions of the State, but let us clear ourselves at once from what we may call the illusion of the soil. Man is a spiritual

being; no doubt attached to the soil, and returning his body to it when breath forsakes him : but his union with his fellows has come to be a union of wills, of ideals, and these are not bound by area. I admit the duty of submission to state authority, to the political group in which I as a private citizen should play a part : but I will not admit that this group has any more claim upon my notice or my affection than other groups of which I am a member. This point is, however, fully discussed in Chap. VII. We suggest that a better perspective is gained by accepting place or space as a universal element in experience, which therefore attaches to every conceivable group, while playing a more important part in some. In politics an illustration comes to mind in the groups which we call Parties. In Chap. IX. we describe these as connected not only with party principles, but with leaders. Now the leader has a home, an area to which he is bound by affection; the untaught mind seeks to embody the abstractions of party principles in the special images; Gladstone and Hawarden, with its trees and woodman's axe, Lloyd George and the Baptist Chapel at Criccieth, Carson and Belfast—carry on a tradition which our ancestors attached to the king in his castle and the priest in his temple.

Time.—Nothing differentiates one group from another more than this factor of endurance in time. In what remote epoch of man's evolution did he learn to connect the present instant with the past event, to use the gift he now calls memory and thereafter to enjoy that complex sentiment which we call 'hope'? :—to value an emotion and a deed not for the immediate satisfaction, but because he had experienced them before :—relying no longer on sight or smell for sensation, but upon a power within himself which links him with the past? To the historian such a question is crucial for with this instrument men first discovered a social capacity.

Henceforth he became conservative, he honoured Tradition and Custom (27); he and his fellows are no longer a flock or pack, held together by stress of appetite, each forgotten by his fellows as soon as he passes beyond the bounds of sense : he now carries within himself a store of good things which he can share with his fellows without loss.

The existence and utility of groups is evidently bound up with this fundamental element. It serves as a balance-wheel to steady the impulse to change (see Appendix I.). In an age when the size of human society threatens to overwhelm the individual, when rapidity of transport and communication lead men to break loose from old moorings, memory abides steadfast, history keeps its records and man finds wisdom and strength by resting on the affections and images of days gone by.

Hence a preliminary classification of groups is to hand (28). A crowd is useless because it is ephemeral : for an hour it is swayed by a fleeting passion and can wreak some mischief : then a whiff of grape-shot will dissolve it ! But if the passion is deep-seated, the need elemental, if the ideas stand firm in many minds, the mob becomes consolidated, organization is adopted and a new institution is born. Thus a stringent law is imposed on the social pioneer : —his group must stand the test of time. The prophet, confident of his new message, bids all men flock to his banner and is impatient of delay : but the wise old world can wait and see.

Time and Place combine to give definition to groups through the agency of emblems and symbols (Chap. X.), for through these means the resources of tradition are reinforced through the senses. The visible tangible world which, in the individual with his bodily structure, constitutes one aspect of personality, of body-mind, serves a like purpose in community. The symbols and signs are not mere embellishments of an institution, they claim to be a part of the institution, identified with it;

through them the group expresses its mind. The institution always struggles to raise itself above the lower level of sense and time :—and always fails ! Most of all it would appear in religion, the great theatre of conflict between body and soul. God is a spirit and can be worshipped in temples built without hands, but the people of Israel, when the prophet was lost to sight, forgot Jehovah, and—“There came out this calf !” And so all the fine arts (see p. 278) are placed at the service of society to perpetuate, to institutionalize, the thoughts and sentiments which inspire the members of a group. The very universe, to a poet such as Goethe, is—

“The garment thou seest Him by.”

We are thus led to a clear distinction between the reach of the individual mind and of the group. The Hebrew race was under the special guardianship of the Eternal, enduring for ever : the individual perishes, the race lives on under the shadow of the Eternal. Place, shape, symbol, are of minor account : ‘Our God is in the heavens’ : but endurance in time was the essence of the revelation to ‘Abraham, the righteous convert.’ Thus the group becomes immortal and we are prepared to revise our conception of time and old age under the instruction of a philosopher (29).

The biologist shews us the same principle at work in lower forms of life. Trotter, for example, describes the hive of bees as “a new animal which differs from others . . . not merely in its immense power, energy, and flexibility, but in the almost startling fact that it has recovered the gift of immortality which seemed to have been lost with its protozoal ancestors” (30). It would lead to dangerous phantasy if we carried these conceptions too far. The Hebrew race has endured, with a vivid consciousness of race and tradition ; a swarm of bees survives and renews the swarm : but “all things suffer change,” to be accomplished both by the death of

individuals and by the modifications of environment. The Hebrews of to-day are not the Hebrews of an earlier day : every group struggles against dissolution and maintains a social continuity beyond the individual reach ; yet the forces of variation and change are always at work. A society, a party, may keep its old name, assemble in the ancient precincts, even rehearse the sacred words ; and yet to the detached observer the minds of the worshippers are seen to be re-formed. Lord Salisbury, in a careless moment, spoke of Spain as being among "the decadent nations," and evidently would have claimed that peoples, like individuals, can die. In a few instances a group definitely breaks up by formal act ; a partnership is dissolved ; a group of rebels, acting for five days as a republic, surrenders, scatters ; the common mind lingers only in the memory. In most cases the moment of decease cannot be traced ; for the regulations and symbols which publish a union of minds are not the essence of the contract. It is possible for men to keep alive the memory of great deeds, to feel their power, to act upon their stimulus in epochs when to all appearance a new world has quite effaced the old. At what moment did the Hellas, which both taught the world and led it captive cease, to be worthy of its heroic name ?

Corporate Life creates—and destroys—institutions.

We need not digress into vexed problems concerned with the continuity of nations, of churches, or of other groups : it is obvious that some groups disappear, for a group only abides at the will of its members, and if they at any given moment decide to separate, the group ceases to live. The Kingdom of Greece at this moment exists as a vigorous aggressive community : some of its members claim that they are the successors of the heroes of Hellas : but it is certain that two hundred years ago very few persons in those regions behaved as members of any group that could be called by that glorious name. Ancient customs in dress and speech, along with frag-

ments of ballad and song survived; Delphi and the Parthenon have escaped the ravages of conquest, but the modern people which calls itself the Hellenes cannot live upon those memories; new institutions developed from new standards of virtue must be devised if the Greek of to-day is to claim prestige and authority side by side with his competitors in the Levant.

Institutions are the forms in which a group establishes and maintains its life. The element of time is evidently attached to this word 'institution': it represents something stable, something that will stand. Thus any given family is a group whose existence is limited although family life and marriage are institutions which abide. "Institutions are forms, established forms of relationship between social beings in respect either simply of one another (as in the institution of rank) or of some external object (as in the institution of property)" (31). When once an institution has become established it exercises control over the groups that have created it; and one of the main purposes of rebellion is to create new groups that will destroy effete institutions. Unhappily some reformers fail to realize that order is necessary to social life and that institutions of some kind are necessary as guides, permanent guides for behaviour. Hence it is not enough for the reformer to destroy: he and his group must be prepared with new institutions which will stand. This explains why most revolutions fail: men must live, most men at least are not prepared to die, and they live as social beings bound up with institutions which their ancestors created. To the Japanese the institution of The Mikado is essential to life; it serves them both for religion and politics; to many scholars academic institutions are indispensable. The principles of religion, of politics, of research which these institutions express are eternal, but the institutions themselves may be destroyed. We live in an epoch where all institutions are being tried by fire and sword. But their

death cannot be hastened; new forms of association are secretly growing into bud and preparing to blossom into leaf and flower : let time take its course ; the decaying leaves of the old year will fall, old customs will dissolve so soon as the youthful energies of a new epoch are ready to take their place.

Property as an institution.—We cannot avoid some further notice of institutions of property, for they hold a distinctive position in regard to the individual and to corporate life. Property is an affair both of number, space and time ; its origins trace back to animal and insect life (32) : the individual owns not only his own body but all the tangible goods that he and his fellows need to maintain life and to achieve progress. Even a debating society must own a minute book and secure a room with seats for the members.

Because of this dependence of the spiritual life upon material support, property took shape in the pagan mind as one main object of existence, and the progress of civilization has not so far released men from the bondage of this conception.

“ Motive for individual exertion must nevertheless be preserved. . . . The only instinct in our race which is sufficiently universal to supply this motive is the desire to accumulate property, generally as a provision for offspring. Other instincts, such as emulation, the altruistic emotions, or the mere love of activity, may all be strongly developed in some, but they are permanent in very few individuals. They are apt to weaken after adolescence, and to disappear as middle age supervenes.”

We need not argue at length the issues raised by this passage (33). Every man must decide for himself whether he does regard the enjoyments that spring from property as the chief impulse of life, and as a consequence is prepared with Bateson to combine with his class to accumulate and defend property against all competitors.

Such a view gives an overwhelming bias to a man's theory of corporate life. He is compelled to base his conception of power (Chap. V.), individual power and social

power, upon conflict as the permanent and final feature in human behaviour; the ideal of unity, of love as the goal of endeavour, is necessarily excluded. If Bateson's view of development be accepted, altruism is just an instinct or an emotion incidental to the period of adolescence.

Without anticipating the theme of later chapters let us be clear as to the rôle played by property in the structure of society. In essence property is an individual affair, *proprium*, my own: the more a piece of money or furniture or land is at my personal disposal the more it is mine; my personality expresses itself through the clothes, the dwelling, the food, the transport which I "enjoy."

The infant early discovers this relation between himself and his possessions; if badly brought up he may never lose this infantile bias and may always suppose, as Bateson suggests, that a man's life "consisteth in the abundance of goods which he possesseth." But persons who have the good fortune to develop more happily come to realize the social conditions which put property, as we say, 'in its place.' These are principally two: (a) although my goods are mine, allotted to me by custom and law, my own personal efforts have had very little to do with the situation: if I had been left alone, a solitary agent against nature, how much could I have appropriated? I may claim power through property and may wield that power, dominating both nature and my fellow men and believing that I am a personality that must be reckoned with:—but I am what I am solely because society has been my benefactor. Society has given me property and if a new social order demands new institutions, may it not take back what it has given? This is the sociological basis of taxes on property and income. (b) The second condition answers that question, for it discovers a path to unity instead of opening up a social conflict. As a child I loved my toys, just as the owner loves his property: but a spiritual life develops, the

idea gains ground that "man does not live by bread alone"; property takes on a new aspect, no longer as end but as means; and even then not as the most important means. So far as this conception extends among large masses of men, it is evident they will accept a new social order. New institutions may be developed encouraging men to forego property, to return it to 'society,' to unload luxuries and superfluities with a satisfaction equal to that attributed by some scientists to an instinct of accumulation.

We do not describe these conditions as doctrines or matters of faith, but as bald fact, biological fact, plain to observation and experience. And the conclusion for sociology is evident. Just so far as men feel unity with their fellows, with this or that group, just so far will they desire to share property, to create new customs and institutions, adapted to a new relation between the individual and society. He who believes that power (whether exercised through concrete property or through property in ideas), is solely an individual affair deceives himself: he who believes that the individual can enjoy life better by renouncing dominance, by sharing power with his fellows, is in line with the inevitable laws of progress: he forsakes what Tawney calls the *Acquisitive Society* (34) and seeks a new communion.

Public Property.—Finally it must be noted that property is distinguished as being sometimes public and sometimes private: the more private it is the more it is my very own. The so-called instinct for property ought not to be labelled with the term *instinct* at all: the phenomenon is just one mark of the expansion of self, of individuality maintaining itself against other selves. The desire for accumulating property is not essential to personality: the story of Andrew Carnegie exhibits a pathetic instance of a remarkable personality who sought in vain to reach a higher level by unloading his wealth. Hence the trend is towards *sharing* property;

we have a stake in the country ; in our city we are part owners of tramways and the electric supply ; we pay subscriptions to all sorts of societies ; we thus extend our personality and our property by the same act.

Now the eager socialist believes that the world is ripe for a universal transfer, but the process is long drawn out and if social revolution comes it will not succeed merely as an economic change, promoting community in goods but as a spiritual change, converting men to brotherhood in every region of behaviour. For, as we noted above, there is property in ideas ; you can patent an idea in bootlaces and turn thought into ' real ' property, so-called ; you can get a royalty on your book and achieve a like purpose. In all such cases there is the conflict between privacy and publicity (p. 51). Men do not relish too much publicity about their income or their investments : these things appear to be of the essence of intimacy. We shall meet again with the problem of intimacy or secrecy when we consider the nature of primary groups, and again in dealing with Discussion as the first element in Organization. The national organization is the greatest property controller, and even a democratic government sometimes resents a vulgar publicity. It is asserted that if the public knew the facts about petroleum wells in Europe and Asia the entire programme of international policy would bear a new aspect : this may be merely an envious libel put about by shareholders in collieries, but it may serve as an illustration. The proprietor does not desire the public to know, for secrecy is requisite to the success of his business : even if publicity did not ruin the venture it would endanger the chances of extension. The student of sociology must therefore include within his range a consideration of the limits within which this sense of privacy in property ranges, for social heredity confers the sentiment upon every child and stamps our minds from infancy with the image of possession.

CHAPTER III

COMMUNICATION

The nerves, so to speak, of society. Number, Time, Space are universal relations and demand consideration in every systematic structure; we now proceed to relations more closely concerned with animated nature. The group is our unit, but it is a composite unit, and the persons who act as individuals "within" it must make exchange, must communicate if the group is to live: corporate life in fact can only be conceived as originating when the members found means of changing views, of learning each others' mind.

This exchange is often pictured as a process analogous to the nervous system of the body: organism of the one, organization of the other. The analogy is worked out in detail:—the eye is said to "report" viâ the brain to the hand; or the hand touching an object requests the brain to take an observation:—the eye obeys, or perchance declines to obey: the brain at headquarters directs proceedings, anyway it keeps the minutes and makes a record of all transactions. Some devices of communication, especially in their modern forms of telephone and wireless, can certainly be compared to the behaviour of the nervous system, but these specific devices must not be understood as covering the whole field. A man will use anything and everything as a means of communication with his neighbour; thus our schoolboys in their game of hare-and-hounds tear up *The Daily Rag*,

converting mere waste paper into a reliable means of communication : every act performed by a man is, or may become, a sign to his fellows. So this analogy with the nervous system soon becomes threadbare : for the important point to keep in mind is that the external world of perception and of act, which first serves the individual to enlarge his experience, serves him also to exchange experience with the *alter*. In other words any act or occurrence may have a double meaning ; it may stand just for itself—a table, a noise, a shade of colour ; or it may be interpreted to mean something else, to those who know the code. I see a flock of mountain sheep on the moor, and by good luck I notice one of them sharply moving its hind foot ; the flock run away to the distant slope, and the farmer's lad at my side tells me that the sharp tap of the foot was a signal, heard by all the flock, who thereupon stampeded up the hill.

Thus means of communication took their rise as the necessary accompaniment or organ of social life : the life itself is mental, inner, spiritual :—only by such terms can the existence of mind be described ; the means of communication are the tangible, audible, visible devices, external or outer, which submit themselves for use. And not only for use, but for enjoyment ; man converts useful art to fine art : bald letters become literature, lines and curves become pictures. Thus we can scarcely separate in experience the outer from the inner, although by reflection we can analyse them apart. Every advance in human capacity implies a further complexity and evolutions of these instruments.

In Trotter's *Instincts of the Herd* we find a picturesque account of the rôle played by communication in the past. "Nature" had failed with the great creatures who had survived in solitude ; she broke up, so to speak, the gross unit and experimented with smaller bodies which were united only in mind, but the mind of the individual was so disposed as to make union in action and policy

imperative; thus a pack of wolves over against the mastodon (a great 'state' of cells) behaved as one wolf; in the mastodon there was a union of cells, but this union only allowed of a slight variety or freedom in action for each cell; the pack of wolves proved itself fittest to survive just because each wolf could, within his sphere, be free to attack as he chose, while using the language of the pack to communicate a common policy. The author thereupon transfers the argument to anthropology.

"The flock, the herd, the pack, the swarm . . . new creatures all, flourished and ranged the world. Their power depended on the capacity for inter-communication amongst their members, and expanded until the limits of this were reached. As long as intercourse was limited the full possibilities of the new experiment were concealed, but at length appeared a creature in whom this capacity could develop indefinitely. At once a power of new magnitude was manifest. Puny as were his individuals, a man's capacity for communication soon made him master of the world. The very quality however which gave him success introduced a new complication in his fate. His brain power allowed him to speak and understand and so to communicate and combine more effectively than any other animal; his brain power gave him individuality and egoism, and the possibility of varied reaction which enabled him to obey the voice of instinct after the fashion of his own heart. All combination therefore was irregular, inordinate, and only very slowly progressive. He has even at times wandered into blind paths where the possibility of progressive combination is lost.

Nevertheless the needs and capacities that were at work in the primeval amoeba are at work in him. In his very flesh and bones is the impulse towards closer and closer union in larger and larger fellowships. To-day he is fighting his way towards that goal, fighting for the perfect unit which Nature has so long foreshadowed, in which there shall be a complete communion of its members, unobstructed by egoism or hatred, by harshness or arrogance or the wolfish lust for blood. That perfect unit will be a new creature, recognizable as a single entity; to its million-minded power and knowledge no barrier will be insurmountable, no gulf impassable, no task too great" (35).

Progress relies upon advance in communication.—This vision is afar off, and we cannot accept the author's conception of a new heaven in a new earth; the contemplation of his eloquence helps us, however, to

realize gesture, language, telegraph, wireless, paper and printing as instruments in a vast evolution and not mere devices of a scholastic system. The changes which have made language, written and printed, so mighty a force in development are not those connected with philosophy and grammar, with the schoolroom and the lesson, but are to be attributed to two sources, the one mental and social, the other material. At first man used language, as animals and little children do, for bare communication on the perceptual plane : but he evolved all sorts of complications in idea and feeling, using speech as the medium in which this higher life found expression :—“ In the beginning ”—the beginning of all higher spiritual life—“ was the Word.” No wonder that men still reverence Bible and Koran, no wonder that libraries are held by some to be more sacred than temples.

But the material advances were equally important : first came the discovery of means for permanent record : a solid tablet of stone, a sacred fire, or a least a lamp that never goes out, these lead on to clay which receives the record and then secures its permanence by the fire of the kiln ; and finally to parchment and paper which in small compass can convey a full tradition. The statutes and the oracles, treaties signed and sealed, become the symbols of a settled society (see Chap. X. below).

In early epoch these were costly instruments, confined to the dominant class who jealously guarded the mysteries of Letters : but presently new and cheap materials were discovered, learning was diffused and, from the point of view of pedants, the diffusion of learning involved its degradation. We commonly attribute the diffusion of letters in the 16th Century to the invention of Gutenberg, but it seems that the discovery of cheaper materials for making paper was equally responsible : for there appear to have been earlier and quite successful efforts in cutting wooden type forms, but they were not utilized simply because the supply of paper was too

scanty. *The Times* of May 27th, 1816, cost 7d., and published the following item of news (it was reprinted on the same date in 1916, price 1d.) :—

“ At the late installation of the French Academy, M. Cuvier, perpetual secretary, read some observations on the progress of the sciences, and their relations with society. The following remarks of his on the application of the steam-engine may give rise to some reflections in the mind of the English reader: ‘ A vessel has crossed the sea without sails, without oars, without scamen. One man to keep up the fire, another to guide the helm, are all its crew, it is propelled by an internal force, like an animated being, like a bird of the sea floating on the waves—to use the captain’s expression. Everyone perceives to what an extent this invention will simplify the navigation of our rivers, and the saving that it may create in men and horses: but we may also be permitted to look forward to consequences more remote, and perhaps of still higher importance—namely, the change which may result from it in maritime war, and the power of nations. It is extremely probable that it will be placed, in some future time, in the list of experiments which have changed the face of the globe.’ ”

The diffusion of correspondence books, newspapers; the easy passage of a man by water, train or aeroplane from place to place, have given him a new life: they have multiplied enormously the variety of his interests, so that while in one aspect every man appears to be taking his own course in isolation they have served out to all of us an immense common supply of commonplace ideas and feelings so that the bulk of us, in another aspect, appear to be as uniform in our tastes and reactions as a row of pins.

In days when the telephone and wireless have once again extended the material devices for communication, it is natural that men should reflect profoundly upon the rôle played by such machinery since man first made use of signs, and thus explored beyond the bounds of sense. Some hold that mind can interchange with mind in a process called telepathy without *any* sensible medium; and others, refusing to see in the dissolution of the body an end to mental life, believe and seek to prove that the bond still holds, and keeps open channels of communi-

cation between the quick and the dead. Such inquiries carry us beyond our province; they serve, however, to impress a student with the supreme importance of communication in the story of evolution; they display the anxiety of man, equipped with these enlarging faculties, to wrest from the future those secrets of which the past can tell him so little.

But the progress is chequered.—These few words may suffice to indicate the function of communication. If the reader is interested, he should study the section devoted to this theme in Cooley's *Social Organization*, especially noting his discussion of current controversies on the development of individuality, since the time when De Tocqueville visited America and expounded the "dead-level" theory. I have referred to this problem in Chap. V. where we discuss uniformity as a characteristic of every social group. Cooley's application of the contrast between solitude and society to the competition of town with country is much to the point at the present time in Great Britain; and equally valuable is the discussion of the pathological effects of stimulation:—"superficiality" in the bulk of our population, "strain" among the few are the inevitable price that our generation has to pay in return for the benefits of an enlarged grasp; we have experienced the opportunities created by rapid exchange and diffusion before the race has become adapted either in body or mind to new arts of self-control. But there is no ground for pessimism. These changes

"in a general way mean the expansion of human nature, that is to say, of its power to express itself in social wholes. They make it possible for society to be organised more and more on the higher faculties of man, on intelligence and sympathy rather than on authority, caste, and routine. The general character of this change is well expressed by the two words *enlargement* and *animation*. Social contacts are extended in space and quickened in time, and in the same degree the mental unity they imply becomes more and more alert. . . . From whatever point of view we study modern society to compare it with the past or forecast

the future we ought to keep at least a subconsciousness of this radical change in mechanism, without allowing for which nothing else can be understood " (36).

The newspaper Cooley regards as playing the most distinctive rôle in this enlargement, as a potent weapon in the creation of public opinion, and as replacing the chatter and gossip of an earlier epoch. And as regards politics what Cooley wrote in the United States ten years ago is almost identical with the outlook of President Wilson in the speeches, to which I have referred above, under the title *The New Freedom*. It may be taken for granted that the personal victory of Wilson was the triumph of a new political philosophy, giving an interpretation of democracy which as yet is little understood in Europe.

" One is often impressed by the thought that there ought to be some wider name for the modern movement than democracy, some name which should more distinctly suggest the enlargement and quickening of the general mind, of which the formal rule of the people is only one among many manifestations. The current of new life that is sweeping with augmenting force through the older structures of society, now carrying them away, now leaving them outwardly undisturbed, has no adequate name. Our time is one of large discourse, looking before and after. . . . The enlargement affects not only thought, but feeling, favouring the growth of a sense of common humanity, of moral unity between nations, races and classes. Among members of a communicating whole, feeling may not always be friendly, but it must be, in some sense, sympathetic, involving some consciousness of the other's point of view. Even the animosities of modern nations are of a human and imaginative sort, not the blind hostility of a more primitive age. They are resentments, and resentment (as Charles Lamb said) is of the family of love.

With a mind enlarged and supplied by such training, the man of to-day inclines to look for a common nature everywhere, and to demand that the whole world shall be brought under the sway of common principles of kindness and justice. He wants to see international strife allayed—in such a way, however, as not to prevent the expansion of capable races and the survival of better types; he wishes the friction of classes reduced and each interest fairly treated—but without checking individuality and enterprise. There was never so general an eagerness that righteousness should prevail; the chief matter of dispute is upon the principles under which it may be established.

The work of communication in enlarging human nature is partly immediate, through facilitating contact, but even more it is indirect, through favouring the increase of intelligence, the decline of mechanical and arbitrary forms of organization, and the rise of a more humane type of society. History may be regarded as a record of the struggle of man to realize his aspirations through organization: and the new communication is an efficient tool for this purpose. Assuming that the human heart and conscience, restricted only by the difficulties of organization, is the arbiter of what institutions are to become, we may expect the facility of intercourse to be the starting-point of an era of moral progress " (37).

And primitive modes of communication cannot be superseded.—The popular mind in our epoch is therefore justified in its eager welcome to the motor car and all the other instruments of science as means by which humanity may enlarge its range and power: at the same time we fall into error if we seek to substitute these resources for the primitive means by which each of us influences his neighbour in face-to-face intercourse. In spite of the great achievements of the schoolroom where the teacher rejoices in every new device from the abacus to the cinema, the common people still distrust science and book learning. In the daily life of societies the children learn not only the arts of social behaviour but they learn the arts of industry through familiar exchange in the home and the street. A striking instance was reported to me from an experiment in the Yorkshire woollen industry. Some manufacturers sought to extend the area from which female labour could be procured by erecting mills in Wakefield and Doncaster, where the population was chiefly engaged in agriculture and the children presumably enjoyed a finer physique than was the lot of those brought up in the congested areas of industrial districts. The experiment, so I was informed, was a failure; the labour of these young people week by week, even after they had been taught the trade, produced so much less profit that the looms had to be abandoned and the mills adapted to other purposes.

The explanation given was that in the industrial valleys of Yorkshire a special craft ability had been developed during the last two hundred years, so that the children of, say, Cleckheaton are born with 'the weaver's touch' in their fingers, whereas the rosy faced lasses of an agricultural area possess fingers which are all thumbs when they handle the loom or shuttle. But we need not lay the case before Lamarckians and neo-Lamarckians; we cannot conceive of the physical inheritance of such a 'character,' 'selected' at most during six generations. The situation is more simply resolved by acknowledging the pervading influence of daily exchange in social life. People in these industrial valleys where every one goes to the mill are talking wool all the time! The children hear of bobbins and shuttles as soon as they hear of anything; it is sight and sound and communication, incessant and variegated, on this theme which give a bias to their minds; in other words it is *social heredity acting through incessant communication*, not physical heredity, which explains the story. The interest of the craft, pursued first in the home before mills were started and then carried over by the same community into factory life, enables a distinctive trade to flourish among the factory people of the present day. We should not infer from this example that work in machine shops cannot be established among a population which has never had experience of machinery, for a great deal of such work is now-a-days mere repetition work, requiring from the young wage-earner nothing more than quick response to the motions of a wheel or tool. The woollen industry demands an interest in wool, in the fabric as well as in the machinery; it is a craft whose members from the highest to the lowest share life-long experiences in the handling of a specific material.

We offer this illustration as typifying the social forces which create social groups in industry, as in every region of activity. New inventions in communication

are reshaping the powers of each generation and at times we are so fascinated by their range as to forget that men still live as simple human beings among their immediate fellows, as personalities not as hands or employees. The task of the organizer in this epoch is to keep the balance between the personal life of primary groups, relying on our ancient forms of intercourse and the collective impersonal life of man-in-the-mass, governed by our new devices of communication; these may raise a man to new heights or may lower him to the status of a machine.

Publicity.—Every topic in our study raises a moral problem. We have treated the diffusion of knowledge as if it were a matter of course that everybody should know everything: progress we say depends upon this diffusion. On the other hand we noticed just now that in earlier epochs the dominant class guarded the portals of learning: ‘a little knowledge,’ said they, ‘is a dangerous thing.’ As we saw in the last chapter there is property in ideas, in information as well as in land or goods; and anything which is of value to the community may be made of value to an individual: so a man, or a company or a class, capture both the means of communication and the actual information which these means distribute. The process is analogous to the mechanical devices by which man controls air and water. A man erects a reservoir or a windmill; by so doing he certainly brings new power or new health to his fellows, but he thereby confines and appropriates these resources and only shares the benefit with those whom he selects. ‘Knowledge is power,’ and because it is so powerful, the self-regarding sentiments of men induce us to retain it, or to dispose of it at a price. This aspect of communication may be illustrated from many points of view: especially from the curriculum of schools, where much knowledge is imparted, but under conditions which prevent it from being turned into power.

In affairs of politics and industry the term publicity

is employed to indicate the demand for giving knowledge to those who have a right to secure it. Research associations are established to enable those who control manufacture to share the discoveries made by men of science, so that all manufacturers may adopt the improvements. Our present Government (1919) has gone further : it is concerned not only for the communication of technical knowledge, but for publicity as to the profits which ensue from advance in technical efficiency.

“The combinations, themselves, whether associations, combines or great consolidations, have a heavy responsibility resting upon them. It is for them, in their own interests and in the public interest, to abandon their traditional policy of secrecy and take pains to make known the facts as to their arrangements and operations. By so doing they would avoid the suspicion and ill-feeling which at present hamper their more beneficial activities, and they would be doing voluntarily and with a good grace what public opinion will anyway compel them to do if the policy of secrecy is persisted in” (38).

The following passage, fathered by Lord Milner, is even more emphatic :—

“It is a vital part of this problem that whatever is not done openly now, whatever is not clearly and fully explained now so that most workmen and most employers understand it, will be misinterpreted and blocked by popular distrust. . . . It is an idle dream, and all too prevalent a dream, to suppose that any great economic re-organization can be brought about by quiet meetings of bankers and big business men and unobtrusive bargains with Government departments. The workers are going to be restive at any changes they cannot understand and watch. Whatever reorganization is attempted must be done in the daylight; it must be set out quite plainly in the popular press” (39).

In politics the same demand is manifested. Voters want to know how candidates are selected for them, who devises the points of a party programme, who contributes to the party funds which pay the cost of elections and secure a party press.

Those who withhold knowledge are not always self-seeking : they plead that publicity would injure the cause which they have at heart; their rivals are unscrupulous; the public would misunderstand the facts;

the common people must trust the officials, the leaders, the representatives (Chap. IX.), and believe in the integrity of those who act on their behalf. These pleas on behalf of secrecy contain a measure of truth: no individual can thoroughly master the facts which guide the masters of big finance, big politics, big industry; and it is equally difficult for these great men to know the social mind of the multitude whose destinies they control. As our study develops we shall see how the compromise between publicity and secrecy depends upon the development not only of an enhanced social capacity but upon the acceptance over a wider area of the spirit of solidarity and altruism. Meanwhile the trend of the times seems to be clear:—those who withhold knowledge must justify their position: their action may be right, but it is exceptional and open to challenge. The old order is reversed: in a society directed by Authority (see p. 166 below) both the arts of communication and the knowledge acquired thereby were reserved to the high priests alike of religion, of learning, of statecraft and of commerce: only such information was vouchsafed to the world at large as would help the elect to maintain their seat of authority. In a society whose watchwords are Citizenship and Democracy, both distribution and the application of knowledge are essential to progress; and each example of reservation and denial must be justified as a temporary and provisional safeguard of the public interest; those who hold back this source of power must make it clear that their motives are inspired by devotion to the commonweal: when the ordinary members of a group have confidence in their representatives and leaders they are content with scanty knowledge; but when the spirit of unity is endangered the only remedy is to publish all the facts, to ‘take your people into your confidence’ and leave the consequences in *their* hands.

We have now reviewed some of the elementary data

on which a systematic scheme of sociology is constructed : before continuing this analysis of general principles we shall be helped by turning to the past. We have already made incidental references to evolution : it seems necessary to spend a chapter exclusively on the steps by which corporate life has shaped itself as an expansion of individual existence since man entered on his heritage.

CHAPTER IV

GENESIS

From Herbert Spencer to 1914.—When we contemplate corporate life about us in terms of purpose or function, the scene at first presents a motley of confusion. Since the opening of the War, the passions of men have been stirred to an exalted pitch : we are compelled to inquire afresh what real purpose is served by this or that combination. Sentiments such as loyalty or patriotism make fresh claims : the appeal of nationalism, brotherhood, comradeship-in-arms arouses a fervour which to our grandfathers would have seemed incredible. They appeared to regard society as an extra, superimposed upon and accessory to the individual. As schoolboys forty years ago we pattered *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori* : but we scarcely imagined that this ancient motto applied to ourselves, or to our kith and kin. No one can read Herbert Spencer, for example, without feeling that his age was obsessed by egoistic views about the purposes of life which have already lost much of their force. Not that the Englishman of the sixties was an un-social person : far from it :—the intuitive sympathies which led him to seek fellowship and display loyalty kept his individualism in check. Nevertheless the varied conceptions of personal freedom, gathering in force since the Renaissance (see p. 14 above), aided latterly by a crude application of Liberal theory to the practice of industrial competition, tended to obscure the naïve intuitions of social purpose. The teaching of his time instructed a man that his own will, his own resources, his own destiny made an exclusive claim on his regard.

The change since those days may be witnessed not only in politics and trade, but in religious groups. In those days the minister dealt with the individual; personal exhortation to save the soul was the theme of the pulpit, pastoral visitation followed up the message. To-day the churches are more conscious of social forces; the High Church movement at one extreme and the Salvation Army with its Social Service at the other, have laid hold of many on that account: the personal relation between the soul and the Source is not ignored, but a higher emphasis is laid on the social mind (40). In politics the War precipitated the issue with great suddenness, letting loose forces of cohesion of which economic socialism was a precursor. Many were not prepared for conversion:—and the inner conflict has been acute. The intellect, schooled by an individualistic philosophy, bids a man assert ‘himself’: his intuitions lead him to follow the crowd and surrender himself:—to England, to the duty of succouring Belgium, to the defence of ‘humanity,’ to the suppression of (Prussian) militarism. We dwell on this episode because it should illustrate a principle of progress. It appears that reason has been on the side of self, blind impulse and intuition on the side of sociality. But reason, on behalf of the community, can also be set to work; for if, as we assumed, self and alter, individual mind and social mind, are only two aspects of one experience, why allow the conflict? Indeed the conflict abates as soon as man, turned sociologist, fully recognizes the essential unity of himself *with* his social milieu. For he then admits consciously that his function is social as much as personal; he then of set purpose allows himself to be identified with social groups. Even the compulsion exercised by the State (compare Chap. VII., p. 172) becomes no longer a cause of conflict, but an expression of union, of solidarity. When the cause is sublime, the surrender of self becomes pleasure rather than pain.

Are we then to run from one extreme to the other? Having been crass individualists in one age, are we to be fanatically devoted to the state, or to any one social group, in the next? There are signs that the pendulum may swing to such an extreme; those who desire to preserve the Golden Mean may be assisted by turning to the past. We may devote a few pages to seeing what light can be thrown upon our study by regarding it from the standpoint of evolution.

Evolution can be traced in three directions.—Herbert Spencer, we see, was a product of his age; opinion in these days advances so rapidly that fifty years suffices to reshape men's thoughts more fully than two hundred years at an earlier epoch, when the arts of communication were less advanced. He is regarded as out of date and yet he pointed out the road by which a clear view may be secured :—he taught us to apply without flinching the principle of evolution to the story of man; if in the application of this principle we reach a goal widely apart from his we should not fail to honour him as a pioneer in sociology.

Now a general assent to a doctrine of evolution is easy; this has indeed become part and parcel of our mode of thinking. When, however, we seek to subject any department of human behaviour to an evolutionary scheme we begin to realize the difficulty of the task : we discover that our assent was largely a matter of faith; we have to study the methods of eminent biologists and psychologists before we can even grasp the data on which a scheme of social evolution can be erected. It might be prudent, therefore, for us, since we are engaged on an elementary study of things as they are, to ignore the past, content to accept the obvious fact that the individual *does* live by social intercourse—and leave it at that. One reason for interposing some reflections on genesis is the belief that the readers of this book, like the writer, are prone to curiosity, and

in our epoch this impulse turns largely to history; we think that we understand both ourselves and the world about us better if we secure a glimpse of how things came to be; we feel that life is more reasonable if we can arrange any one of its features in a series. We believe also that Genesis and Revelation are part of one book: if we can plot the curve in its beginnings, may we not secure a glimpse of its further course? Some may hold that the curve is not progressive: what is late in time may be degenerate in quality: it was held for example by Alfred Russel Wallace that our ethical ideals are not so advanced as those of the Greeks in their heroic days (41). But whatever be our view as to advancement, the past has quite a definite relation to the present. "We must acknowledge that man, with all his noble qualities . . . with all these exalted powers,—man still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin" (42). And Darwin need not have restricted his dictum to the bodily frame, for the mind of Man, social or solitary, is the last chapter in a story which traces back to the dust: the explanation of function and design must be sought in the history of his ancestry.

The most elementary study of sociological literature shews how engrossed its students have been with this point of view. Thus Trotter's *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* declares that "any real understanding of man's behaviour must depend upon a knowledge of the relation his mind bears to those of the lower animals" (43). A few months before the appearance of that book, Professor Keller of Yale published "*Societal Evolution, a Study of the Evolutionary basis of the Science of Society*" (44); envious of the biologists, who have attained such confidence in handling variation, selection, transmission, adaptation, he attempts boldly to take over these principles and prove their validity in the development of human society. We refer to these two books not because they are of the first rank, but as evidence of the

persistent effort to explain the problem of humanity in terms of the complex series of organisms of which man appears as the highest phase.

There seem to be three directions in which the evolutionist can work in seeking to interpret corporate life. Man has attained to his present height *firstly*, in contrast to the animal world, and the biologist compares animal societies with the types evolved in man; *secondly*, modern man displays a social capacity more complicated than that of primitive or savage man: as heir of all the ages he learns something of the nature of his inheritance by consulting his ancestors: the anthropologist here seeks to establish an evolutionary series; *thirdly*, the single individual fully grown exhibits capacities which were latent in the cradle, but have developed by stages with advancing years: the child-psychologist now takes up the theme and seeks a recapitulatory theory. On each line of development the investigator is tempted to argue by analogy, from one of the three to the other two; and, true enough, the evidence reached on one line often suggests a clue which may be worth tracking on another line. For example, Baldwin (45) finds a period of social reaction in infancy parallel to the pastoral peaceful life of man such as is described in the Book of Genesis. It is obvious, however, that argument by analogy may readily lead to disaster; we must admit as a general principle that in each of these three directions evolution is to be witnessed, but it may well be that the evolutionary scheme in the essential details is so different in the three worlds of Biology, Anthropology, and Child Psychology as to render any argument by analogy worthless. Thus Trotter describes Germany as "a State in which prevails a primitive type of the gregarious instinct—the aggressive—a type which shews the closest resemblance in its needs, its ideals, and its reactions to the society of the wolf-pack" (46); the comparison is suggestive, but is it scientific? I mean, may it not

lead us as much towards error as towards truth? One feels great admiration for the forceful and eloquent style of this remarkable study; his argument on behalf of altruism may well be presented to scientists of the opposite school who affirm that instincts of self-preservation or of property are the chief guide to conduct: but both the altruists and the egoists are relying upon defective psychology: men are not 'good' because they possess a gregarious instinct, nor 'bad' because they are compelled by instinct, as some hold, to acquire property.

We shall not attempt here any such adventurous conclusions. Our preceding chapters have given a sketch of 'the social mind' as we witness it operating in ourselves and our neighbours. Can we, by turning our attention to origins, discern to any degree the stages by which we have arrived at such capacity? We regard ourselves on the summit of civilization, as *the* successful variation: (a) insects and animals have, on certain lines of social combination, achieved extraordinary results, but we are their masters; (b) other humans, savage or less completely civilized than ourselves, have co-operated with great skill and reached great distinction, but we pride ourselves that our particular type is master once more: the line of ancestry which we have pursued, in which social capacity has certainly been one factor, appears to have evolved into a group of races which so far have held their own. Can we trace the course of evolution here? And (c) as regards children, common observation shews us that social qualities and habits are indispensable to individual development. Let us then inquire how far these three lines of development can throw light upon current problems of corporate life.

The animal world and the lowest forms of life.—

“Talk of mountains now?

We talk of mould that heaps the mountains, mites
That throng the mould, and God that makes the
mites” (47).

Long before anything approaching a social mind, with emotion, intelligence, will, can be postulated, we have to conceive the basis for this structure in the lowly existence of multi-cellular organisms, furnished solely with appetite. However remote from the thoughts and ideals of man, we must allow the story of evolution to start at the first chapter, remembering that the germ-plasm of every individual was an organism impelled by that lowest type of behaviour which we call appetite; remembering too that the body, this earthly tabernacle, continues to manifest those appetites, however much they may be 'sublimed' or controlled; nay more, when appetite is gone, life is gone: if individual existences abide after the process called death, such phenomena lie outside the sphere of organic evolution.

What then is appetite? It is the lowest form of desire (48) of seeking. Every living tissue seeks, it would appear, to continue in time, to go on in a straight line so to speak; it also seeks to vary the straight line, to achieve something different; there is a static, conservative impulse, there is also a dynamic, innovating progressive impulse. The first is appetite for food and for excretion; let us say for sustenance; for movement in space and for repose from movement; for reproduction and succession.

The lowest forms of life appear to display these appetites; the individual cannot continue living unless it seeks food and discharges what is injurious, unless it moves and balances activity with rest; and when the individual has exhausted its life, the race must continue. The uni-cellular organism displays these appetites and if creation were static the story would end there. But higher forms of life are evolved and the biologist postulates the dynamic principle as an appetite for change or variation. The development of multi-cellular organisms, of two sexes, each necessary to the continuance of a species is a capital achievement, whereby evolution to

a higher form of life is made possible. The function of sex is not primarily to secure continuance of species, for the uni-cellular organisms reproduce without sex; it is designed to provide for advance in type, for differentiation. The appetites, then, are characteristic not only of an entire 'body,' highly evolved with complicated organs, but of every cell among the millions that compose the body. We ought to emphasize that aspect of life, because what is called the higher life, in which our social relations are conducted, so often pretends to despise those coarse foundations : and such contempt (as St Paul for one clearly realized) does not make for truth. Our whole physical frame is bent on appetite : not only does the mouth hunger for food, but the entire body is an open mouth; the fist, for example, is specifically adapted for struggle, but all flesh is struggle, every cell against every cell, and also every cell, in due order, rendering mutual aid. "Each apparently simple voluntary movement, such as those of vision, eating . . . is a brilliantly played piece of biological symphony by hundreds of thousands of nerve-cells and muscle-cells playing in perfect harmony" (49). In fact, the biologist uses analogies drawn from sociology to describe the solidarity of the animal frame in seeking to maintain its wonderful machinery. As already said, we shall avoid such analogies; we get nearer the truth by accepting the actual principles of life and watching their operations in ourselves.

For the purposes of sociology, this principle of variation needs close attention. It is discussed under many names. Dr Benjamin Moore speaks of The Law of Complexity : a body does not merely vegetate, it changes, and a successful variation in course of time evolves into a higher type : "At still higher levels," he says, "it forms the basis of social evolution and leads to intellectual development." Variation through sex is the starting-point of communal life simply because

every social group is a union of like and unlike, the rhythm of uniformity and diversity underlies all unity (compare Chap. VI.) Hence from the evolutionary point of view sociology begins where multi-cellular organisms are discerned in the ascending scale as a successful variation (50); for appetites, like higher forms of desire, are conflicting: the demands of sustenance are purely egoistic while sex involves altruism. The foundations of society are to be sought in the three-fold diversity of male, female, and of offspring varying from both: the distinction between self and alter can scarcely be conceived until the continuance of a species is found to depend upon a union of the two sexes.

Considerations surrounding the study of sex are often found to be embarrassing, for their supreme importance to the race has placed them in a rank by themselves among the intimate things of life; like religion, too intimate and weighty to be treated in casual discourse. Civilized man developed both reverence and modesty as safeguards of spiritual and of physical life (51). It is scarcely in place to apply the term *social* to the primary relation of organisms exhibited in sex, or to speak of sexual love in treating of the behaviour of cells and plants: Hæckel, Lester Ward and others employ such language but it does not help us to the truth of facts. And yet we may go to the opposite error if we refuse to admit that sex is the ultimate basis on which the structure of society reposes. The first social group is the family, of parents and young, first in time and first and last in permanence: the earliest type of friendship is the mating of male and female, attracted in the beginning by the blind appetite of sex, but continuing in companionship because the pair find secondary and higher benefits in the relation. Thus the trend of evolution gives a favouring bias to such species as make the most out of a relation which in its origin is purely physical.

From appetite to instinct.—When once embarked on

experiment with social organization, with discovery, *i.e.*, of the benefits accruing from alliance between *self* and *alter*, whether for sustenance, for continuance or for variation, how manifold are the inventions which species have adopted ! The biologist is never tired of sketching for us the fascinating story of ants and bees. In the hive the principle of solidarity is so far advanced that the individual, worker or drone, has well-nigh lost himself :—he has solved the dissonance between self and alter by renouncing self ! Only in that one crisis of the hive's existence, when the virgin bee flies to the empyrean does the drone assert himself and soar in pursuit, reverting for a moment to the fundamental basis of sex in which the contrast between self and alter took its rise (52). The psychologist, seeking to trace a progressive series in evolution, warns us that the beehive and the anthill afford little promise of progress. The mind of a bee is a poor sort of mind ! In spite of Trotter's eulogy of the hive (53), we hesitate to think that its fortunes and its destiny in the hierarchy of insects and animals is such as to favour his eloquent analogy with the mind of Britain. The individual bee or ant seems to be little more of an individual than the remote organisms that we watch rushing to and fro under the microscope. Trotter speaks of "capacity for unanimous decisions," but is he not transferring to blind instinctive movement the language and range which can only properly be used to describe the behaviour of a human group ? There is no "decision," (if we read Maeterlinck correctly ?) in the response of a bee to its environment ; the hive appears more like a single organism, whose 'members' fly from it and return to it with somewhat more initiative than the tulip shews when it folds its petals at sundown (54).

The beehive is, however, only one sample in the vast display of species which have risen above the lowest plane of existence through appetite to a range where *instincts* have been evolved. A life directed by instinct

is an advance on one whose sustenance and continuance are merely an affair of appetite. Both appetite and instinct are inherited, but the instincts cover a far wider range, for the body which is the theatre of their action, has evolved *organs*; their operation is always accompanied by emotional excitement, and each instinct finds scope for exercise in the growth of new organs of sense, such as eyes and ears, or of adaptations of organs, such as hands and feet, to perform specific functions. Each new organ serves to answer more effectively the primitive purpose of appetite than the more general tool employed by a more rudimentary species; but, like all good tools, it may also be diverted to answer secondary purposes :—thus the hand, at first adapted for climbing or to bring food to the mouth, will hold a pen or strike the harp, and so contribute to all the higher regions of life which claim a man's regard.

Hence the course of evolution must be viewed as ascending from appetite to a higher life of instinct, from cell to body, with organs, and a nervous system of communication between these. In other words, the principle of ascending complexity, of appetite for variation has led some types to achieve a mechanism which works as uniformly and unerringly in specialized directions as appetite alone does at the lower levels :— the term instinct can be properly assigned to this uniform process, and it can be observed in any living being possessing a nervous system and organs. Furthermore, it would appear that this advance from protozoa to animal is accompanied by progress in mentality. The protozoa displays only one psychical feature :—that lowest form of desire which we call appetite; instinctive behaviour is obviously a far higher type, as can be easily discerned by comparing the diffused appetite of hunger in a cell with the precise instinctive acts and complicated mechanism developed by animals in taking or in procuring food. Not only so :—“ every object that

excites an instinct excites an *emotion* as well" (55). Something new in life is experienced, unknown, it would seem, to the lowlier organisms; a *body* experiences pleasure or pain: not only vague feeling, but definite and specialized:—and most remarkably related to sensations in various parts of the body. The crude reaction to the call of appetite is now complicated by a variety of responses, still without self-consciousness, but aware of the environment and capable of making a variety of response, according as one instinctive impulse or another prevails over the rest. Psychologists not only use the adjective *instinctive*, and speak of the life of instinct as a general type of existence, but they name a number of specific instincts: and as soon as they embark on these they quarrel; every writer labels a new instinct. It is perhaps presumptuous in a student who is not a professed psychologist to mingle in the fray, but McDougall's *Social Psychology* has shewn how important the discussion has become for sociology. His scheme of instincts and innate tendencies has won wide acceptance; in venturing to rearrange his plan we shall seek to bring into relief some factors in the situation which occur more readily to an onlooker than to those who are experts in psychological theory.

McDougall's classification of instincts.—If we understand McDougall aright all the types of tendency to action which he claims to be true instincts can be arranged in two divisions (*a*) those in which the stimulus to action is a member of the *same species*; (*b*) those in which the stimulus comes from any other object. Under (*a*) come his instincts of Self-abasement, with its converse, Self-assertion; when one meets another of the same species the instinctive response is either positive feeling, by display of self, or negative feeling, suppressing and hiding the self. But if we interpret his scheme aright, there is a third sequel to the relation, when it occurs between individuals who belong not only to the

same species, but are of the same family within that species :—the mother feels tenderness for the child, an emotion connected with a Paternal Instinct : and the male and female for each other, the Sex Instinct. From this elementary basis the psychologist traces the evolution of endless refined sentiments not only in family life, but in many groups both animal and human. Under (b) McDougall provides four instincts, Flight, Repulsion, Pugnacity and Curiosity; to these he adds a further two, of Acquisition and of Construction. While the stimulus in any of these *may* be supplied by a member of the species there is no reason why this should be the case : any object animate or inanimate will on occasion arouse a creature to fear and to fly, to loathe and to reject, to hate and to fight, to investigate and to wonder.

We find great difficulty in accepting McDougall's treatment of Acquisition (often called the collecting instinct) and Construction. While as regards the other eight he postulates a distinctive emotion, in these two cases he neglects to discuss the emotional aspect. But if we can assume a stage of life precedent to the life of instinct the difficulty seems to vanish. Acquisition and Construction are surely offshoots or refinements (as indeed his Chap. XIV. suggests) of the basal appetite for sustenance. The creature may store his food, as the squirrel does, or build a nest, with an elaborate equipment of tools evolved in his body, but the motive is always to ensure the prolongation of life in the individual or in the offspring. The accompanying emotion is just satisfaction, self-feeling, an undifferentiated pleasure at the sight of the object of acquisition or of construction.

In addition to this catalogue of instincts, we are offered a scheme of "general innate tendencies." When an animal, a self, encounters an 'alter,' he may respond instinctively in three ways, either with tender feeling, with assertion or with submission; to avoid misunderstanding let us add that he may also react by the non-social

instincts, of curiosity, etc.—this however, does not affect the argument. But now, says McDougall in effect, the alter who may stimulate one or other of these instincts is himself a behaving creature, behaving on his own account; and the self may be affected neither by tender feeling, nor by assertion nor by submission, but may be *absorbed in* the alter's behaviour, and may therefore be satisfied to copy this behaviour, instead of making an instinctive response. Suppose the alter is smiling, I (infant in a cradle) smile in *sympathy*: or he is pouncing on an enemy (in play or in earnest), I (a young animal) pounce in *imitation*. When we proceed to a higher plane of life the same phenomenon appears in the intellectual life and the *suggestion* of an idea is sufficient to lead us to accept it. Now McDougall declines to group any of these sympathetic or imitative actions as instinctive for they are not specific in their range; the self is not impelled to change his condition, but just enjoys being *in* sympathy or enjoys doing as the alter does, whatever variety of feeling or of act the alter may be engaged upon. And this enjoyment may proceed to a further stage when, as in the higher animals and in man, some sort of self-consciousness is discerned. For one may desire to compete with the alter and rival his performance; McDougall thereupon enters *play* (including rivalry) along with suggestion, sympathy and imitation, as general innate tendencies.

Here then are eight different modes of reaction when a self meets an alter:—four of them instinctive, closely related in their physical foundation to the appetite of sex, but in their complications and refinements extending to ideals infinitely higher; four of a more diffuse character, but equally innate and forceful as assisting in selection, and in the progress of all the higher species. One might almost suppose that this enumeration of instincts and tendencies accounts for all the phenomena of social behaviour among animals, but we are bidden

to study a mass of phenomena where animals and man alike appear to consort without any apparent motive. Why, for example, do birds assemble in vast troops before migration? Why do men and women spend their time walking in crowds? McDougall describes many such phenomena and postulates another instinct which he calls the "gregarious." It is often called the social instinct and in Trotter's exposition absorbs the innate tendencies and appears as the main factor in determining the destiny of a species; more than that, he finds in it a solution for the destinies of the modern world. "Socialized gregariousness is the goal of man's development" (56). He is so impressed by the achievement wrought through sociality alike in animals and man as to believe that these phenomena will interpret the genesis and reveal the design of all creation. Succeeding chapters will shew that we acknowledge an element of truth in this view, but we doubt whether the plan of evolution can be confidently expounded on so narrow a basis. Life is too complex and the future too obscure for us to share a confidence so eager.

The gregarious instinct a misleading term.—It is evident that while some species, like the tiger, are solitary, or non-gregarious, others live in a crowd of their own kind. The impulse is explained from various motives. Fifty tigers could neither hunt comfortably together for food or fight in a body against a foe: but a hundred wolves will run in a pack, and countless hordes of bisons used to feed together on the prairie. The solitary creature is not wholly solitary, for the tiger fosters her cub; the pair and the brood being the limit of his social organization; he flourishes in the jungle without being gregarious. There are not many of him all told, but, if he were able to explain himself he would express the greatest contempt for the herd of oxen, whose behaviour was observed so attentively by Galton (57). After noticing the behaviour of gregarious animals, McDougall

proceeds to comment as follows: "The individual is born into a society of some sort and grows up in it, and the being with others and doing as they do becomes a habit deeply rooted in the instinct. It would seem to be a general rule, the explanation of which is to be found in the principle of sympathetic emotion to be considered later, that the more numerous the herd or crowd or society in which the individual finds himself, the more complete is the satisfaction of this impulse" (58). One cannot accept this passage as satisfactory. Every individual is born into a society, tiger as much as wolf, and the lowest types of organism are precisely those which swarm most. As soon as self and alter are distinguished each member of a species enjoys three modes of experience:—first himself as subject and object; secondly his kind, his own species; thirdly the rest of preceptual experience both animate and inanimate. As a species evolves it learns to 'know' itself by reference to its species; only by so referring and comparing does it enjoy existence. Now the terms 'habit' and 'instinct' would appear to be far too narrow as an explanation of such a situation: reference to the alter is as necessary to the tiger and the shark as it is to the wolf or the minnow. What then becomes of "the general rule"? Clearly it only applies to "gregarious animals" who display emotions of a specific kind when separated from the herd, and develop modes of action adapted for communication. But does McDougall deny sympathetic emotion and distinctive modes of communication to non-gregarious species?

In order further to explain the gregarious animal, he "assumes" (p. 93) "that in the gregarious animals each of the principal instincts has a special perceptual inlet (or recipient afferent part) that is adapted to receive and to elaborate the sense-impressions made by the expression of the same instinct in other animals of the same species—that *e.g.*, the fear-instinct has besides

others, a special perceptual inlet that renders it excitable by the sound of the cry of fear." . . . "Human sympathy has its roots in similar specializations of the instinctive dispositions on their different sides."

This assumption does not create any special difficulty, but why regard it as a special attribute of gregarious animals? If some species fall under "the general rule," others, he states, do not and yet *are not all equally affected* by the operation of "the special perceptual inlet"? Any animal, gregarious or other, when he has evolved an organ of hearing, will hear sounds proceeding either from his own body, or from another of his species, or some other object. He learns to discriminate the source of each of the three, and responds appropriately both in sympathy and in behaviour. Why then are we to trace the operation of a special perceptual inlet in gregarious species while denying the process to the solitary species?

One cannot but think that both McDougall and Trotter have been misled by 'the illusion of the near.' Our modern life, as we have seen in Chap. II., has brought modern man into *The Great Society*, numbers press upon us; Trotter insists that our fellowship in 'the major unit,' the nation, should be the governing sentiment; McDougall repeatedly describes 'the fascination of the crowd' as an instinctive quality of human life. We do not question the facts as they record them, but we doubt the explanation they put forward. Their argument seems to have begun at the wrong end. They witness modern phenomena of human aggregation which could, of course, be illustrated by epochs of Babylonian and Egyptian civilizations: to explain these they thereupon hark back to the animal or insect world and bring the whole series under the operation of a gregarious or herd instinct. But suppose a psychologist set out from the opposite standpoint? suppose that he were equally impressed with traits in human disposition of the solitary type,

could he not seek, in many animal species, for analogies such as those of the cat tribe which would enable him to assume an Instinct of Isolation? From all that I can read of the gregarious instinct so-called, we are inclined to think that such a speculation would come quite as near to the truth of facts; to assume the inevitable universal operation of a gregarious instinct seems to me to be an easy, dogmatic way of explaining phenomena, whose causes and effects are far more complicated than these authors would admit. The reader will see how we have been led to examine the entire doctrine of instinct: the claim made for a specific Gregarious Instinct (with a capital I) forces itself upon our entire thinking about corporate life and compels us to criticism. The rhythm of life sways to and fro, now towards solitude and anon towards society: here proclaiming the rights of a solitary self, there exulting in the devotion of a multitude.

We may perhaps get a clearer view of the controversy if we follow the distinction made by Trotter between types of gregarious instinct:—the wolf is of the aggressive type, the sheep is protective, the bee displays “socialized gregariousness,” *i.e.*, “the individual bee is completely absorbed in the major unit,” the hive (59). Let us compare this with the category of instincts submitted by McDougall: Self-assertion, Self-abasement, and the Parental Instinct; or again with the following passage: “The deep significance and historical importance of the lines of differentiation indicated by the cell-cycle become more evident when we recognize that the three phases correspond to the three possibilities of relatively predominant anabolism, relatively predominant katabolism, and a compromise between these two” (60). Although these writers are discussing quite different phases of existence, their views seem to point to an eternal law of evolution, sweeping with vast range over the realm of animated nature. Wherever the self

comes into relations with an alter (whether a single one of the species, or a multitude sharing a social mind) he and his kind exhibit in greater or less degree one of the two opposite tendencies, accompanied, to use McDougall's term, by the Positive Self-Feeling of a superior or the Negative Self-Feeling of an inferior; again a third tendency, a 'compromise between the two' may be discerned. This, we take it, as between individuals, affords what McDougall calls the Tender Emotion, while Trotter, treating of the self over against a crowd of his fellows rather than an individual, discerns the same type of sentiment as the goal of social organization, neither pride on the one hand or meek submission on the other, but "kindliness, generosity, patience, tolerance" (61)—all the qualities in fact which we associate with a union on equal terms between self and alter, with that principle of unity which will claim our attention in the next chapter. Hence, when an individual encounters another of his own species, he can enter into one of three relations to it, he can be superior, can assert himself, feel elated, display his powers; or he can abase himself as an inferior, feel sobered and suppress his powers; or finally he can feel himself as an equal. This third case presents a novel situation, and *the sequel may take two courses*; the feeling of equality may be mere indifference to the alter, the encounter may just awaken *no feeling at all*, both parties going about their business; but in other cases both self and alter may find lively satisfaction in each other's presence; they are equal but *by no means* indifferent. The beehive exhibits an immense community in which the self, the individual bee has little interest in his neighbour bee; the three instincts in McDougall's scheme (Self-Assertion, Self-Abasement and Parental) do not operate; each is absorbed in his work and displays no 'social' reaction at all. The interest is expended on the hive, on the group; the self, apparently, does not react to the

stimulus evoked by an alter. But in the case of animals which lead a more individual life the encounter between self and alter is not so uniform. The relation of the sexes, observed in its origins, is one of equality, each sex, *i.e.*, charged with an indispensable duty in relation to the race; the male it is true more katabolic and disruptive, the female more anabolic and constructive, but each playing an equal part "in the rhythm of metabolism" (62). This triple theme is pursued by the student of evolution as the undertone of a mighty fugue, in every region of social experience, animal and human alike. Our present purpose is served in making clear that the types of gregarious impulse need not be regarded as an exclusive feature of gregarious animals, but as illustrations of a universal law, and that a student of animal life is on safer ground if he abstains from postulating a specific gregarious instinct. He does better to contemplate the general scheme of existence exhibited by animals as one in which the entire life proceeds by instinctive response. And he will be then more ready to concede in the scheme of evolution a place to isolation and withdrawal, as at times equally important with sociality.

Instinct in relation to control.—We have been led to comment on McDougall and Trotter in preference to other investigators into animal life because they have dealt especially with the relations of biology to sociology; we may conclude by viewing the theme in relation to the influence of theories of behaviour such as we noticed in the last paragraphs of Chap. II. As one studies writers on evolution and psychology one gains the impression that the psychologists have been content to stay where Darwin placed them; *i.e.*, they have accepted his records of the instinctive behaviour of animals supplied with organs, but they have not reckoned with the later researches of biologists into the lowest forms of life.

They seek to explain human behaviour in terms of

animal life and are right in so doing to some extent, for man is also an animal : but both animal and man are composed of cells : the individual begins as a cell and carries along with him in his evolution the appetites which mark his earlier existence. Instead therefore of postulating a series of instincts why not describe the animal as a being whose life is very largely a manifestation of instinctive behaviour, just as the life of a cell, to the psychologist, is a manifestation of appetitive behaviour? A 'successful' animal controls his appetites : his organs were evolved for this very purpose : and man, where he follows the true line of ascent, not only controls his (cell) appetites but controls his (animal) instincts. Instinct is a mode of behaviour, characterizing the entire life of animal species ; the more you attempt to catalogue the proceedings under separate labels the more likely you are to confuse his behaviour with that of the human species. As a social being the animal reacts to stimulus from his own species with far greater definiteness than is possible to creatures who only display appetite, but man, become self-conscious, stands on still a higher plane.

The issues here raised will meet us again and again : they are allied to the encounters between free will and determinism. The popular idea of instinct is of something which you cannot help 'obeying,' something inevitable ; its authority excuses the man who surrenders control at its bidding. As one endeavours to get at the facts the conviction grows that evolutionary psychology must revise the theory of instinct by taking more account of control. The animal compared with a cellular creature has developed organs to enable him more effectively to fulfil appetite : the eye sees food, the hand grasps it ; and these organs behave uniformly, without any 'will' of their own, in response to an appropriate stimulus : the instinct is 'in' the organ and as a rough approximation to accuracy one might say 'No organ, no

instinct' (63). But these organs are not solely concerned to fulfil the demands of appetite; as a secondary but quite important result of the evolution of organs, the bird and the beast *enjoy the exercise of them*, and their life partly consists in what is called play. Now if this extension of range and capacity through the evolution of organs were given *free* play, the species could not survive: the unchecked indulgence of appetite, the limitless enjoyment of play would lead to extinction. Hence a necessary feature of animal existence is the evolution of instinctive control, relegating the exercise of organs to appropriate times and seasons. We may say if we please that the animal cannot help indulging his appetites of hunger and sex; but we must add that he also cannot help inhibiting these desires except at the appointed times and seasons.

Now when the psychologist contemplates the nature of man he finds a new situation: the organs are there, but man has evolved something we call self-consciousness, a power to override the inhibitions of time and season; as he grows from infancy to childhood he can, if he will, indulge his appetite beyond the requirements of his body. This new power threatens to become a terrible source of weakness: he has retained all the pressure to fulfil appetite, inherited from cellular life and enlarged by the acquirement of animal organs, but has become free from the automatic control which instinctively supplied the animal with safeguards against excess. "Oh! wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from this body of death?" He found deliverance by the discovery of *self-control*, of sanctions, prohibitions, tabus which have no relation whatever to the conditions of animal existence but constitute a spiritual life. It is open to the biologist to say that this entire region of super-natural experience is an illusion, a fetish from which a higher stage of evolution will emancipate him: but he cannot have the argument

both ways : he cannot, that is, describe man as being still under the inevitable control of animal instincts and also advanced beyond the range of spiritual control.

We therefore contemplate the course of human evolution as an effort by the successful species to reconcile the dissonance between the 'natural' man, possessed by his animal powers but conscious of his ability to disregard their inhibitions, and the 'spiritual' man who accepts sanctions, social imperatives, social and religious ideals, which enable him to disregard the imperatives of his instinctive nature. Instead of treating evolution from animal to man as the evolution of new instincts or new differentiations of animal instinct, we regard him as a species raised as much beyond the range of animal existence as the animal is raised above the cell. When for example we are bidden to witness an instinct of Self-assertion allied to an animal instinct of Pugnacity and both of these as justifying anti-social conduct, we question whether these tendencies, either in animal or man, account for all the facts or give warrant to any philosophy either of determinism or freedom. Men sometimes fight and sometimes refrain from fighting; animals sometimes fight and sometimes refrain from fighting; each species is endowed with organs appropriate to the struggle : "Blessed be the Lord my strength which teacheth my hands to war and my fingers to fight." The postulate of an instinct of Pugnacity does little to forward our understanding of the motives, controls, appetites which lead the combatants to join battle or to cease : it darkens counsel if it leads self-conscious man to accept a fatalistic belief in the supremacy of appetite and instinct.

Early man: the evolution of a higher social potential.—What has now been advanced anticipates the problems which anthropology seeks to elucidate. We need only pursue the discussion to open up a little further the position as regards this gregarious instinct,

so-called, which has loomed so large in recent studies in sociology. The following is suggestive: "Thus the erect attitude became stereotyped and fixed, and the limbs specialized, and these upright Simians emerged from their ancestral forests in societies armed with sticks and stones and with the rudiments of all the powers which have enabled them to conquer the world" (64). What were the numbers in those societies? And did the group, when it had shared the perils and raptures of victory, break up again into solitary families? Species allied to the primates but not in our exact pedigree, remaining in trees, have had a chequered history; the monkeys are sufficiently gregarious, but anthropoid apes live in isolation. When once man stands erect with feet on the ground and tools in his hand, with dominion over the beast of the field and over the fowl of the air; above all with a new mind, employing language to express ideas and feelings, displaying self-consciousness with its implication of a repressed sub-conscious realm:—for such a being one cannot willingly agree that precedents drawn from the instinctive life of lower animals are of great avail, except as explaining in roughest outline the function of organs with which his ancestry has supplied him. Some of these ancestors were a gregarious species, others were solitary: if he has inherited organs which helped them to join the herd for safety in one age or in another to withdraw for safety, what is that to him? he has new powers, a new outlook and he will dispense with such organs and with the related instinct, if his destiny demands the change.

The rôle, therefore, played by a gregarious instinct in the life of Early Man does not impress one as very important in comparison with other phenomena. The outstanding fact is surely that enormous enrichment of experience, the multiplied avenues of enjoyment, when once the creature has learned to communicate and to understand the art of social intercourse *with a few*.

Grant, if you like, by analogy with wolves and oxen that the first motive for sociality was struggle (aggressive or protective) against other species, we cannot assume that this was the only or the chief benefit that he sought from his fellows. We know from the records they have left that the earliest species of Human cultivated art in caves; we are learning more and more of the sympathetic imitative zeal with which a tribe picked up the materials of new culture from wandering traders. Such evidence makes it hazardous to accept any exclusive theory of evolution, whether of the Bernhardt, tooth-and-claw type or of that suggested by Trotter's *Herd Instinct*. What is very certain is that speech was a weighty factor in the rapid strides by which man cut himself off from the brutes: research such as the philologist can make into the earliest forms of speech may prove of the highest value for evolutionary sociology. Granted that the basic impulses for food, for warmth, for play, for sex still master the individual life, what opportunities for variation, and for the enjoyment of variation, are opened up so soon as one can freely exchange ideas with a neighbour! Even if we allow that the social impulse of such exchange was at first mainly to help the species in the struggle for existence: as soon as the use of this marvellous tool is learned, as soon that is as man finds himself sharing communion with his comrades—why, he is a new creature! Our familiarity with the process dulls our apprehension of its wonderful attraction to those who first learnt to be socially minded. In other relations what I possess you cannot have:—we struggle for it and if you gain, I lose: but here, in this business of the mind, I give from myself and yet you and I both share the gift: I practise, for example, a new trick with a tool or with my arm: before the era of speech, you could indeed see and move and thus copy the pattern: but now you can ask and I can explain, correct, show

amusement or displeasure : learning becomes a fascinating pursuit to both parties.

A survey of the human record, civilized and savage, past and present, appears to picture man as being able, in this matter of soci-ability, to adapt himself to emergencies with extraordinary facility. Even in the nineteenth century, which witnessed such unique aggregations of men and women in modern cities, out on the frontiers men were equally ready to pioneer in the wilds, to seek the comfort of loneliness. Even in England there is a 'back to the land' movement; the steady migration of some to the close tenement of towns is countered by contra-emigration from the town to the country. As regards early man, every variety of unit seems to have been tried : if cities of the plain and of the great rivers provide states and civilizations parallel to those of our epoch, petty tribes and isolated families are also found. True enough, in the content of his mind your modern pioneer is by no means so solitary as his forerunner in the days of Abraham and Lot; he has his books, his post, and now on American farms his telephone. But this increase in communication, while no doubt enormously advancing man's capacity for intercourse, has nothing in common with the blind instinct of gregarious animals : these resources are both invented and employed by self-conscious man, directing with intelligence his machinery, able at will to 'cut off' his neighbours, and cut loose from social bonds.

The real line of advance, as it now appears, from the time when our Simian progenitor swooped down from the branches, is in the *capacity of an individual for sharing in many social minds* (65). This ancestor of ours belonged, more or less, to a family, and belonged, at any rate in war time, to his band of warriors, his state. Yet he has no club, no church, no college, no trade union : our situation as described in earlier chapters was not only beyond his ken but beyond his

mental power. Describe him, if you will, as a creature with gregarious instinct, but the salient fact is not concerned with the operation of an instinct, but with the use man makes of this tendency, and equally, of course, of other tendencies. The bee creates one institution, the hive; the wolf another, the pack: these were great achievements, but they were costly, for the bee surrenders family, and the wolf is less of a mother because she has to run with the pack; the human mother is not only a mother, but a friend and partner in many social circles and even her claim to partnership as a woman in affairs of State is admitted.

Man creates, and dissolves, all sorts of social groups, and at the end remains lord of himself "the master of my fate, the captain of my soul." It is precisely here that one finds dissatisfaction with a philosophy of collectivism or socialism based on theories of gregarious instinct. To writers like Mr Trotter there is one overpowering 'major unit,' the state or nation, and the purpose of his exposition of the gregarious instinct is to exalt our faith and loyalty to that combination, tacitly ignoring the claims of all the rest. No doubt in the stress of a terrible war, thrown back as we appear to be, on a struggle for existence, everyone was impelled to a fervent realization of the claims of this major unit; but we cannot revert, even if Prussian example prevailed in England, to the primitive condition when the Simiáns founded a state in the woods. Having learned the arts of complex society we can only maintain the state by maintaining also in due proportion our allegiance to other social groups (see Chap. VII. below). It will some day be the task of historical sociology to trace the evolution of this capacity; the materials for it have already been collected and are being interpreted with growing insight by the anthropologists. One or two further notes may suffice to indicate directions which this story may follow.

Man's relation to animals.—Firstly, man's relation to the animal world from which he has emerged. He has interfered most arrogantly with the course of evolution, substituting his own transformations for the programme of natural selection. The wild dog is gregarious, but man has little use for a pack of dogs, so he trains and breeds a special class that can repress the instincts of the herd and create a solitary devotion to a solitary master. It seems as if this art of domestication was a necessary preliminary to the evolution of complex social arts. Men who live in isolation from their own species enjoy the society of animals: and the domesticated animals, in varying degrees, reciprocate the sympathy. The city, however congenial to man, is not a fit breeding-place for the creatures he has tamed. Protected from the severe discipline of natural selection these tame creatures evolve into modified species; the aggressive, katabolic, features are repressed in favour of the mild submissive traits which beseem a creature in the toils. The gregarious instinct has not sufficed to save them from the supremacy of man; at his will he allows them to graze in herds, or keeps them apart. This artificial selection may be called, if we please, progress, but the progress is not designed in the interest of the lower species. It may be, as Maeterlinck suggests (66) that our boasted progress is but a development of the same kind; for ought we know, we too, like the denizens of the hive, are domesticated, creatures of some lofty power which dominates *our* hive!

While man in thus mastering the brute creation has solely kept in mind his own desires, we should observe that there often exists a certain solidarity of feeling between the tamer and the tamed. Jack London's *White Fang* (67) is a romance and not zoology but it is only an exaggeration of the truth. Most human beings have a feeling towards animals differing from that displayed either towards plants or towards inanimate objects:

the same psychology which discriminates the relations of the self and the alter serves to analyse the mutual sympathies of an animal to other species, as well as his relation to man. It does not therefore seem unreasonable to speculate that mastery and sympathy with the lower creatures played a part in human evolution, analogous to that witnessed among our children when we permit them to be the playmates of kittens and dogs; or, better still, the friends of ponies and cattle.

Evolution of an inner life.—Secondly, the evolution of self-consciousness, as we noted above, implies its co-relative, an unconscious field, with all the phenomena of repression and conflict with which the psychoanalysts are making us acquainted. To put the situation in other terms the evolution of intelligence implies an advance in memory power, in capacity for remembering what is pleasant to remember and therewith a capacity for thrusting out of recollection those unpleasant or inconvenient memories which the social order requires to be so treated. An unconscious life has become possible, and to this uncanny region man learns to transfer, when convenient, those vestiges of the past which remind him too acutely of the pit whence he was digged. Now this procedure must have had an important bearing upon the problem of isolation and herding among primitive races. The solitary has nothing to conceal, but as soon as he consciously realizes the alter he must play in presence of the alter a double part. The self is becoming two selves, which we may distinguish as an inner self, in process of sublimation, and an outer self “to face the world with” (68). This latter self is moulded by custom, by the behaviour of one’s fellows; the former seeks solitude and shrinks from the herd. In the beginnings, with early man, the materials for conflict are not so various as with modern man since the mental life is simple; there is little to forget, but the pressure of society on the individual is more complete, as the

anthropologists shew; the custom of the tribe appears to dominate the entire life, and it is only among the leaders, wizards or ruling-chiefs, that personal freedom can find outlet. The psychologists point out a similar contrast between the child and the adult; in every individual, growing from infancy to adult life, the 'conflict' is renewed, and the ceremonies of initiation with temporary isolation at adolescence, which play so prominent a part in tribal life, may be viewed as an attempt to reconcile the inner and the outer self.

One is tempted to interpret the Mosaic account of Paradise from this point of view. The use of speech is presented as an accompaniment to this developing sense of society. "Who *told* thee that thou wast naked?" thunders the chastising voice. Language came as a revealer of a new social regime, and in the presence of his fellow man felt shame and 'hid himself' in retirement, mental and physical alike. Not only with clothes to restrain the appetite of sex but with a thousand other conventions, with all the minute and tedious ceremony in which savage life abounds: and even the most 'advanced' of modern cultures cannot afford to discard the pressure of society or escape the adventures of conflict.

Evolution from the cradle.—This chapter only touches upon problems each of which deserved prolonged study: so a few words may suffice to note the third direction in which the student observes the evolution of corporate life: each person from the beginning of his life is an epitome of the story of creation. The conflict between inner and outer to which we have just referred is said by the psycho-analyst to take its rise in infancy, and every feature in social behaviour can be viewed from the standpoint of personal behaviour.

The foundations for such a study have been well laid by students of Child Psychology; Sully, Barnes, Stanley Hall (69) have rendered valuable service to

the theory and practice of education. For our present purpose they serve to reinforce the arguments drawn from animal psychology and anthropology. Modern man is inclined to say : " Let the dead bury their dead " : of what value are your zoologists and anthropologists to me and mine ? Their studies may be interesting, but the gulf between myself and primeval man is profound ; our modern society is unique and can learn little from either bees or Babylonians. In his impatience he is reluctant to spend time over the story of animals or primitive man simply because they lie so far behind him. But we have to call a halt to such disclaimers when we see that in every individual the past persists ; within the infant's nature are impulses similar to those which governed the instinctive life of beast and man in far-off epochs ; true, the stages of evolution are different since the environment has been transformed, and heredity has also endowed the infant with plasticity and powers of rapid development unknown to that ancestry. But stages there are ; comparison with the animal world, with primitive man, is therefore not mere analogy, but actual explanation in terms of cause and effect.

And this explanation brings us to a fresh realization of ourselves ; the social groups which we share are a product of the ages. Sociology cannot be regarded as a description of fixed forms, for the kaleidoscope is changing in our hands. The picture at the moment when we observe it is like the face of a fresh-hewn timber : a section is exposed to us at the point where the trunk has been severed but we can only understand that section if we trace it down to the roots. The present writer has elsewhere (70) given a sketch of child development, and as this and other accounts are so readily accessible he may be excused for repeating here what in any case would only be a bald summary.

Genesis helps to an understanding of Design.—Reflections in this field help to explain why genetic

psychology and social psychology have claimed increasing attention during the last twenty years, years in which the anthropologist has become psychologist. The explorer of earlier days collected the objects used by 'natives' or recorded facts about manners, customs or religion, but he could only interpret these in terms of his conception of individual mind or of his own cosmogomy. He has now realized that his collections are emblems or evidences of a social behaviour, quite as purposeful as the social group to which the explorer himself belongs, and in their place as necessary to development. To the beginner in sociology for whom these chapters are written many of these researches—into totemism and the like—are recondite; they seem to have no practical bearing on the social order of to-day. In a sense this is true: the 'social worker' so-called, who devotes himself to Poor Relief would be puzzled to know, *e.g.*, how Dr Rivers' research among The Todas can affect his handling of a 'case.' If, however, the principle of evolution be resolutely accepted, it will be seen that any man whose calling requires him to organise the behaviour of his fellows will be the better for studying some samples of behaviour chosen from another field. The chief difficulty that a social worker has to encounter is in himself: he cannot conceive the *rationale* of conduct so different from that of his own circle: he cannot sympathize with standards and customs so alien from those to which he is attached. True the teachings of what is called 'social history' should help towards this detachment: but the story of the Poor Law of 1601 lies too near to us to be treated in terms of evolution: we have not the data on which to base a sound interpretation of change in modern epochs; nor have historians begun as yet to treat psychology with serious attention. This accounts, as it seems to me, for the trend among sociologists to busy themselves mainly with early cultures rather than with contemporary life. Research begins at what is

remote simply because the gulf between early man and ourselves makes it possible to detach our minds *from* ourselves, from the view of life which shapes our ordinary thinking.

As the reader will have already gathered this book neither attempts a scientific explanation of the social forces operating around us to-day, nor offers a view of development in earlier civilization : it is designed only as an introduction ; just to help a student to build up for himself a system of thought on which both fields, the present and the past, may be investigated. We hold, therefore, that the relation of sociology and psychology to the past should be reversed from that often presented to students. We must begin with the present : describing and defining what we witness with all the power of abstraction we possess. And yet this description soon makes us revert to the past because we are not describing a collection of static phenomena, fixed once for all in their places, but an item in development, in dynamic evolution, only to be fully explained in terms of beginnings. Our very conception of evolution is a hypothesis, changing its elusive aspect with every new discovery in science. Hence we *first* construct a scheme, a provisional scheme of things as they are : in this case, of the social order as we witness it in the daily life of our time. We classify, arrange, give names to phenomena : cutting adrift from partisan views and scholastic prejudices so far as we can. *Then*, we can try our hand at explanation, *i.e.*, a view of the evolutionary story, an acceptance of what is, or has become, necessary, as epoch after epoch has stamped its pattern on the great complex design.

For most students, for the great bulk of those who search among phenomena for a glimpse of truth, some sort of explanation of harmony between opposites must suffice : and it will be much, if in these early days of sociology, a student can get so far. The higher ambitions

need not disturb us : if we can bring out of the scattered phenomena of society some systematic view more or less in line with the endless story of matter, life, mind, which we call evolution, we have laid a foundation on which to build.

In conclusion let us note the persistence with which man has pursued this toilsome search ever since language gave him the means to conceive such search as possible. Starting with the simple use of speech as a practical instrument, he has joined with his fellows to advance from age to age the boundaries of mankind ; an entire race or civilization would seem to be designed only to bring forth a new conception, a new emotion, and then make an end ! The Greeks produce their Pheidias, their Aristotle, their Plato, and then sink back to be slaves or hucksters : the Chinese along another line reach up to Confucius and then appear to stand quiescent for ages ; but with each advance the new powers which are transmitted to human life are shared, if not to-day then to-morrow, by the coming race. The marvel of evolution as witnessed in man is that each one of us starts at the lowest level of cell life, and can rise, on the shoulders of his progenitors, to the entertainment and use of all the instruments which the genius of the past has fitted to his hands. We study for example the man of Western Europe in the fifteenth century : during many so-called Dark Ages he had gone slowly : the mass of men content with a social order which as we look back appears to lead nowhere : but within fifty years all is changed :—a new view of life (which we now call individuality) emerges ; all the old formulæ, in religion, in politics, in trade are revised, until finally the conception of personal freedom appears as universal as is the employment of the tongue for speech or the feet for walking.

To-day man is not only conscious, but he is becoming super-conscious : he can *study* mind : he can deliberately mould the minds of others : he can not only act

in society, but can, with intention and fore-knowledge, create society. Already the shibboleths of the newest psychology are becoming common property: already the mechanism of the social order is being appreciated here and there, as a century ago the mechanism of instinct was appreciated by the early biologists. With every decade some new field of experience, let it be in religion or politics or industry, is being subject to tests due to a better sense of values. If once men learn to master the processes of mind, to probe the machinery by which a social group maintains its power, why then a new epoch, a new stage in evolution will have been accomplished. To dream of such a line of evolution may perhaps be idle fancy: but something is gained in purpose and in confidence if a student at the outset of his journey, bewildered by cloud and fog, discern for a moment a summit to which his feet perchance may climb.

Note (Feb. 1920)).—Only now, when passing this book through the Press, have I been introduced to J. S. Huxley, *The Individual in the Animal Kingdom* (Camb. Univ. Press, 1912). Much of the zoology contained in that brilliant exposition is beyond the comprehension of a layman; the general argument, however, justifies the attempt made in this chapter to speculate on the evolution of human society, and will encourage students, both of biology and of sociology to further investigation. I congratulate myself that the position taken up in this book falls into line with the conception of groups, as “individuals of the third grade.” And, also, that as regards biology one can turn with hope to a young explorer like Julian Huxley to answer the dogmas of the older school of pessimists (p. 38 ff. above).

CHAPTER V

POWER :—THROUGH UNIFORMITY AND DIVERSITY, UNITY, CONFLICT, FUSION

Social power.—Our conception of corporate life takes on more and more the aspect of reality. We *do* things, achieve results; not only is there community of feeling and of memory, but of product. Thus we come to some conception of force or energy, terms which go back in the origin of speech to root ideas about using the hands and getting things done by their means. When man first employed this language he had no conception of general or potential energy in nature; science in later days has given a universal reference to language of a more limited range, blessing the Jehovah who “teacheth my hands to war so that a bow of steel is broken in mine arms.” In this passage the exercise of power is personal, and here as everywhere the paradox of self and alter, universal and individual, will pursue us. Man at first seeks power, whether through fists or through cunning, for himself; as he grows in grace he surveys the kingdoms of the world and turns away from them: the lust for personal power dies, replaced by the exercise of social power (71), where personal achievement and authority are subsumed in corporate activity. The individual still finds scope for personality; he is not a mere cypher, but his influence is expressed as part of a chorus. And his further development is marked by increase in capa-

city for playing a part in many groups, extending both sympathy and intellectual interest over an extended range. His highest ambition leads not to the Super-man of Nietzsche but to the Son of Man, the servant, comrade or counsellor of all:—both are sources of power, but while the first deals death the second is a fountain of life.

We need a further mode of speech to express the energy exercised in social groups; we seem compelled to use the language of physics, but must avoid mere analogy; both physics and psychology trace back their terms to a time when man first distinguished power from its instrument. It is as easy for a psychologist to conceive of social power as for the physicist to assume the continuity of physical energy. Nor is this power a mere multiplication of individual wills; our club committee acts as a united whole, differently from its members, expressing a mind of its own, known and felt as such both by them and by outsiders. "Public opinion is just public opinion and no single person can speak on its behalf."

For practical purposes this idea of social energy helps us in distinguishing types of social structure. Every one has experience of groups in which membership is a matter of form, of habit or of social pressure; we conform because it seems the right thing to do, but we are not 'keen,' we feel little sense of unity (see below) and the majority of the members are like ourselves. If we had the necessary time, or the capacity, we should make the group effective, but as things are we let it live a lingering death.

Every theme which provides a purpose for corporate action attracts individuals in varying degrees. In the realm of football, *e.g.*, there is a small group who exist largely, if not wholly, *for* football; they may or may not make their livelihood from it; indeed the most exalted devotees are seldom "professionals" in any walk

of life. Outside this ring are a receding circle of groups, some quite vigorous, serving on committees perhaps; others "doing their bit," while the outer fringes only 'talk' football. The devotees of course complain bitterly of the "slackers," but an unprejudiced observer sees that every circle contributes its share to keep the game going. If football were the only thing worth living for, then it would be the first duty of every man to get a place in the team. But the charming quality of our species is our variety of talent; so we *distribute* our energy; not always wisely, for sometimes we dissipate it. A useful exercise for a student is to make out a list of the groups to which he belongs, commencing with the family and the nation, and then arrange these in the order in which he enjoys and displays activity: let him thereupon for the sake of comparison do the same for a friend in some other walk in life; it will readily be seen how little of our life is our own; also into how many regions we are content to dip casually without putting personal initiative and energy into them. It is only in those groups into which, as we say, we 'throw ourselves' that we really live. Social power, the energy of a group, is the outcome of individual wills. "The essence of it is control over the human spirit, and the most direct phases of it are immediately spiritual such as one mind exercises over another by virtue of what it is,—without any means but the ordinary exercise of communication. This is live human power and those who have it in great degree are the prime movers of society" (72).

When we seek to witness the operation from the standpoint of structure, we observe that the individual exerts this power not only by direct communication but through organization. In the matter of football (compare p. 24 above) there is an outermost fringe who refuse to be organized, they may even have dropped their subscription to a club and play a game once a year

or less, but we must reckon them somehow as players, in contrast to the multitude who stand absolutely beyond the pale. Above this humble level are a series of circles, each narrower and more closely knit more highly organized in successive series; each having more authority than the circle beyond it—Club, Committee, Captain, President, etc. Authority goes with interest and energy; the group must achieve its end: those who have the maximum of skill at play, who shew the keenest spirit, who devote any amount of time, will get each other chosen to manage the affairs of all.

Increase of potential.—Social energy therefore displays itself in management, in arrangements, in organization: a man may in fact be an indifferent player, but an excellent secretary of the club. A complex of instruments come into being and are refined as society becomes elaborated; structures take shape which some people call artificial because they are super-imposed upon the concrete situation. Perhaps in the case of football the play's the thing: the club is effect not cause. But what of politics, of commerce, of schooling or culture? In these realms it is evident that the machine often forgets the end for which it was created. If effects of increase in population and of means of communication be admitted, it will be seen that the modern world has made great strides in spreading and in refining those arts of organization which will engage our attention in later chapters. The result is seen in an increase in potential. True we may be over-organized: even in athletic clubs the complaint is made that some men talk too much and play too little: but men have always been liable to excess in the use of a new tool. Now that the energy has been utilized, now that the possibility of social control has been witnessed, the science of sociology, *i.e.*, the analysis of the process, cannot be long delayed.

For example, the provision of munitions in 1915 was

largely a problem of the hasty utilization of social forces : beginning with committees of all descriptions, then assembling thousands of workers, most of them new to the work, and finally a new and elaborate organization of "Welfare," due to a clearer recognition than had previously obtained that the mental and physical condition of the worker was gravely affecting the amount and quality of the munitions. Thus a tendency is shown, as we noticed above, to idolize a new species of activity :—organization : and a new type of man emerges, called the organizer. Lord Rosebery many years ago expressed the idea in a phrase now become popular :— 'social efficiency' : he hoped to see a new type of (young) man who could "go anywhere and do anything," with gifts not to be confused with the charms and courtesies of "social gifts" but with the qualities of the "public" man, the man of affairs. The popular imagination distrusts with some reason the influence of the organizer; he is sometimes identified with the lawyer, whose business it is to be, above all, social, *i.e.*, to know other people's business and to see things from their point of view.

The secret of this power, exchanged between the one who has become an organizer and the many who share in the membership is *in the reality of the bond*. The good organizer is not a "boss," or at least not a tyrant : he shares the sentiments of the multitude : he loses himself in his party, except so far as he can induce the party to receive something of his personality. But as organizer, as agent, his rôle is not to lead, but to manipulate.

It is vain for us to complain against politicians, directors, secretaries, committees : their increasing energy is a necessary product of a new social order. They are the symbols which express the manifold energy of great masses of people who are no longer, as in ancient civilization, mere existences living from hand to

mouth, but full grown men with ideas and affections acting through a colossal and a complex mechanism.

Thus we arrive at the paradox of freedom with its individuality over against social energy, expressed through a mechanism in which the individual *appears* to be sacrificed. We saw in the last chapter that society found its origin in variation, or diversity : that the very bond which unites two or more in company depends upon each individual being different from his fellow ; and yet membership implies uniformity, suppression of self : social power can only achieve its results by such means. The real distinction between a democracy and a tyranny is that the structure of democratic society enables all who care for freedom to share to some extent in membership, to count in organization : whereas tyranny depresses all except the tyrant's friends.

Uniformity and Diversity.—This demand for uniformity needs further notice. Energy expresses itself *through* the machine : and social energy is effective just so far as the members of a group fall into line. The steam roller of uniform rules, statute law, common dress, refined accent, passes over the individual ; all must pay the same subscription, vote on the same day, talk the same language :—or the group dissolves. This we say is a law of nature : the uniformity of nature is the first article of the creed. And yet there is nothing absolute about this law of nature : variation and eccentricity are equally a part of nature's scheme. It looks as if the law, so-called, were merely a device by which the maximum of benefit can be got *from* routine : wherever, in any direction, a chance for variation is postponed, or wherever things *need* to be repeated, then "nature" establishes a routine, fixes a procedure. Thereafter a minimum of attention, or no attention at all, is required : the subject can transfer his regard to what is novel and variant. Thus reflexes, habits, rules of thumb have their function as bases for a higher life.

So it is in the social order. The manufacturer always seeks uniformity : he reduces time, locality, temperature, force, hands to a routine which produces a million articles to pattern : the member of parliament needs uniform voters ; the accountant tries a uniform Brunsviga calculator to replace a clerk who can (with variations) tot lines of figures ; the efficient school, from this point of view, is a smooth machine. Thus by the elaboration of machinery the modern world, as we have seen, finds itself overwhelmed by a capacity to increase its resources until man comes to believe that God is on the side of the big battalions. And in quite a real sense this is true :—yet only half the truth.

For I submit to routine in one situation so that I may vary in another. I cannot get my share in the social life of my group unless I hand over a part of myself to the group : but I lose my life to save it, *i.e.*, to find another avenue for freedom (see below).

We are very liable in discussing uniformity to get astray from the facts. There is a chapter in Bryce's *American Commonwealth* on "The Uniformity of American Life" (73) which well repays reading in this connection. He is wearied, as everyone who has travelled widely on that continent must be, by the monotonous repetition of cities, streets, stores, cars, multiplied without end and possessing apparently no individual quality : the only situation like it in Europe is in Lancashire where, he says, "Bury is slightly less rough than Oldham, and Wigan a thought more grimy than Bolton." But he rightly points out that this phenomenon, so distasteful to a traveller accustomed to the variation of Italy or Spain, is due simply to "newness." Give America time—centuries of time—and each State, each "ville," will find its own life. The error in judgment arises from the point of view : to the man himself, running a store in Pottsville or a mill in Bury, Lancs., life may be just as varied and picturesque as it is to Lord Bryce : it is

only to the traveller (who is not obliged to travel, any way !) that the swarming multitude seems all of a piece. If the view as regards routine which is expressed above be accepted, then these uniform characters are merely displayed in order to enable the individual, Lancashire operative or Ohio storekeeper, to express his personality in other spheres where initiative is still available. You object, he says, to my building this street like the last ; to our establishing a Local Board identical with those of our neighbours ; to my wearing a coat like those of a million other people ? But why object ? I am not concerned about variety in these matters ; the pattern is not perfect, but it will do : I myself want to get the house put up, the rates fixed, the clothes ordered as quickly (and therefore as uniformly) as possible, so that I can find more time for my pleasures, for my inner freedom. When for instance we read other chapters of Bryce and see how the typical American engages in politics and in business it is clear that individuality and expansion may have due scope, but in directions quite different from those hitherto regarded as adequate. The American in fact is making an art out of social relationships. The huge scale on which business and politics are now transacted has opened an extraordinary vista to the imagination, and set millions of men engaged, in their leisure time, with newspapers and with talk about public life. To them such affairs constitute the art of life ; uniformity in streets, cars, dress, churches, that does not trouble them at all : in fact the endless repetition of identical forms in such matters adds to the interest of the problem. For numbers tell ; millions are pitted against millions ; the art of life is in calculation, in wholesale estimation. You object to uniformity ? The American answers by producing a super-machine which will turn out a million uniforms a minute, all exactly alike, so that he need never hereafter worry about clothes. And his art, his enjoyment is not in wearing the

clothes, but in devising the machine, and in organizing thereafter the advertisement and sale of the goods. A critic adds that this may be all right for the man who devises the machine, but what of the million who wear his clothes? Does not the process create a new aristocracy, a select few, Americans *par excellence*, who organize the life of a stupid multitude beneath them. The criticism is just and shews that diversity needs to be organized for as much as uniformity. The problem carries us straight towards those burning issues of the relation between employer and employed which are rapidly becoming the focus of conflict in the Anglo-Saxon race. Sooner or later both parties to this strife will see that the employee, while apparently seeking higher wages as a means to equality, is really needing them as a resource against monotony: he seeks variation, change (see pp. 18, 62) and every step taken, by education, by shorter hours for labour and the like, to stimulate the appetite for variety tends to make the employee less satisfied with the present situation. The dissonance between uniformity and diversity is always sounding a new note. When Mr Hoover and his few Americans fed and clothed destitute Belgium in 1915-16 on a completely uniform mechanical system, the moral and social effect on the forlorn multitude was wholly different from the steam-roller suppression of individuality feared by my critic as a result of wholesale manufacture and distribution in competitive industry.

Choice, Freedom, Opportunity.—The inquiry into uniformity carries us further afield. We attach ourselves to many groups by deliberate choice; although when once attached we must obey the rules, we enter freely and we depart freely. In other groups, however, such as the Family, the Occupation, the State, we are members whether we will or no: we shall discuss the nature of these universal groups in later chapters, but it is important at once to note their claim as regards

uniformity. We are in and cannot get out : hence we are compelled to obey : and yet " the Englishman hates compulsion." Compulsion he says is the sworn foe of freedom, and freedom is the peculiar birth-right of true Britons. Here is a dilemma indeed ! For compulsion is the sequel to organization, wherever the group is of universal character : a community *can* only express its power through the application of rules. Individuals may protest against any particular act, they may determine on resistance, passive or active ; but to be on principle " agin the Government " is fatuous. The organization has been contrived for the very purpose of this detested compulsion : a group which proposes to be managed anarchically is already in dissolution. If freedom be nothing more than desire to escape from fellowship then it is a will o' the wisp.

Hence the average Englishman, being a practical theorist, has made his general line of freedom centre on some specific field of enfranchisement : in the sixteenth century he wished to be free from Papal compulsion but accepted Tudor tyranny ; in the nineteenth he asked to be free from the excise man but accepted an Income Tax. It was only a few philosophers who taught a general theory of freedom from anything and anybody : they set up (as we saw in the last chapter) an idol called Individualism, and have had a popular following from those who like to be deceived by phrases ; but the practical Englishman comes back to definite policy and common sense. The general freedom that he demands is the *feeling* of spontaneity and go-as-you-please, like " birds that wanton in the air " ; " fishes that tippie in the deep " (74). Other things being equal he ought to enjoy this feeling in as many spheres as possible. To quote again from Bryce : " Thus he (the American citizen) is led, I will not say to form his own opinions, for even in America few are those who do that, but to fancy that he has formed them " (75). So a man is

ready to admit that this enjoyment has to be restricted, and his social and political activities are concerned, not with raising shrines to the goddess of Freedom, but in compromising between self and alter. With the advance of democracy he works out the compromise in new ways :—if for example he has to surrender his freedom, well then there must be compulsion *all round*. My general sense of freedom is greatly stimulated if I know that we are all in the same boat! This explains partly why the Trades Unions exercise so strong a compulsion over their circle; they are the stoutest advocates of freedom over against rival groups, but discipline and uniformity within the trade they realize as essential. During the war their representatives in the Labour Party did not oppose Military Service as such, but they pointed out that when once you start compulsion you are logically entitled to seek compulsion all round; hence Mr J. H. Thomas prophesied a “conscription of wealth” as the proper sequel to a conscription of the wealth producer; hence when the unmarried men were called up the demand followed for compulsion of the married.

To the American freedom is *opportunity*, opportunity for right development. As a member of the State he is willing to be compelled, but he has interests other than political, and if as a citizen he accepts compulsion not only must every other citizen fall into line but in other social relations he must find scope for variety, and this scope he finds in the range of social and industrial opportunity which the New World still offers so abundantly.

Diversity one aspect of freedom.—The efficiency therefore of a social group runs parallel once more with the psychology of personal development, in the contrasted rhythms of freedom and discipline, of uniformity and diversity. You cannot make Epictetus a slave in soul or disturb his serenity by chains: “Stone walls

do not a prison make" (74). At the other extreme a man may be free from civic restraint, as Englishmen and Americans have so largely been, and yet bound rigidly by the conventions of his social circle and neighbourhood. He who is *really* free is frank and sincere first of all with himself; and what is true of the individual is equally true in all the manifestations of the social mind. When first writing these lines I was reading narratives which shew how two different types of Englishmen regard their freedom. In the one a distinguished "agitator" is brought before a Tribunal (March 1916) which has claimed his service as a soldier. He refuses the claim because as a "free" man he claims the right to decide how he shall serve his country. We need not discuss the Act of Parliament by which such men were coerced, or the procedure followed by some of our fellow-citizens who served on the Tribunals, but in the last resort no man can stand against his nation and decide by himself how we can be rescued from peril or whether we shall submit to an enemy:—unless indeed a man resolves to rebel and recreate the social order! After reading this report I read some of the chapters in *Naval Occasions* (76) and realized how wonderfully the naval officer can find true freedom in a group where despotism reigns supreme. Here are men full of resource and initiative, free within their sphere yet compelled by winds and waves to inexorable discipline; shewing nothing of agitation in demeanour or speech, but stirred by "the soul of the ship," to a silent devotion to the Service. "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, *there* is liberty": on sea and land alike. The agitator accepting prison because he paradoxically demands his freedom, the sailor serving his ship for England's sake, can alike maintain the spirit of a freeman and yet bow to social discipline.

In seeking to reconcile freedom with discipline we come to the heart of things; to the inner spirit by

which the dry bones of Uniformity are stirred to life by Unity.

Unity.—

“ That Sovran Heart in Harmony !
 Its eyes unseen, its ways unknown.
 'Tis utter Justice; boundless sea
 Of Unity; and Secret Throne
 Of Love; a spirit Meeting Place
 Of vital dust and mortal breath
 That needs no point of time or space
 To bind together life and death ” (77).

One finds it difficult to put into words the tremendous import of this principle, for here at last we have a view of experience to which other sciences can offer no parallel scheme of thought. We have seen that for the sake of society a man hands over something of his personality : he loses his life to save it.

What then am I hoping to save by this transaction? What is the life that I have saved? Is it solely a self-ish thing, something attached to me, in which an “ alter ” has no share? In some groups and to some extent this is the case. In the golf-club, for instance, I pay my subscription, attend meetings, serve perhaps in office, associate with partners when I go round the greens, and in all these transactions I behave according to code, accept uniformity, lose my self. At the end, however, I get something entirely personal, I get my health : my digestion, my circulation are improved. But is this all? Certainly not. Even the most egotistic golfer knows that something more is gained than the exercise which is the ostensible pretence : the social exchange, what we call the “ society ” has counted for much : so that even if the weather is execrable and compels all to stay in the clubroom, the Saturday afternoon is not wholly wasted.

How much more then is the benefit of an altruistic kind in groups whose constitution and aim are solely concerned *with* society :—in the family, in religion, law,

politics, education. Here the benefit is solely due to a union of souls, of minds, of hearts, whatever term we may select to indicate the persons who reciprocate experience. This union is not an accretion of uniform particles attracted to one spot by identity in composition: on the contrary when you have done with uniformity, when you have adopted the rules and conventions of your group and thrust them below the level of consciousness, you enter then into variety, exchange, face-to-face intercourse. You are "free": you give of your best, and what you give is not lost to you for it is united in your neighbour's thought: he expresses himself, not for his own sake but because he and you are of one mind, one social mind.

This union of wills is, as we saw in Chapter I., the basis of sociology; what we are now emphasizing is the emotional aspect of it: some groups are constituted for "strictly business" purposes, or from other motives, intellectual or æsthetic, which appeal only slightly to social passion. But it is obvious that as soon as human beings come face to face the intentions of good feeling and affection lie in wait, ready to blossom into intimate regard if the soil is favourable; and in groups of the most formal kind, even in a Limited Company, some sort of mutual fellowship is an advantage. We add "mutual" although it sounds like tautology; but this is to emphasize the fact that affection may be one-sided: love may be unrequited. Now while it is possible for partners in any type of grouping to differ widely in the capacity for affection or in the height to which feeling may extend, the success of the group cannot depend upon love unless the affection is returned. The bond may be maintained by self-regarding interests, by affinities drawn from a hundred sources, but sheer human affection and goodwill does not enter into the transaction unless the display of such sentiments by one is responded to by the other. The founder of the

Christian commonwealth said : " I love them that love me " although, without inconsistency, we find elsewhere the exhortation to " love your enemies." There is no inconsistency : granted that I display such abounding passion as to love my enemy, I cannot share life *with* him, there is no mutual bond on which to base a joint endeavour. The hope for human progress lies in the contagious quality of the passions : hate suggests hate, but love suggests love also : and when the tide turns love will prove the master.

Unity the source of power.—There are many terms to express this principle : altruism (78), love, goodwill, fellowship, harmony, sympathy, communion, concord. We prefer " unity " because it is the most universal in its reference. It brings us to the heart of the social situation just because it involves that union of *meum* and *tuum* on which social energy in the last resort depends : it selects out of all our relations with our kind those qualities and efforts in which we agree : it exalts these, rejoices in them, but allows our diversities and differences to go their own way and operate in their own sphere. In religion it created tolerance, in politics it admitted government by party ; in family life it allows the elders to give scope to the rising generation, and is reshaping the relation of the sexes.

It gets to the root of progress because human life is at bottom an affair of emotions : if the self be anywhere it resides in feeling and sentiment : and if the social mind exist at all it is manifest in sympathy. Some philosophers have taken happiness, " the greatest happiness of the greatest number " as a formula of progress ; others have sought to describe salvation as " harmonious development " : the Christian made love, human and divine, the pole star of his universe. The point we wish to bring into relief is that this attitude towards " the neighbour," *i.e.*, towards every group to which a man belongs, is the root of social power ; call

it good-feeling and we can perhaps realize better its import. It is the disposition or setting in which discussion and enterprise have full scope. In a gathering where it is felt that some are out of harmony with the rest, that A. has a private design which B. suspects and fears, the entire force of the organization is inhibited. Perfection of efficiency is not secured by complete adjustment of the uniform routine but by the wholehearted communion of a loyal fellowship.

But, it will be said, to demand this sympathy is to demand impossibilities: the man of affairs, who knows the world, knows that such sentiments are rare; that, on the contrary, the instincts, so-called, of self-assertion, pugnacity, fear, repulsion (see p. 67 above), all impel a man to quarrel. One, of course, replies that tendencies which carry back to our brute ancestry (compare p. 79 above) are just those which one may expect to survive as vestiges of a lower life, but should not on that account be accepted as inevitable: that even the veriest man of the world assumes the *demeanour* of courtesy and friendship when he desires to persuade his fellows to work for common ends.

Is it too much to believe that hope for human progress finally depends upon the refinement and exaltation of this spirit? That man and his societies have developed largely in the measure of their obedience to it? Thus Graham Wallas (79) holds that Public Spirit is a modern development; Trotter, while looking for salvation to a new principle in "the conscious direction of society," bases his hope for this consummation in a further evolution of altruism (80). Bryce noted in 1888 as an encouraging feature in American life that "To help others is better recognized as a duty than in Europe" (81); from personal experience in more recent days I am sure that this recognition is still widely accepted as an obligation.

What is here indicated is not to be mistaken for

enthusiasm, which is an overflow of sympathy for one social group, often at the expense of other claims. If life were so simple that we could offer our all in one temple, then indeed the abandonment of the enthusiast would be justified; in the crisis of a world war when the call of the nation is imperative, the soldier is asked to be enthusiastic, to neglect for the time the claims of all other groups until the commonwealth is saved from dissolution. How hard it is for any man of wide tastes and interests to enter such combat in a cheerful spirit! It needed all the philosophy as well as the camaraderie of camp friends to maintain the glow.

In the more trivial concerns of life the glow is fainter because the devotion is less exclusive; but the quality is of a like kind; in speech, in demeanour, as well as in the inner spirit, it speaks of brightness and good cheer. Granted that the darker elements in human nature oppress society with fear and jealousy, "perfect love casteth out fear."

Unity as Public Spirit.—If we dwell on this principle of goodwill it is only because we fail to find it adequately emphasized by many of those who concern themselves with 'social questions.' Its importance as an element in religion is of course admitted, but since religious communities are only one type of social grouping men are prone to assume that "charity," to use yet another term, is a disposition confined to religious observance; that in other spheres it may be a hindrance to efficiency, or at best an ornamental grace. Doubtless an appearance of prestige is often secured when the egoistic authority suppresses the alter and ignores the inner spirit of unity; the reality is otherwise.

We have seen that the modern world displays social energy on a wholesale scale: the organizer of social forces succeeds the magnetic leader and captain of earlier generations. The master-hand to-day controls "movements" rather than men: prestige and power comes

to him who can guide the energy of opinion. It is therefore all the more necessary to penetrate deeper and make certain whether energy, even of multiplied millions, can exalt a nation. In the material world energy will destroy as readily as it will save: and, if the analogy hold good, social energy is just as blind to destiny. Both types of force need the control of a higher ideal. It is said that "corporations have no souls," by which is meant that the soul of a corporation is mean, or that the moral standard of a company is lower than that of an individual, or perhaps that a social group always tends to adopt the ideals of its weakest members. No such general indictment can be maintained; if a corporation is at times degraded by the meanness of the mean, equally often its loftier sentiments uplift the baser sort: the soul of England from 1915 to 1918 was, in some directions, of better fibre than that of many Englishmen.

The warning against a soulless corporation has, however, a definite reference to our generation, to the epoch of The Great Society. It is possible for modern man to adopt a modern creed, and actually believe that the social mind is exempt from the moral code. With such a creed the official can give full rein to the lust of power, can use his social machine to the basest ends, comforted by the assurance that goodwill and harmony are out of place when dealing with the multitude. The opposite sentiment has been finely sketched for us under the term Public Spirit (82). In contrast to earlier views Graham Wallas maintains that the simple emotion of goodwill lays hold of men of larger mind with equal energy and with finer grasp. The patriot statesman images "man as part of a living universe"; he feels a sense of public duty to a great party, to his "people," even at times to the world as a whole, with as definite a purpose as a clergyman may feel for his parish, or a preceptor in Rugby School for his House.

The development of personality in the higher types of men in our epoch evidently depends upon increase in this capacity; in adolescence the youth opens his heart to his neighbour and as life enlarges he discovers a larger and yet larger circle with which he may unite, without forsaking the more intimate range of personal affection (compare pp. 136 and 224). By way of contrast with Graham Wallas a student can observe a tendency among some psychologists to anticipate another course, to suggest the evolution of a higher type of man who will deliberately acquire the arts both of self-control and of control over inferior men apart from sympathy and fellowship. There is no doubt that psychology has now advanced sufficiently not only to help the politician and the industrial expert, but to help the individual in self-direction, by the assiduous cultivation of "the self-regarding sentiment" (83). But if a man seeks to grow year by year mainly by watching and experimenting upon himself, he may possibly become powerful, but one doubts if he will find solid rock beneath his feet. Few physicians are daring enough to prescribe for their own ailments; it is in the service of others that they practise their art. The student of human nature is well advised to use psychology and seek higher levels by forgetting himself, finding an inner harmony in the expansion of social relations. In other words, self direction and self culture ensue as a sequel to public spirit, to a study of the claims to loyalty made by the various groups in which a man is involved.

The sphere of conflict.—We have sought to shew that unity is a special quality, the root principle of social life. In the individual life one cannot hope to avoid conflict: personal development is, in one aspect, a perpetual controversy between desires: choice is never settled once for all: the cheerfulness of a happy disposition is not the result of smug satisfaction with oneself. In this respect a sharp line has to be drawn

drawn between the group and the individual. The group *must* seek unity; discussion there may be, but internal conflict, civil war is fatal: whereas in our individual life conflict is the order of the day, for we rise "*from* our dead selves to higher things."

In saying this we are not treating a group as an accretion of uniform particles, for the members of a group are a unique combination of likeness and difference. They unite because the desires which unite are greater than those which tend to separation; but they unite also because by exchange and discussion they seek amid diversity to achieve a common purpose. But such exchange is not quarrel; so far as animosity is introduced into the relations so far is the group in danger of dissolution.

Is there then no sphere of conflict in our social relations? Yes, for each group struggles to maintain itself against the rest. Each type, religious, political, athletic, industrial, makes its claim for attention and fights for itself. Protestants differ from the Roman Catholic Church and with one another, but they unite on behalf of the spiritual life to combat the 'worldly' policy of states or of the liquor trade: hence the Churches are alternately in alliance and at war. City and County are one day engaged in competition with each other, and the next are combining to withstand the central government. To-day France is the firm ally of England, but twelve years ago we were on the brink of war. And in this case we have to use the term 'war' in its proper sense to indicate that final dreadful type of struggle, to which other types of conflict are the prelude. The argument appears to take the following course:

(a) The ultimate goal of social endeavour, as of the personal life, is towards harmony and reconciliation. Just as in the personality that inner conflict, when you become conscious of it, can only be pursued with the conviction that some higher condition will be attained in

which paradox will be resolved, so in the perpetual conflict between church and church, nation and nation, city and county, old friends and new foes, some faith in ultimate reconciliation must be held unless we struggle in mad despair.

(b) But this ultimate goal, this hope of far-off things, while it should powerfully temper the tone of our conflict should not obscure the plain facts on which we base the immediate duty. Paradoxical as it may seem to pure logic, we believe quite as sincerely in the righteousness of our cause, of our group, as we do in an ultimate reconciliation of opposites. Indeed we believe more steadfastly in what is near than in what is remote : faith in the ultimate is nothing more than faith in wise destiny, in evolution ; and the course of evolution is hidden from us. " God is love " : quite true, but also " Verily Thou art a God that hidest Thyself " : so we get nearer home and are challenged by the dictum " He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how shall he love God whom he hath not seen."

Loyalty within a group implies conflict with other groups.—(c) Loyalty therefore to our group, our class, our nation is of the essence of right conduct ; and loyalty implies submission, surrender. The typical case is that of the soldier fighting in a bad cause : in the midst of the fight when war is declared he cannot without treachery forsake his comrades. All he can do is at the first convenient opportunity lay down his arms and decline service because the cause is wicked ; and many soldiers will not take this tragic step, for they cannot see clearly enough where loyalty should cease and rebellion begin. But while he remains a soldier he is no longer an individual : he is part of an organization : his views are not sought, and if he entertains views he must for the time being set them aside. We would ask the reader to think through this problem resolutely, for it underlies the deepest tragedies of our epoch.

(d) Our difficulty in accepting the doctrine of submission is due to our modern conceptions of personal freedom, which our upbringing and social heredity in recent centuries have so greatly fostered. We have come, especially in this isle of freedom, to believe in the sacred duty of asserting ourselves. If we think a policy to be wrong, we hold it our duty firstly to say so, secondly to sever ourselves from our comrades if they disagree. We cannot admit that on many topics it may be our duty to be silent; that in some cases it is our duty to continue in the group even when we disagree, and to share the guilt if our comrades act unrighteously. Further reflection should convince anyone that such loyalty is demanded and offered in many social groups, e.g., in the family, in city government, in the warehouse, in the trades union, in the church; and that the difficulties are by no means confined to that particular group we call the state or the nation. If any man doubts whether he does not surrender his convictions in such spheres of social conduct let him examine carefully his behaviour when he buys and sells, when he votes or abstains from voting, when he obeys his father; it is idle to say that moral issues are not involved in such transactions. An example may be taken from the sweated industries. It is common knowledge that many articles of domestic use, especially in rubber, pottery and textiles, are produced under shameful conditions: we buy and use these things, profiting by the low wages and unhealthy lives of our fellow men. We do not allow our conscience to be offended because we cannot help the situation: we are pawns in the game: it would be "quixotic" to assert our freedom and refuse these articles. Are we not then sharers in the guilt? Undoubtedly we are: we have surrendered our own standards of behaviour: we accept a comradeship with manufacturer, foreman, salesman and all the rest who offer these articles to us. No doubt an apologist can

soothe our consciences : he can tell us that all these forlorn toilers are free to change their occupations, to unite in Unions and to strike : but such an evasion will not stand. The workman is bound up with groups as we are ; he is not free, any more than we are, to do as he pleases ; and the employer also has a defence.

And involves our standards of conduct.—(e) Let us seek for a solution to this issue by taking another example. The cotton trade is faced with a lock-out or a strike : most employers abide by the decision of their Federation but some yield to the demands of the operatives and their mills are kept busy while the rest are idle ; they stand in conflict with their fellow employers and are disloyal to them. The test of the righteousness of their behaviour can only be answered by ascertaining their motive. If these employers by keeping open their mills are seeking personal gain, securing profits when the Federation refrains, then they are the enemies of society : but if they believe that the operatives demands are just then they are rendering allegiance to groups which appeal to their social conscience. The test of conduct has to be sought in the personal decision amid conflicting claims of social duty. Employers who abide by the Federation may in some cases hold that the majority in their Federation has done wrong, but they feel that their first duty is to their group, that solidarity and continuity of action is essential to the success of the whole trade, employers and operatives together : they therefore share in a decision which they know to be wrong and no one can justly condemn them without knowing the inner motive which leads them to acquiesce.

The conclusion which seems to confront us is that our surrender to the will of a group may involve the surrender not only of our own tastes, our own property, our own power, but of our behaviour. Our personal convictions of right and wrong have to be set aside for

the time because we believe that unity in the group will ultimately make for good beyond the benefit that might accrue by our separating from one group to join another. To some readers this conclusion may appear as an insidious defence, as compromise with evil, a cloak for unrighteousness under a specious plea for unity. And to those who so employ the argument it may well serve their turn: the motto "my country, right or wrong" will serve to dispense the individual from listening to the dictates of his own conscience. But such an interpretation will, one hopes, not be found by those who think out for themselves the fundamental relations between self and alter.

For while to the spectator the conflict appears to be carried on between rival groups, each individual member of a group finds the struggle resolving itself into that inner strife within the personality which we distinguished above from social conflict. And it is in the plain fact that the individual does and must make choice that we discern the way of escape from the demand for surrender.

The individual cannot hold aloof.—(f) It appears that I am, in all my concerns, an associate, a mere instrument in conflict, encompassed by my fellows, surrendering to their interests. Where do *I* come in? What becomes of personality and initiative? You are permitted to function, we would reply, in two ways. Firstly, you are an element in every group you belong to: an association is not a static compound of unbending shape: your part is to reform it: no doubt many of the plans you devise for this reformation will go astray, but your 'self' has play: for what you are worth you count. Over against other groups you defend your own, you are a partizan; you sink differences, you share conflict: within your group you do not quarrel, but you have your say, you influence, even where you do not convince. Secondly, you have a certain discretion in the choice

of groups : you can leave the athletic club, if you please : you can and sometimes do abandon your profession. In the old days you could with difficulty leave your township, but now-a-days you can flit from suburb to suburb without hindrance (p. 31 above).

The succeeding chapters are devoted to an analysis and survey of such groups. Meanwhile it should be emphasized that while the individual has a certain amount of choice, he cannot evade responsibility by professing to stand aloof from all groups. A man may belong to no church, to no political party, to no friendly or professional society ; he may sever himself from family relations and live in the wilderness like Thoreau, supported by the labour of his hands. All in vain ; he *knows* what goes in the world from which he has sought exemption ; formality of alliance is only the seal of a bond which attached to him from birth and will follow him to the grave (compare pp. 7 and 24 above).

The state makes an overriding claim.—(g) There is, however, one group from which no one can escape. The state makes a comprehensive and compulsory claim upon all its citizens, as the Holy Catholic Church claimed allegiance in the Middle Ages, the Khalifate in the Mussulman world or the Sheik in patriarchal families. From some such political control no individual can escape : his physical life depends upon his fellows and only by surrender of the body can he refuse dependence on their aid. Because of this ultimate necessity for social control by some kind of state, many students of sociology would appear to suffer from a political bias (see p. 32 above), erecting this group to an exalted sphere, which holds authority by a sort of divine right over all other groups. Now while this exaltation of the state tends to excess, both in theory and practice, and at the present time seems to constitute a real danger to progress, we must recognize the facts as related to the problem of conflict. For conflict implies the pos-

sible use of force. This ugly feature is concealed from us by every possible device ; it is only when the bandage on our eyes is ruthlessly torn aside by a declaration of war :—only then do we realize the dreadful consequences involved in the assertion of the human will. In all our domestic and business relations we rely upon the civil law, if need arise, to support the decisions of our group ; and this law is supported finally by the armed forces of our state ; we rest on that security when we buy and sell, when we hold debate, write, when we join in worship, when we teach and when we trade.

No logical avenue of escape from the dilemma of conflict.—(*h*) How then can any individual escape from the sense of shame, from loss of self respect when he finds his partners in a family, in an industry, in a city, in a nation, engaged in transactions which he abhors ; and that they rely, *as we all do in the last resort*, upon the ultimate sanction of force ? We suggest that no general rule can be laid down. Every man must consult his own conscience and, if need arise, must be ready to sever himself from a group with all the energy of which he is capable. During the late war our parliament recognized the logic of this position and sought a means of relief to those whose conscience forbade them to join in the European struggle. But the very fact that this relief had to be granted by the state shewed that every citizen is bound, whether he will or no, in communion with his fellows. He may adopt passive resistance and protest even to the taking of his goods or his life ; or he may actively resist and aim to establish a new government : but some sort of action, some decision is forced upon him, so long as he remains alive. We shall discuss on a subsequent page (see Chap. VII. below) the nature of this overwhelming claim made by state authority : here it is sufficient to have made clear that this force abides because conflict abides, because human passion creates enmity : men still strive for wealth and pride

and glory as well as for ideals. He who seeks to 'stop the war,' to disarm the nations, must teach them first to rise above the base passions from which all conflict takes its rise.

Fusion.—Finally, to get a complete survey of the sphere of conflict, we should need to contemplate the processes of *fusion*. As in the individual mind so in social groups we become weary of conflict and seek a larger synthesis. This is always possible in groups sharing like interests or like purposes. In early English history local government and central government are found at war—differences of origin and function were hard to reconcile. In later periods actual war has ceased but rivalry and contention reappear under various guises : at one time a Star Chamber, at another a Local Government Board are devised to aid or to thwart the fusion. The mind of England to-day is not merely local or merely national, but it is both ; Westminster has not swallowed up the Town Hall but their conflict is ended ; or what remains of jealousy can be determined by discussion. So in the larger sphere of foreign politics, we do not need *always* to fight or even to threaten ; arbitration seems possible ; federation is sometimes achieved, or is at least desired. Again let us be clear that this fusion produces not a mere mechanical structure ($a + b + c$) but a *new social mind* (an A or B). When a League of Nations Council gathers to determine the fate of Europe its members meet no longer as English or French but as a new entity, on a new plane : certainly this plane intersects with the planes of national sentiment or policy, but it is a new creation. This change in the spirit or soul of a group explains the difficulty in what is called delegation. I help to elect a Town Councillor from my ward and regard him as my representative to express my will, or rather to express the social mind of all of us who put him in the Council. But when he gets to the Town Hall he enters into a new atmosphere : when we meet

him he is no longer the man we elected, our representative, but a partner in a new firm. He does not intend to break faith with us but he sees things in a new light, and the utmost he can do is to meet us from time to time and explain what looks like confusion but may only be a case of fusion; the conflicting interests of wards and parties are fused in one social mind expressing itself in our city government. Try as we may to turn our representatives into mere delegates to vote at our bidding, nature is against us and creates, in spite of us, a new collective will.

It will not escape the reader that this process of fusion involves that act of partial surrender which occupied us earlier in this chapter. A group cannot maintain its full sovereign rights of independence when it consents to comply with the decisions of a league or federation in which its own voice is no longer supreme. This is of course the difficulty underlying the great Covenant of the League of Nations. Many enthusiastic reformers, especially in Great Britain and America welcomed this policy as a speedy device to end the dreadful agonies of war: but so soon as they realized that the League of Nations must take from each dominant state some of its inherited rights their ardour cooled; they hesitated at the very point where aspiration is to be turned into the stern realities of international control. They were prepared to sanction a League which shall exercise mandates over weaker nations, but when it dawned upon them that the exercise of a mandate might involve their own state in restrictions and obligations they revised their policy. A precisely similar difficulty confronts all attempts to fuse the clashing interests of property and labour. Whitley Councils are distrusted by many representatives of *both* sides simply because they foresee that the effective operation of fusion demands a measure of surrender; and no one can foresee how the surrender will extend.

We have now completed the first section of our study, securing a view of the features of corporate life, and of the conditions which enable a group to exercise power and achieve its ends. We are now in a position to arrange groups in a scheme of classification according to their salient characteristics.

SECTION II.—TYPES OF SOCIAL GROUPING

THE society to which moral conduct is a contribution may vary in its range from the immediate surroundings to humanity itself. But even when an act is claimed in the name of humanity, it is no less a duty towards a particular person or a limited society. Morality only implies that, however wide or narrow the society, the service should be rendered freely. Hardly any temperament is so ineffectual for progress as that which, because its sympathies are widely diffused, cannot at the same time intensely love a few.—ALEXANDER, *Moral Order and Progress*, pp. 410, 411.

But there was more in it than that. He talked to me about Russia. That seemed to be his great idea when the war began that it was going to lead to the most marvellous patriotism all through Russia. It seemed to begin like that, and do you know, Durward, as he talked, I saw that patriotism was at the bottom of everything, that you could talk about Internationalism until you were blue in the face and that it only began to mean anything when you'd learned first what nationality was—that you couldn't really love all mankind until you'd first learnt to love one or two people close to you. And that you couldn't love the world as a vast democratic state until you'd learnt to love your own little bit of ground, your own fields, your own river, your own church tower. Markovitch had it all as plain as plain: "Make your own house secure and beautiful. Then it will fit into the general scheme."—HUGH WALPOLE, *The Secret City*, p. 348.

CHAPTER VI

PRIMARY GROUPS

A scheme of classification.—Writers on sociology propose many schemes of classification for groups; we have already referred to more than one arrangement. A preliminary distribution (p. 34 above) arises from the length of time during which a company holds together: the crowd (84), the social evening, the public meeting are ephemeral gatherings: they are important phenomena and their behaviour has attracted considerable attention from investigators. If we omit them from these chapters it is only because we think that the more permanent forms of association first of all demand attention from students of sociology.

Confining our notice therefore to groups which bear a character of stability, we find a classification ready to our hand by following the developing interests of a human being (compare p. 84 above):—the *Family* circle first engages the infant, and long before he is himself conscious of sex distinctions he realizes the three “worlds” of Men, Women and Children: we add *children* because every child shares the mind of his own *period* or generation quite otherwise than with his elders. As soon as he steps out-of-doors he explores a new circle, for acquaintance begins with outsiders; and when he goes to *school*, if not before, *friendship* becomes possible, and as time goes on he may find himself on intimate terms with others beyond the home circle. In classes of society where school activities do not afford

adequate scope for friendship boys often form gangs (85), whose activities demand the attention of the police as well as of social workers. So far he is satisfied with face-to-face intercourse, in Primary Groups such as we have already distinguished (see p. 25 above). But a large part of his education, both casual and deliberate, is concerned with introducing him to large impersonal groups, which will make a greater or less claim upon his regard according to his social capacity. The *locality* in which the youngster's home is found appeals at first through the familiar sights and sounds about him : in a favourable environment this complex establishes itself in his regard with a more diffuse but still quite genuine sentiment towards his village or town : and a basis of local patriotism can be traced to these years of childhood. Much more impressive, however, in most families two strands of influence are witnessed of a nature quite disparate but each holding its own in human society ; the one is the prestige of *class*, the other the development of an inner spiritual life, and therewith the encouragement of children to affiliation with some *religious* group. Identification with the *state* has not been presented, in this country, to the child's attention with the same zeal as is shewn by the clergy on behalf of religion : but in some countries such as Germany, Japan and America deliberate efforts have long been made to maintain royal prestige or national devotion by capturing the hearts of children. It is only as the years of adolescence are approaching that such sentiments can be expected and they will develop unless education and environment are alike unfortunate. Finally, there are three other types of social activity which find more and more scope as the self-regarding sentiments (p. 66 above) take more definite shape during this same period :—not of necessity in opposition to altruism, but as supplementary thereto (compare p. 189 below) :—these we may call, firstly, the pursuit of an *occupation*

or vocation, secondly, the pursuit of *leisure*; including the pursuit of culture or personal development, so far as the young man with the passage of years finds that his mind is not satisfied by the stimulus of other social groups.

Put into a scheme of classification we arrange as follows :—

- I. Primary Groups :—Family, Sex, Period, Friendship, Neighbourhood.
- II. Universal Groups :—Spiritual (Religious) contrasted with Secular (State); and Caste or Class as antithetical to these.
- III. Self-regarding Groups :—Occupation, Leisure.

Some students interpose intermediate groups between the primary groups and the secondary impersonal groups; thus city is intermediate between the ward and the state; county football comes between the local team and the national association. But this distinction is one of degree rather than of kind : it is important, certainly, for the organizer who has to deal with members of a group according to their capacity for sharing in the extended life of a wide circle; in a preliminary study such as these chapters offer the distinction need not be pursued further, although it is quite important in its place, and one must be always ready to allow for a variety of grades ranging between the smallest primary groups and the vast unities of church, nation and league of nations.

One is aware that any such classification is open to criticism—indeed the author can criticize it himself as soon as it is put down in black and white. Any attempt to earmark a form of social grouping tends to emphasize one aspect of an activity at the expense of others. Its value will only be admitted by those who appreciate the importance of studying development from infancy

to adult life, and roughly parallel to this, the development of the race from savagery to civilization. It appears that as mankind has passed through great epochs differentiation has made man conscious in succession of the needs for specific organization and grouping, beginning with the primary and advancing to the impersonal, beginning with a stage where the organization of relationship (86) covers the claims of Religion, of Vocation, of Leisure and Culture, and ending in our present social order, wherein the dominant races maintain their prestige by the aid of a preponderant capacity for corporate feeling and activity, a capacity that extends the range and complexity of social grouping, without diminishing to a hazardous degree the strength of those primitive bonds in primary groups to which early man was confined. This capacity is a feature of evolution in the race; it is equally demanded in the evolution of personality. The life story of 'successful' men may be pictured in many cases as effort to escape from the limitations of family and parish to the large impersonal life of the city or nation, the diocese, the trades union or the federation. Conflict between the sexes is largely based on this change of outlook and sympathy. 'Woman's place is the home' says the man, and she replies, 'Man's place is the home also,' and her plea is supported by the passages quoted in the introduction to this section (p. 119 above). One of the tasks laid by modern society upon the school is to assist both sexes to develop wisely in sympathy both for the immediate and the remote.

In this and the two chapters following we shall treat briefly of each of these types, in the hope of shewing that under one or other of them every mode of social activity can find a place, and also of indicating in general terms the way in which each of them operates in our modern life in obedience to the laws or principles of social evolution.

The Family.—Popular discussion often pictures the family as the most primitive human group and thereupon describes the enlargement of the unit as evolving into clans, tribes, villages, cities and finally nations as the summit of civilization. Now while there is a certain basis of truth in this view of development, we have already noticed (Chap. IV.) that the anthropological record does not justify any such simple scheme of relationships (87). It would be beyond our purpose, and beyond my capacity, to review the researches made in this field, whether of mankind in its beginnings or of the lowest types of humanity which advancing civilization has still permitted to struggle for existence. In some primitive types of society it would almost appear as if the indiscriminate association of the sexes, so revolting alike to barbarism and to civilized sentiment, created a situation where there was no place for the family group. Such a society appears on a superficial study to indicate a condition of decadence beneath that of the higher mammals from whom the human race derived: but we must await the results of further research by anthropologists before pretending to pronounce judgment on our ancestors. The bond which creates the family is not essentially concerned with sexual love, or with life-long intimacy between a man and a woman, but with the care of the young. It is for their sake that the family, whether in birds or beasts or humans, originates; all the elaborations and refinements of family organization, of law and custom relating to the home, sprang from the experience that the rising generation are fostered best (best, *i.e.*, in the interests of the species) by being kept in the narrow shelter of the parents for an appropriate period. This consideration disposes of the naïve view entertained by some writers that with the enlargement of the sociological unit in the modern world the family may count less as a social group. The state, it is sometimes held,

is the last chapter in an evolution which began with the family and, after the successive enlargements to which we have referred, is now to emerge as the foster-parent :—analogous to the beehive which so often presents itself as an engaging illustration. No doubt, for the simplicities of speculation, such a theory has something to commend it : the state, it is said, already provides the crèche for babes and the school for children, why not extend this efficient machinery and relieve the elders of all other obligations except the brute task of bringing offspring into the world? Such travesty of argument only shews how easy it is to bring into contempt the theory of evolution, when transferred from the cautious investigations of the anthropologist to the speculations of the armchair. No doubt the economic basis of the family is open to revision along with the legal status of its members, but as a group essential to the progress of mankind its status cannot be undermined without peril.

It should be observed that these speculations are always published by men : women writers, such as Ellen Key, however revolutionary their criticism of the family as now established, never deny the relationship of woman to the home. Such a denial is impossible simply because the parental impulse shapes so differently in the two sexes. If we follow McDougall (88) this impulse may almost be regarded as largely maternal, since in the male its force is as a rule so much less. It is through the development of the intelligence and the sentiments that the higher types of man have come to exhibit a heightened sense of protection for their offspring, as well as a kindly interest in the well-being of the young as a whole. When a man, however gifted as a writer or thinker, finds it possible to maintain that the strength of parental impulse is abating, it is not unjust to conceive that he himself presents a case of abnormal retrogression.

While, however, there is no evidence that the course

of evolution is likely to diminish the value of the Family, we must admit that the complexities of modern life demand a careful review of its status over against the claims of other groups, not only of the state but of the vocation and of others which will engage our attention. The solution of these rivalries is not to be sought by a denial of the right of any one of them, but by recognizing (as we repeatedly point out) the true line of evolution in a heightened capacity for sociality. The average man or woman of to-day who has enjoyed any advantages in schooling or environment, possesses a capacity which in earlier epochs was only evinced by a favoured class : he can share at the same time in many social interests, his intelligence enables him to grasp a larger field and, much more important, his sympathies enable him to reconcile and unite these with a tolerant breadth of regard. Thus he can continue to be a "good family man" while extending his range over a whole series of groups outside the home. One illustration may suffice :—the change produced by the Reformation as regards the learned and cultured professions. In the mediæval world men of learning were presumed to be celibate and were not expected to found a family : it was not regarded as within human capacity to lead the secular life with wife and children if the mind were required to centre itself upon divinity and scholarship. We do not present this as the reason for the celibacy of the clerical order but as an explanation which accounts in part for the situation.

In discussions of the stability of the family the sentiments of the children are often ignored. It is tacitly assumed that the parental sentiment keeps the home together but this is only half the truth. The child is early influenced not only by the trend of feeling in his own homestead, but by the sentiments of other children, of the general habit of his time : he comes to feel an affection for his parents often in excess of the actual

regard which they display for him. The suggestion of literature, of public opinion greatly enhances the sentiment, especially in the unsophisticated classes. There is no need to postulate filial and fraternal instincts responding to the so-called parental instinct, but these sentiments operate in our boys and girls with an effect almost as inevitable as is the case with true instincts. The book of Genesis throws back to an epoch when the claim of this sentiment was first realized. The elder son challenges the divine wrath with a sneer: "I know not: Am I my brother's keeper?" Or was this question an expression of remorse, the first awakening and revelation of a social conscience? Cain is condemned to exile, but the punishment was merely the confirmation of an attitude which till the moment of the tragedy had controlled his life: it was realized as punishment because now for the first time he was taught the meaning of family union and learnt what he had lost when he slew his father's son: "I shall be a fugitive and a vagabond on the earth." When the son rejects the family bond all other groups reject him. Thus the family presents itself as the typical scene in which altruism plays its part: here first man learns, both in the history of the race and in its renewal by each family circle how self and alter can adjust themselves to a mutual harmony (89).

A corresponding adjustment works out in all cases where family life reaches a high level of success:—the ego is not lost, but identifies the interests of the family with the self: the "family man" regards the group as *his* family; his sentiments of self-regard find satisfaction in this identification: he founds a family with his name, his homestead, his flocks and herds. So it comes about that to our modern view the family bond appears as an expression of gross individualism: it takes its stand against all other groups; and thus a process which in its origin was an immense step towards solidarity and a higher social life may appear in a more

complex society as reactionary. And so some socialists, as we have seen, justify their distrust of family sentiments and seek to establish the state as the successful rival. To the question "Am I my brother's keeper?" they would reply "Yes, for you are everybody's keeper, and you must not slay your brother since he is a citizen : but you need feel no special regard for him : set your supreme affection on the state and your brother will be well looked after." The view offered in this volume suggests that this sharp antagonism between Individualism and Socialism can be reconciled by a deeper search for principles of unity.

But we should not ignore the difficulties encountered in this search : encountered not so much by the philosopher or writer as by the elders and the young folk in the present epoch, when the avenues for a wider social life attract, and distract, the rising generation. For the emphasis on self-assertion which is the key note of solidarity in the family comes from the parents : the family is theirs, the possession of the father as the legal head, the "founder" of his family, and of the mother whose life it absorbs : the children, in spite of the strength of filial or paternal sentiments, often struggle for a larger freedom. It is inevitable therefore that in many homes, of rich and poor alike, there should be a note of pessimism (90); the failure of the family is a commonplace in the press and supplies a theme both for the pulpit and for popular fiction. A more extended application of sociological principles at this point would carry us beyond our present purpose.

Men and Women.—Difference of Sex and of Period need not long detain us for the grouping here is obvious. As regards sex the problem presents itself to the sociologist as a claim by each sex to seek a specific bond with their own kind. Important as it is, both in the family and in the nation, for men and women to agree, it is equally important that they should agree to differ,

i.e., to respect mutually the contrasted standpoint of the two sexes. Like seeks like; women are justified not only in seeking for the fulfilment of life in love of a mate, but in sharing the lives of other women: the same is true of men and has never been disputed. The Feminist Movement is partly an expression of this desire: many women engaged in domestic service, as wife or maid, are cut off from feminine organization and even from the friendship of their own sex. But this does not occur without loss; if the position of the dominant sex were not in appearance so entrenched a similar loss would be sustained by men.

Many men, and a few women, fear that this impulse to separation may be carried to excess and will emphasize sex-antagonism; they therefore seek to reconcile the antagonism by allotting spheres to each sex, giving to the woman, in addition to her function in the home, certain fields of industry or social activity which may satisfy her desire for fellowship with her own sex without bringing her into perpetual rivalry with the supposed interests of men. So far as it goes this policy succeeds; it does satisfy many women who otherwise would lead an empty life; it provides social groups in which women can pursue a vocation in common or can enjoy specialized forms of art or other culture; all such measures are better than attempts to suppress an enlarging vision by reverting to the seclusion of the Eastern harem, or the kitchen to which the German *Hausfrau* was limited. This policy certainly falls into line with the principle of enlarging capacity, justifying the modern woman who finds that she is capable not only of sharing adequately in the family group, but in finding a place also in other groups which the developments of modern life have created (91).

But on further consideration it becomes clear that this is only a palliative; it assumes that women are satisfied, as regards their own sex, with social grouping

in trades or professions specially selected for women. When however by the effects of schooling and environment you introduce a new generation of women to a larger life they make discoveries in two directions, firstly they find themselves interested in anything and everything that is going on about them : politics, religion, science, industry, progress, all and each claim regard from one or another. It may be that these interests are fleeting and superficial ; an older person may say that young women *should* not be interested in such affairs : but the facts are so, and the movement towards equality of schooling for boys and girls has greatly aided to widen this interest. Hence when they ask to be registered as citizens, to be admitted as auxiliary police force, to practice medicine or law, they are merely illustrating the compelling process of evolution ; and the concession of such liberties is no longer a matter of principle but of expediency and mutual goodwill between the sexes. For this process of enlargement leads to the second discovery concerned with woman's relationships to the opposite sex. She discovers that she is much more like men than an earlier generation had admitted. The domestic circle emphasizes contrast of sex, but when men and women work together, study together,—we may now add (although not in the literal sense) fight together for king and country—they find that they share a common mind in a hundred spheres. True enough the attraction and separation due to sex does not disappear, but these tend to fall below the threshold of consciousness and are reserved for the proper time and occasion. In all the higher interests of modern life, while there exists no doubt a man's view and a woman's view, there exists also an abstract, universal, neutral view, a common ground from which neither sex can be barred entry. The fact that in such occupations the two sexes meet is not, or need not be, a hindrance to the pleasure with which both parties engage in them ;

on the contrary the variety of point of view, of feeling and insight, of charm and expression due to sex, may add to enjoyment and therefore to the success of the joint effort :—so long of course as the attraction of sex does not force itself above the threshold and dominate the attention. The novelist, of course, describing a man of science and a women student in the laboratory insists that they shall not only be acquaintances or friends, but shall fall in love :—quite so, it is his business to make people fall in love on every occasion. But the plain result of what is called the emancipation of women is that it brings with it the emancipation of man also :—a freedom, that is to say, of both sexes to enter upon a larger life with mutual interests, which will keep sex in its place although never denying either its function or its value. It goes without saying that this freedom, if it is not to cause unhappiness and social loss, implies a higher self-discipline and inhibition than was demanded in earlier epochs when the dominant sex satisfied its desires without question.

Grouping according to sex therefore presents itself in a double form ; first as a separatist movement, recognizing the need and right of each sex to their own point of view and, by consequence, an exclusive social life ; secondly as a co-operative movement, yielding place to both sexes with equal claims in all the other groups, from the primary groups of family and neighbourhood to the wide spread institutions of the state, of occupation, or of culture and leisure.

A complete survey of the sociology of sex would lead us at this point to consider the change in public opinion and in social heredity as regard the control of sex appetite (pp. 61-5 above), but this theme needs a volume to itself, and it cannot be adequately treated by a plea for what is now advocated under the term sex-education (92).

Period or Generation.—As regards children, the same general line of argument can be followed. Although

closely attached to their elders in the home, they seek society among those of their own generation. For the chief purpose of school, looked at from the level of the child's horizon, is to secure companionship : some parents do not understand this and are often subconsciously impelled by jealousy, disguised as an anxiety lest their offspring should be contaminated by undesirable acquaintance. Certainly, as Thomas Arnold long ago preached to his sober lads in Rugby Chapel (93), companionship may be disastrous : it may also, and in numberless instances does, prove an elixir of life, of the best quality of life ; it is always hard for parents, especially in circles where class distinctions are felt to be valuable, to strike the mean between discipline and freedom.

We differentiate our system of schools partly in obedience to child psychology, distinguishing Infant, Primary, Secondary and College, but this distinction extends far beyond the educational system. The psychologist indicated four well-marked periods or stages between the cradle and the fully developed man or woman :—Infancy, Childhood, Early Adolescence or Youth and Later Adolescence (94); and a year or two of uncertainty is interposed between these stages ; the scholars in a good school system should find themselves at each stage grouped with those of their own period and organized, for corporate life even more than for instruction, from this point of view. Every generation of contemporaries receives its own social inheritance and looks at the world with new eyes ; the elders may try their utmost to control and guide the society of youth, but they can only achieve this within limits, for they—one had better say we—cannot wholly understand the young life about us ; we cannot even gain a partial understanding except by sympathy and by close study. The boys and girls at school, the young men in workshops and in academies belong to their own period and revise our conceptions of life and

progress. This was always the case, but in these later days the process is more marked because our belief in freedom and our reliance on schooling offer far greater opportunities to youth for expansion than the elder world could have permitted. In Europe above all during these desperate years of war the reliance of youth on age has been undermined; the pillars of society are rocked to their foundations; we have squandered the resources which they looked to enjoy and the task of reconstruction is left in their hands.

To say this is by no means to accept Dr Osler's dictum "too old at forty." But it indicates a line of demarcation which cannot be overstepped and suggests the need for observing the Golden Mean; avoiding excess either in identifying ourselves with the society of youth, or in severing ourselves from the periods which succeed us. Thus in the Public Schools we find some teachers content to live entirely with their boys to the detriment of personal development: while in others, both primary and secondary, there is a certain type of teacher (happily not too common in England) who makes a point of keeping aloof from the children, regarding his office as akin to that of a clerk. English fathers are seldom too much in their children's society, leaving the burden and the privilege to mothers, who would be happier if both they and their children secured more elbow room.

The same recognition of child-life as having its own sphere underlies the movement known as Self-Government in Schools (95), but the discussion of that special field of sociology would carry us beyond the range of this volume.

What of the older folk? How far does age exempt men or women from the need for society of their own generation? Do the old people like to club together? Or does individuality assert itself the nearer we approach the terminus where each lies in his solitary grave?

Rabbi Ben Ezra is courageous and bids the doubter "Grow old along with me!" (96); but the older we get the more do our contemporaries in life's journey fall out. The larger vision, which Browning claims as the prerogative of wise old age, appears to be something too personal, almost transcendental: it can scarcely be shared by the coming race, who as a happy band of pilgrims strike out their own road and dream their own dreams. But while the old may be solitary in their inner life, they are not un-genial: they have been active among men and institutions: they by no means answer to the mean description of the melancholy Jacques who ends the story of his Seven Ages in "second childishness and mere oblivion." The conception of old age presented by Browning in contrast to Shakespeare is surely an evidence that the possibilities of human progress are not exhausted.

Friendship.—The groups so far considered each of them bear well-defined characters: sociology concerns itself largely with these and with others which we shall presently consider, *because* they can be so readily identified. But it would be untrue to experience if we limited our attention to these fixed types: life is fluid and some of the best elements in life seek to escape definition (Chap. I.). This is the case for example in the relation of race to nationality: we shall presently define the state in terms which enable us to handle it as a workable social unit that can be moved to definite ends, enjoy regular boundaries, a stable constitution, and so forth: but the racial bond often interferes with this, it is vague and appears to evoke sympathy without action:—yet the "Celtic fringe" in British history has played a great part; and in the supreme example, the Jewish race, we see this bond exerting a subtle force in every quarter of the globe. Now an analogous part in the personal life is played by friendship:—analogous in the fluid quality of its structure. Friendship is a late

product of civilization : the fruit of highly developed sentiments, found among Greeks but rare among their foes the barbarians : David and Jonathan are more than brothers, and they exhibit qualities of culture finer than can be observed in the Pentateuch. For in the more primitive cultures, as among humbler classes and races of this era, the relations arising out of family, sex, period, neighbourhood supply all that the nature requires. Friendship appears as something extra, as an accessory to other bonds; usually it finds a beginning in the common interests of a vocation or of culture, of politics or of neighbourhood : but this is merely the starting point. The fleeting friendships of children of the same age seldom endure, although the affection at the moment is often intense : but friendships formed subsequently, especially during later adolescence, often last a lifetime.

Because its structure is so vague and because it postulates a high degree of refinement as well as some leisure, friendship has been a favourite theme for poets and essayists. Emerson would not have recognized himself as a sociologist, but his essay (97) deals so finely with the theme that we may quote him at length :—

“ I awoke this morning with devout thanksgiving for my friends, the old and the new. Shall I not call God the Beautiful, who daily showeth himself so to me in his gifts? I chide society, I embrace solitude, and yet I am not so ungrateful as not to see the wise, the lovely, and the noble-minded, as from time to time they pass my gate. Who hears me, who understands me, becomes mine,—a possession for all time. Nor is nature so poor but she gives me this joy several times, and thus we weave social threads of our own, a new web of relations; and, as many thoughts in succession substantiate themselves, we shall by and by stand in a new world of our own creation, and no longer strangers and pilgrims in a traditionary globe. My friends have come to me unsought. The Great God gave them to me. By oldest right, by the divine affinity of virtue with itself, I find them, or rather not I, but the Deity in me and in them derides and cancels the thick walls of individual character, relation, age, sex, circumstance, at which he usually connives, and now makes many one. High thanks I owe you, excellent lovers, who carry out the world for me to new and noble depths, and enlarge the meaning of all my thoughts.”

Emerson lived in retirement and took time to live : in these days of passage from minute to minute we make thousands of acquaintances but a friendship can scarcely ripen. And yet, so far as one can judge from the biographies of eminent men in the nineteenth century, new resources seem to be forthcoming to replace the old. Railway and steamship keep men apart, but the same energy which divides me from my friend carries a message to him. Although, as Emerson says, "conversation is the practice and consummation of friendship," he add : "To my friend I write a letter, and from him receive a letter. That seems to you a little. It suffices me." Thus the establishment of the post office marked a great step not only in the development of larger social groups whose energy might appear to swamp the intimacies of life, it gave by way of compensation a chance of not only maintaining but of developing the more private sentiments between friends as well as between husband and wife, parents and children. Some day an industrious researcher will write for us the history of the letter-bag as an agency in social evolution : he may begin with Paul and Timothy although he will probably carry us further back to Assyrian and Egyptian tablets. He will consider how far the contrast between England and the Continent, as regards safety of transit in Tudor and Stuart days, affected social organization in the island, compared with France and Germany overrun with soldiers and bandits.

We have seen that friendship has a fluid, elusive quality, but as our object is analysis we must endeavour to catch its features as best we can. As we noted, its origin is usually in some common bond, of neighbourhood, vocation, religion or the like, but its special mark is in a personal attachment *superadded* to these interests (98). At the foundation of all social grouping is the desire of one of a species to associate with another of the species ; in other words, we are attracted by what

is partly like ourselves and partly different; and since there is such infinite variety in human nature, the possibilities of attraction through differences are infinite. To say that friendship is capricious is merely to emphasize the freedom of choice: in other relations we join a group because of specific interests or obligations, but here we have a relation in which, so far as we know, our personal choice creates and maintains the bond. Hence a certain suspicion or criticism to which the choice of friends is subjected by third parties:—a kind of jealousy which the established forms of society shew towards more private and unrecognized alliances: the latter seem unreasonable, and indeed often are. Hence, especially among the young, manifestations of friendship are repressed and kept from the eyes of the elders: this is the case not only in intimacy between the sexes, in which society claims a special right to interfere, but in every Primary Group which has not the sanction of some prescribed and conventional purpose.

Secret Societies.—It is this feature of privacy which leads one to treat of *secret societies* as an outgrowth of Friendship. Such societies are often organized on so large a scale as to extend far beyond the limits of face-to-face intercourse, but we trace their motive and origin to the same fundamental trait, the desire, *i.e.*, to rebel against and escape from the stricter discipline of public life; masonic societies are, it is true, world-wide in their organization and the secrecy of their operations does not appear to affect greatly, in modern times and among English-speaking people, the quality of their communion: but the distinctive appeal of Freemasonry largely rests upon the motives above alleged, upon a desire for undifferentiated friendship. Efforts to maintain such societies are witnessed in all grades of civilization:

“Secret Societies flourish in West Africa in which masks are employed. These societies are powerful engines for the regulation of society and punishment of evildoers, although at times their

power is abused. Very frequently the women also have secret societies which protect their interests" (99).

Secrecy is here employed for a purpose beyond that of mere friendship or benevolence: public life tends to repress impulses and practices which some individuals desire to maintain and the individual seeks an escape for the repressed complex by sharing his impulses with those who are like-minded; if such an avenue is not afforded, that inner conflict, which we discussed in Chap. IV., must continue. The revolutionary in politics or religion or morals has at first been a conspirator, mainly because an open declaration of faith would defeat his cause at the outset, but partly because the private interchange of opinion between friends is needed as a preliminary to the more public onslaught on tradition. But in such combinations secrecy is only a means to a public end, whereas the secret society true to type enjoys and maintains the symbolism and the code *just because* these are reserved for the initiated.

It is this same tendency in human nature which supports the special cult of all crafts and professions: we enjoy the expansion of what is esoteric and peculiar, just because it is our privilege (compare p. 41 above). For the parallelism between social mind and individual mind pursues us all along. The privacy of our inner life, the repression which this life encounters are first relieved by the associations of friendship or of mystery; and these then become identified with our personality and reproduce in their features the qualities of secretiveness.

Let us not however give too much weight to privacy as a quality in friendship: rather should we say that it displays this quality solely because the bond touches the core of personality so closely. A recent writer has analysed *The Ethics of Intercourse* (100) with rare insight and declares his belief that the only real morality of which we are capable is to be found in friendship.

“ It is only in our private personal intercourse with our fellow-beings that we can practise what I may call the lesser moralities.”

And he concludes by prophesying that the finer standards of conduct in large social groups, in industry and politics, will wait upon the growth of virtue in face-to-face intercourse.

“ If that be so, it will be largely, I may say solely, because, even in our darkest hours, we did not altogether forget, each in his individual sphere, to worship and to follow the same and saving virtues of generosity, self-sacrifice, mutual kindness; because all through our competitive warfare we held firm by the sense of comradeship, of brotherhood, one with another; because we spent such leisure moments as the battles of existence allowed us in cultivating, each in his little private patch of garden, those plants and flowers that are destined, let us hope, one day to cover the face of the earth, to make the desert blossom as the rose.”

Locality and Neighbourhood.—The treatment of a man's life in terms of boundary and space (Chap. II.) bears upon the corporate life of a locality as well as of the state (Chap. VII.). Most men feel some tie to a city, a county or a village: this is also often felt in relation to the house which shelters the family, but local patriotism is quite different from family feeling and is much more akin to nationalism. A few families may be said to live nowhere, for they possess half-a-dozen country seats as well as a house in town. It would probably be difficult for the Duke of Devonshire, who has recently made a new home in Ottawa, to say where he really “ lives ”: certainly the good folk in the Midlands claim him as a Derbyshire man: but most of us, unless we are itinerant by profession, cling to some locality and share its social mind; even Senhouse, the super-individualist who sleeps in the *Open Country* (101) is tied to a postal address “ care of Mrs Webster, basket maker.” The novelist does not conceal the conflict in his hero's mind between self and alter. Senhouse still feels sympathy for family, friendship and for locality although he struggles so valiantly to maintain his isolation—and fails!

Thus locality is much more than an affair of local government, and a county or city quite other than a numerical or geographical division of the nation. Historically, of course, the township is older than the state; and if, in later epochs, the prestige of the state has appeared to overshadow the minor group, this is not in the nature of things but is partly due to the overpowering effect of improved means of communication in the present epoch. The average man lives in his neighbourhood, with face-to-face exchange, in a life which is not merely politics or government but joined up with the more private concerns of family, friendship, employment. The depression of local prestige and activity over against the Central Authority is almost an unmixed evil: provincialism so far from being a sign of weakness should be a mark of distinction. A few great men of first rank possess both the physical energy, the intellectual capacity, and the sympathy to be statesmen as well as county-men or city-men: but if not, they are both more useful and happier when they devote their best energies to their province. If we can speak both the Yorkshire dialect and the King's English well and good: but if we cannot master both, give us the dialect. This one must maintain in spite of the earnest efforts of inspectors and teachers to use the school as an engine for the extinction of local accent.

This trend towards the metropolis and the great theatre of events is an inevitable feature of progressive life:—no doubt it was noticeable in Jerusalem or in Nineveh; but it has been accentuated in England by the system of schooling favoured by the landed and wealthy classes. The boy is sent from home when young to be educated in an environment cut off from the petty concerns of his neighbourhood; all the suggestion of his education during adolescence, both in his Public School and his University, if he goes to Oxford or Cambridge, tend to alienate his ambitions away from

the province. The development of the boarding school was not designed : it was the result of peculiar social and political conditions which are more appropriately considered in discussing the corporate life of school : but the reaction upon local government has been lamentable—at least in the cities. For the efficiency of a city council depends upon the quality of the alderman and councillors who are elected to it; it is seldom that a young man will submit himself to election if during these critical years of adolescence he has been cut off from the environment of his people. He will be ambitious for parliamentary honours, he will try for the Civil Service or enter the Army or Navy, or he may seek adventure abroad, but he has learnt (even if not definitely so instructed) to despise association with rate-payers. This exclusion of a class of men whose training qualifies them so eminently for leadership is a misfortune both for themselves and for their fellow citizens. If, as is often stated, our English counties command a higher type of councillor than the cities the cause may in part be attributed to this peculiarity in our system of schooling.

Still, whatever be the quality of those who conduct local government, and in spite of the loss of prestige suffered by the provinces during the nineteenth century, Great Britain has been fortunate, by contrast with the Continent, in the traditions which have sustained the power of its local authorities : and it is equally fortunate for the United States and for the British Empire that this tradition has been carried round the globe by the Anglo-Saxon race. Here again we must refrain from reviewing the growth of this tradition (102); most Englishmen are not only unaware of this history, but are ignorant of the vital consequences to liberty which are involved in the maintenance of a just balance between the Central and the Local Authority : in spite of all the tendencies of our age, this balance has hitherto been

maintained, and has stood the supreme test of a world-wide war. Whitehall performed its part, but every local area employed its organization and its own initiative in answer to the call of patriotism.

For we must keep in mind our conception of locality : both in sentiment and action it extends far beyond the sphere of government or politics : the locality determines largely the *type of man*. The crude distinction between town and country does not carry far enough : there are several varieties of " area " which need separate investigation in any complete review of institutions. Thus there is the dweller in a Congested Area, whose life is so strictly and anxiously interfered with by officials, whose forlorn condition among the submerged tenth is the blackest spot in our civilization ; there is the countryman in the Depopulated Area, equally forlorn but far happier in his comparative solitude ; there are the suburbs, artisan, genteel, plutocratic, each with a distinctive quality of its own and corresponding to the Economic Classes which will be discussed in the next chapter. These are again diversified by the historic landmarks of parish, ward or village, and carry back to the earliest days of settlement.

Once more, as in the instance of secret societies, what begins on the small scale with face-to-face intercourse enlarges to a machinery extending beyond these limitations. We have separated Primary Groups from Universal Groups, including in this last category The State. But where in political organization can we draw the line between Local and Central Authority ? To the average citizen in the West Riding there is not much difference between the type of machinery which issues orders from Wakefield and that from Whitehall and Westminster ; both are pretty remote and impersonal. Historically, as we saw above, the one is the development of the other, depending on the extension of means of communication and other arts of civilization ; but

in relation to the private citizen they are of the same order. And each in turn finds it necessary to throw back on face-to-face intercourse; the unwieldy West Riding finds the need of districts or other sub-local areas, with sub-officials and sub-offices, until the principle of neighbourhood again finds scope. We cannot in these days be too insistent in urging the value of neighbourhood duties and neighbourhood interests as fostering the common life of the state; if in world politics the principle of nationalism is acknowledged as a wholesome check upon the vague abstractions of cosmopolitan and humanitarian sentiment, equally important is it to see in the petty concerns of the parish and the town hall a sphere of goodwill and of duty to counterbalance the mechanical tendencies of a central bureaucracy. For this, among other reasons, the group of studies known as Regional Survey (103) of which in Great Britain Patrick Geddes has been the pioneer, are a significant sign of the times. Subconsciously the untaught mind of the average man, in parish church or methodist chapel, in district council, in the cattle market, in the village inn, who knows "his people," who loves the streets and lanes of his neighbourhood is always at work on regional survey, geographical and historical both; and the learned efforts of investigators who are providing a philosophy of these things are based upon sociological laws which vitally concern the well-being of nations and empires.

Kinship and Clan.—We have based this brief discussion of a man's intercourse with his neighbours upon the fundamental conception of space: face-to-face intercourse as realized among people who meet in the area in which they habitually move. But the reader will feel that this is only a one-sided view of the impulses which have created the sentiments of neighbourhood and is closely allied to our institutions of property (p. 38 above), the township, defended from outsiders by the

thorn fence (the *tun*), was only one form of social and political development. We have put it in the foreground because in our modern life, and in the Western races, this aspect of neighbourhood appears to predominate. We must, however, recognize another influence, often working in opposition to that of settlement in locality. In tracing the origin of the modern state Hobhouse (p. 151 below) finds three principles or leading forces which have served as bonds of human society :—kinship, authority, citizenship, and the first carries back to epochs when settlement had little influence on social institutions, for men needed to keep constantly moving about in order to procure food. The modern family in the popular view is short-lived ; we only conceive of it so long as the actual members, parents and children keep together ; when a son or daughter marry a new family centre is created. But our ancestors, first savage and then tribal or clannish, strove to defy time ; those conceptions of duration which we attach to religion or to a state or to a universe they sought to attach to their own flesh and blood. Eventually in our Anglo-Saxon race the homestead, inherited and abiding, answered this need, and thus the sense of attachment to locality on which we have dwelt. But kith and kin could hold together quite apart from attachment to place, and hence among some races the outgrowth of family sentiment created forms of political organization, emphasized by Hobhouse and other writers on early politics, long before the epochs when our forefathers sheltered the homestead with walls or hedges. “ The patriarchal family is an ideal and undying unity ” (104). The Celtic races are found organized in clans ; the children of Abraham form a patriarchal family, which is much more than a family, for it is an independent political unity, based not on locality but on kinship. And just as a township among our forefathers would, with due precautions, admit a foreigner to the privi-

leges of the town, so a clan will enlarge its numbers at times by bestowing kinship on an alien.

To what extent do groups survive at the present day whose strength is based on the sentiment of the clan? The answer is not far to seek :—firstly, the attachments which we describe as those of *caste* and to some extent those of *rank* and *class* find their origin in a form of society where blood-relationship was the governing factor in the social order. Secondly, the love of kith and kin is found expanding itself in race attachment and thus appears as one of the elements which constitute the group which we now call a nation; in this region a sentiment which originally attached itself to a few, in face-to-face intercourse has been reshaped to subserve the interests of a large impersonal group, in which the actual bond of descent and blood-relationship no longer holds. Thus states and classes in modern society, which we discuss in the next chapter, can be treated as an evolution of institutions which early man devised while his social range was still limited to face-to-face intercourse.

CHAPTER VII

THE UNIVERSAL GROUPS : NATION, RELIGION, CLASS

The State.—Our endeavour to classify groups or associations has brought into relief the distinctions between vague, fluid societies which escape from organization and more precise, clear-cut groups through which social power is expressed and maintained. The ideas we attach to the terms Nation and State afford a good example of this contrast. A nation includes all the people *who share its mind*, whatever their race or language, whether or no they possess ‘a stake in the country.’ Voters or non-voters, officials or private persons, all are *in it*; the child, as soon as he *has* a mind for such matters, the humblest serf or slave if he feel the sentiment of loyalty; the stranger within the gates who first seeks the shelter of a foreign people and then learns to love those who have entertained him, all are members of the body corporate and strengthen the common bond. The state is a representative body, a group of citizens selected from the nation to serve its interests and represent its power over against other states. In primitive times the selection was made in rough and ready fashion, and the history of politics is the story of efforts to secure methods by which the mind of a people can be better expressed through its representatives, king and congress, citizens and councilors, jury and judges. The citizens, selected and registered by law, sanction the organization, but they are only representatives, expressing the mind of many mem-

bers of the nation whom the law excludes from the state. These non-citizens can share the corporate life, not only in patriotic sentiments, but in acts of devotion to the land of their allegiance.

In the British Empire the distinction between state and people or nation needs always to be kept in mind. Sentiments of patriotism have outrun the possibilities of organization. Recently in the city of Manchester the Premier of the Australian Commonwealth was welcomed as an Australian and a Welshman, but above all as a "Britisher." In commenting on the situation the *Manchester Guardian* wrote: "The unity of the Imperial Commonwealth in its modern form is of comparatively recent growth and arises directly out of the very indifference of the last generation. . . . The result has been the growth of what is in a sense a new nation, or super-nation, for it is composed of many constituent nations, and a new state—the commonwealth which is officially entitled the British Empire. But this state remains unorganized. Its machinery is either non-existent or archaic and out of all relation to present facts. . . . All these and many more considerations suggest to thoughtful men the need for some body of institutions to incarnate that spirit of unity of which we have spoken." Let it be granted that in due course some new machinery will be devised to enable these brother states to act entirely as one, it must be emphasized that Great Britain, the Dominions, Colonies (and the Indian Empire?) are already one "people"; the crisis of world-wide war has exposed the hard facts of reality to the dullest imagination; at the moment when the King of England went to war with the ruler of Germany the vast majority of his "subjects" became the enemy of the Kaiser around the circle of the globe. It will not be contested that Australia and New Zealand are as democratic, both in theory and in practice, as states can be and yet when their King addresses them,

he speaks to "My people" and they answer him in the language of deferential fealty to a chief. To the citizen of a republic such as the United States this attitude savours of abasement; they find it difficult to reconcile the practice of freedom with the forms of "subjection" to a throne; to understand how the bonds of ancient use and wont can hold among a people who have won their independence.

There is another term 'Government' which is sometimes confused with both state and nation, but the distinction is readily indicated and will be followed up when we discuss organization (Chap. IX.). Every type of state either inherits or creates a plan for managing its affairs and the institutions comprised in this plan are collectively described as its 'Government'; some of these institutions are central, *i.e.*, they manage affairs affecting the whole nation, others are provincial or local: but all serve as instruments of the state, exactly as a secretary or a committee serves as the instrument of any association, and governs its members according to the instructions of rule or law. It is customary in modern acts of parliament to use the term 'authority' in somewhat the same sense, but government is the comprehensive term including all the authorities which direct the affairs of a group (105).

Attributes of the State.—This illustration serves to emphasize the features of the group we call the State. Our prejudice in favour of this or that form of government, our belief in this or that set of institutions as calculated to promote the good or otherwise of the body politic should not blind us to the truth of facts. The essential attributes of a state are, as regards time—a continuous existence beyond the lifetime of any individual; as regards space—a defined portion of the earth's surface over which its government has jurisdiction; and as regards power—the obligation and the right to manage the political affairs of those who reside within its

boundaries without the interference of other states. This last attribute is subject to some qualification, for a state may be weak and therefore enter into engagements with its neighbours for protection; it may even be required to obey a Mandate; or the principle of federation may be adopted whereby a group such as that of the United States, or of the Dominions in the British Empire, may be content with supremacy in domestic affairs while yielding the control of foreign affairs to a higher authority.

The reality of the tie which joins together the members is found in the principle of unity, in that specific type of sentiment which we call patriotism.

Community of race, a common speech, a common religion, custom and social habits all help to bind persons into a state, but all of these may fail if the sentiment itself be wanting. Statesmen in great crises such as this of Europe to-day need all their wisdom to discover where the bond is real and where it is only superficial. Our foes misjudged the situation in South Africa; it is probable that the Allies have more than once missed the mark in sorting out the diverse nationalities of Eastern Europe. The commonest error is to assume that civil strife, or even civil war is of itself a proof that a nation is in dissolution: on the contrary it is the privilege of brothers to quarrel within their own circle while ready to unite with all the greater ardour against an alien enemy. One evidence of genuine patriotism can however never be mistaken. When men have fought together in a noble cause, have suffered and lost on behalf of a fatherland, thereafter they will hold by the memory of a patriotism sealed with blood which can scarcely be mistaken. No one will question that Serbia is now a nation fit for statehood, but we may doubt whether Slavs in Croatia will fully share a sentiment which they have done little to strengthen. Tradition is not solely a matter of time and custom, though these

count for much, especially in a people like the Swiss, isolated by its mountains, or Irishmen cut off by the sea; a tradition recent in time if it be fresh and tragic in experience prevails even more.

Evolution of the modern State.—It is no easy matter to determine the factors which lead a body of men to identify themselves with one nation rather than another. Following Hobhouse's view of political evolution (104) we should survey the advance as a change in mentality, in the outlook which men have maintained when submitting to rules. At first the idea of Kinship prevailed: early man could only conceive political power as expressed through the superior beings from whom he traced descent. In the course of ages, with advance in organization and communication, this primitive attachment to kith and kin proved inadequate and a conception of 'Authority' was evolved as something containing within itself a permanent claim to supreme control. It is difficult for educated people in Western Europe to put themselves back into the mind of a thousand years ago; and yet this frame of mind still prevails over a greater part of the uncivilized world and still exercises a potent influence, sub-consciously, in the western world also. When Louis Quatorze declared *L'Etat c'est moi* he was asserting a principle which the great mass of mankind had accepted for ages without demur; men could see no way of conducting life other than by bowing the neck to 'authority' or to established forms of political control; to most Englishmen even in the 16th century, the Tudor monarch, king or queen, *was* England. Thus power itself begot power, not only by winning battles, but by capturing the imagination

He ruled them like a tyrant—true! but none
Were ruled like slaves: each felt Napoleon (106).

It took many generations before men could learn to think in terms of citizenship or democracy: the advance,

when it is made in any part of the world is an advance in personality, in a grasp of new relations between self and alter.

We must not however take the sequence kinship, authority, citizenship as covering the entire field. If man were wholly a 'political animal' this explanation of his behaviour would suffice; we should expect that as soon as he realized democracy as a possible idea, he would shake off the yoke of absolutism and establish himself as the citizen of a free nation. But the great mass of mankind, educated and backward alike, are interested in other things besides politics: religion, *e.g.*, still binds many of the Albanian tribes to their ancient masters in Stamboul; the custom of class and caste often run counter to the appeal of citizenship, and thus nations may be held together and may defend the constitution of an outworn state not because of their ancient habit of submitting to an august authority, but because their attachment to other interests, such as language or religion, allows them to remain among a people with whom they have no racial affinity.

State Boundaries.—It is one of the anomalies of modern life that while the soil and its boundaries constitute the chief symbol of national existence, so many citizens can leave the country, dwell for years as aliens abroad, hold property among strangers and yet remain loyal and attached to their native land. Once again we find an explanation in the increased facilities for communication; exile is tolerable when we can hear so much and so often of the doings of our home folk. But the ease with which this exchange between alien and native can now be affected has led some people to assume too hastily that the basis of nationality has changed, or even that it is on the point of dissolution. The reason why nations *must* be defined in terms of territory, why boundaries are held so sacred, is because land and the map are tangible simple affairs which all can under-

stand. On this spot either you or I are master; if I yield then I yield sovereignty; everything else may pass from one nation to another—merchandise, men, learning, art—without definite lowering of sovereign power, but if ‘my people’ surrender a yard of territory against their will, then we have bowed the yoke to a superior power. At the same time we may admit as reinforcing this position that attachment to land has something akin to the landowner’s pride in his estate, and has no doubt something in common with the general sentiment of adherence to property (Chap. II.); while then we anticipate that a loftier standard of values is leading many individuals to scorn estate and wealth, it would be chimerical to expect that the association between territory and nationalism will soon be destroyed. Nay, it tends to be strengthened: for the surplus has been exhausted: the whole earth has been mapped out; no longer can Boer or Mormon mount his ox-wagon and trek to an unknown land to found a new state in the wilds. Hence a man who loves his nation must be ready to protect its soil, even though in his personal estimate of things he counts all such things as dross. Hence too we must be willing to let disputes about boundaries occupy a large place in foreign politics, and good citizens must study geography; the surveyor who can rigidly fix a post and draw a line is a good servant to his nation.

We should however be untrue to facts if we based the plea for nationality solely on the ground beneath our feet. The soil is a symbol, an expression of something deeper. Every nation worthy of the name finds within itself a social mind, a culture, as the Germans say, of its own. Sometimes it cannot put this inner life into words; sometimes it can, with an excess of volubility and pride; its mind is best exhibited in its works—works of art, works of traffic or craft. The pre-eminent example is certainly the Hebrew race, indelibly stamped

with the faith of Abraham, favoured by a "jealous God," the exclusive privilege of the faithful, although the stranger within the gates might take some share in the blessing. And precisely because Jehovah is Eternal in the Heavens, transcending time and space, the conception of unity in race constantly overshadowed in the Hebrew mind the importance of unity through territory. The Promised Land to many Jews was a highway between Nile and Euphrates; and when the Great Rabbi taught his countrymen to worship in temples made without hands He was reverting to a conception which was enshrined in Passover itself, in memories of the Forty Years (but compare p. 34 above).

Internationalism.—The Gospel ideal was antagonistic to the Hebrew spirit not because it overpassed the boundaries of the Jewish Kingdom, but because it welcomed the alien as an equal. It transcended at one stroke all the limitations, of kinship, of language, of culture, and forecast a universal temper which invites every true Christian to love without restriction. Statecraft, even when based upon the lower levels of human nature, has always been influenced by this supreme hope of universal unity; but reckoning with men as they are, it has been compelled to postpone the realization until the great mass of mankind have evolved to the higher platform (107). Imperialism, Cosmopolitanism, Humanitarianism at different epochs have expressed in various ways sometimes the ambitions of rulers, sometimes the real spirit of sociality. In our epoch Internationalism is the watchword: in spite of the unique example of the Jew, who can attach himself to all the nations, we yield to human weakness and are satisfied to practise the arts of brotherhood first and foremost among our own people, among those whom destiny has selected as a nation for us. We strive to love all men, even those who compete with us in trade; even when we are at war and inflamed with bitter anger, we know that the higher law of love

should and must prevail; and so we seek a line of compromise by linking "inter" to "national," not renouncing our own people in a weak sentiment of humanitarian fellowship, but seeking for new principles of harmony in which the uglier features of nationalism may be softened according to the law of Christ, the inspirer of the League of Nations.

One can more readily defer to this lingering hope of ultimate salvation when we contemplate the great gulf which divides nations from each other. Every nation and race regards itself as standing, on the whole, at the summit of civilization : in certain minor characters each may admit an inferiority but in the essential things, Chinaman, Kaffir, Englishman, Russian each regards his culture as the model scheme; and each regards the invasion of his mode of life, whether by intermarriage or by conquest, as a weakening of the fibre of existence. It is true that some students of comparative psychology hold that the popular repugnance to intermarriage even between white and coloured races, is unfounded; but as civilization now stands, it is hard for most of us to believe that the evidence of social degradation from such admixture has been mistaken.

Intermarriage is only one method by which the strength of nationalism can be sapped; the vices of a people with great prestige penetrate as readily as their virtues. Nationalism in Germany is partly the result of a reaction against the earlier habit of Central Europe to copy the fashions of its neighbours : Italy, France, England all in turn invaded German life and manners; in revenge the German State hoped to force its own distinctive *Kultur* upon Europe.

These practical and self-evident impediments to a world-embracing organization accounts for the cynical indifference with which most statesmen in the past have treated the visionaries. Organization must wait upon sentiment; the sentiment must be wide-spread and

mutual before it can take shape in an institution : so long as there are only a few humanitarians in only a few supra-civilized countries the doctrine of universal brotherhood is little more than a pious hope. And the humanitarian himself does nothing to advance towards the ultimate evolution if meanwhile he cannot reconcile his faith in the ultimate with a loyal acceptance and submission to the narrow régime of this present evil world. What his neighbours expect from him is that he should combine his hope for the distant goal with readiness to organize as a nationalist and as a town man, a county man, on the lowly plane at which the world now stands.

The Peace of 1919 offered to Europe and indeed to the entire globe a wonderful vista of hope in the League of Nations : here, as in the case of South Africa the tragedies of death and destruction will, it is believed, force the combatants, victor and vanquished both, to renounce their enmities and group themselves afresh as members of a super-state. The ideal is magnificent and the blessing to mankind which such a union would bestow is incalculable : no wonder that men everywhere are preaching the new gospel. The apostles should not however be blind to the obstacles which they will encounter ; two of these will be apparent from the survey of principles discussed in earlier chapters. The doctrine that unity between groups involves a measure of surrender (see pp. 100 and 114 above) will be a stumbling-block to every sovereign state. The Covenant itself contains the principle of surrender, but it is hedged around with saving clauses ; even when thus disguised and restricted, it is likely to prove unwelcome when the test of action is applied. Already the United States of America, entrenched behind the doctrine of Munroe, are afraid lest they may lose their Independence : and one can hardly believe that Great Britain will willingly compromise her proud supremacy as mistress of the seas. Secondly, the advocates of a world federation, making

their appeal to a higher political conscience will find, as we saw above, that the mass of men are not politically minded, are not ready, *i.e.*, to sink other interests for the sake of a supreme political achievement. If a man cares more for his trade and his nation than he cares for religion or for mankind he may render lip-service to the new doctrine, but when the time comes to test his faith at the polling-booth, he may hold back. We are warned by many signs of the times that the contest for property of the rich (or would-be rich) versus the poor (or won't be poor) is likely to culminate with great rapidity (see p. 274) and that this struggle will be complicated by the competition between states for the produce of the earth. Statesmanship seeks ways and means for compromise so that a tolerable form of federation by League may be achieved: but no one should shut his eyes to the strength of those sinister forces which threaten not only the prospect of peace between jealous nations, but the internal peace of peoples within their own borders.

Over against these patent obstacles one hope for success appears on the horizon: it is afforded by evidence drawn from what is sometimes called collective psychology. No one who studies the changes witnessed in great nations such as the Americans, the Japanese or the Germans can fail to admit the possibility of creating within a comparatively short period an entirely novel sentiment. Limits of space do not permit us here to enlarge upon this theme; Kidd's *Science of Power* gives perhaps the clearest exposition (108). If the common people in all the great states which have been engaged in war are now really stirred to the depths with a desire to achieve unity, it may be possible to utilize the resources of communication, by literature, by word of mouth and by the press, to overcome the forces of reaction. Who would have supposed six years ago that the fifty states of America would have been stirred by an entirely novel

impulse to forsake the political habits of a hundred years and plunge into the maelstrom of Europe? These changes are possible to the modern world—possible as Kidd declares “in the life time of a generation”—only because we now live in public and think openly. He is a bold man who would prophesy that such a wave of regenerating brotherhood is likely to sweep over society, but we walk by faith not by sight.

Sphere of the state.—The tendency of these times appears to be extending the power of the state at the cost of all other groups. And although the scope of this elementary study does not permit of thorough treatment we can indicate the main current of thought. There are really two problems in the controversy, one concerned with the sphere of state control, the other with the various groups in society whose interests are affected by this control. We can best discern the relation of these two problems by referring to the position achieved a hundred years ago by the great Reform Act of 1832. The political philosophy which triumphed at that epoch was based on two principles. Firstly, the source of state power was transferred from what Hobhouse calls ‘Authority’ (104), (the right of an exalted monarch or of an exclusive class) to Citizenship, the right, *i.e.*, of a large group of ordinary members in the nation to create the organ of state control. Secondly, the sphere of control was to be limited by the doctrine of *laissez-faire*, a self-denying principle, which minimized the sphere of government to the maintenance of order at home, of defence against other states, of public works, and of a revenue limited to attain these ends (109). Now it was supposed that this first principle would of necessity abolish the spirit and temper of autocracy; when once the government was honestly chosen by the citizens men believed that the nation was secure in the exercise of its liberties; in the intervals of five or seven years interposed between one election and another it was supposed

that the platform and the press would serve to check any remaining tendencies to tyranny. There can be no question that this hope has only been partially realized and that the distrust of Parliamentary Government as organized since 1832 increases steadily (compare p. 250 below). The source of this distrust may be sought in the defects of the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and his contemporaries.

They supposed that when "Authority" was replaced by "Citizenship," the excessive power of the state over the individual would be diminished, that man would be 'free' because he was no longer subject to a personal ruler or to a governing class.

We may grant to the full that the transfer has conferred immense benefits upon society, but experience has shewn that it is not adequate to restrain the temper of tyranny. For, by the necessities of the case, the state must with absolute decision enforce its will: there is no other group which can contend with it, when a conflict is proposed; it relies upon force and crushes rebellion.

Now all through the nineteenth century the power of the state government, exercised more and more through a permanent group of politicians and of civil servants, went on increasing; it had inherited all the authoritative prestige derived from the absolute monarchies of earlier epochs, and this was enhanced by the new prestige derived from popular election by ballot. The governing group, however, still persisted as a select separate group of persons, with a collective mind of its own, retaining moreover a position of antagonism to all other groups and classes which came into touch with its sphere of control. As the administrative machine developed there came to be established in men's minds a conception of political groups—Town and County Councils, 'Home,' Local Government, and other offices and Boards in Whitehall, each of which based its power

ultimately on a popular vote, but really upon the collective strength of the group itself entrenched behind law and prestige.

These groups tend of necessity to be indifferent to the voice of public opinion (110), indifferent that is to the claims of manifold groups, concerned for religion, for industry, for culture and for social well being. We are not here expounding a theory but explaining in sociological terms a phenomenon which is widely admitted by all who have had to do with national or local government; we are not offering an 'attack' upon public officials or statesmen; but an explanation of a commonplace social phenomenon. Every man is unconsciously modified in his inner mind by the group with which he is associated; and the state official is not exempt from this law: he becomes its defender and shares its power: he expresses his personality chiefly through its agency. It is true that our social capacity, as we saw in Chap. I., enables modern man to share in many groups and there is no doubt that many civil servants share the sentiments of citizens who are 'outside' the government. But this breadth of sympathy is inevitably weakened by the absolute status enjoyed in the state service and represented by its organ: the sense of absolute power is a most subtle influence which undermines sociality. The civil servant, local or national, tends to be cut off from all the 'free' groups who combine in trade or professional unions: he and his fellows cannot openly combine, but they tend to unite in sub-conscious rivalry to all who stand outside their circle. This we say is human nature and we have no ground to denounce the bureaucrat for displaying qualities which we ourselves tend to manifest in our behaviour as members of other groups.

Bentham and his contemporaries no doubt realized the danger, for bureaucracy was not created by the Act of 1832: but they expected to check the injury by

upholding the second principle, the doctrine of *laissez-faire*. They believed that the range of control by the state could be limited, but the sequel has proved that their philosophy was unsound. Even in their day the state was called upon to regulate poverty, education and industry, and with every decade since then the sphere of state control has been enlarged (111). Auberon Herbert was the last of a gallant band of individualists who fought to restrain the government official from 'interfering' in the daily affairs of citizens. If then the spirit of state control is by its very nature a danger to variety and freedom in corporate life, it is evident that the immense extension of state control since 1832 enhances the danger. The *laissez-faire* philosophy has failed and some other philosophy of relations between autocracy and freedom must take its place..

The reformers of 1832 could not conceive of the ingenious means by which the power of the state could be 'captured' on behalf of anti-social interests. They believed that a progressive people, enlightened by schooling would always be able to assert themselves and that the autocracy of government would be compelled to bow to the will of any 'free' people. They therefore put their trust in education and from that day to this the establishment of schools and colleges has been advocated (see below, p. 286) as the chief means by which civil liberty and social progress can be advanced. We must not digress to consider how far this appeal to education has been justified. It needs only a moment's reflection to see that the appeal merely shifts the solution of political difficulties from the shoulders of the present generation: it says in effect:—'we, statesmen and thinkers of the present day, cannot see our way to a reconciliation of the conflict between the state and the individual, or between the state and other groups in society: but when schooling has created a community of reasonable and virtuous men, our difficulty will

vanish ! Now it is notorious that practical politicians, from Gladstone and Disraeli onwards, have never taken a real interest in schooling, and their intuition has been sound : they have had to deal with things as they are, with voters, with the press, with the passions and interests of groups and parties : they need a philosophy of these things that will help to resolve the conflicts of the moment : education in their eyes takes its place with other ‘ movements,’ with the Churches, with Agriculture, with Trades Unions : they have to reckon with it as a claim, a force that comes into the programme, but when they are exhorted to push forward the claims of schooling as a panacea for social ills, their political intuitions warn them to be cautious.

New principles to fit the new times.—While waiting therefore for a golden age when education shall have fashioned men anew, the Western world has passed beyond the philosophy of Bentham and Spencer, beyond the collective efforts of political parties since 1870 : and the War has brought into clear relief the main issues at stake. Two principles at least seem to be generally accepted. Firstly, the *laissez-faire* philosophy has been abandoned, no limit is now set *in theory* to the functions of the state as permitted to express the intentions of its members. If need arises the state can issue laws and regulations covering every department of our lives, and when we resist or evade it, can claim supreme authority to enforce its bidding. In all the institutions of life, religion and morality, science and culture, marriage, trade, property, the state has a voice and when it chooses to make pronouncement, the private citizen has either to obey or reckon the cost of disobedience. Secondly, this absolutist doctrine is being made tolerable in practice by several counter forces ; (a) The time-honoured influence of public opinion as expressed at the polls. Although we no longer place such implicit faith as our grandfathers did in the efficacy of parlia-

mentary or municipal elections (see below), nevertheless we still accept them as an indispensable resource. The politician and the civil servant are both aware that the general body of citizens are, in the final resort, the state. In spite of all the machinery that moulds public opinion or thwarts its expression, no one who is employed in the state service can wholly ignore the ultimate reckoning which is made at the polling booth.

The demand of voluntary groups over against the state.—We have seen (p. 160 above) that public opinion no longer relies upon its own momentum to keep the world 'safe for democracy': hence the further principles are coming into operation as follows: (b) The advance in social consciousness, in the exercise, that is, of liberty to organize *voluntary associations*, has been extraordinarily rapid during the last hundred years. While the state claims at need, to 'interfere' in every department of a man's life, the individual has prepared himself, if need arise, to resist by combination with his fellows (rather than be asserting his individuality as the philosophers bade him do). The process has naturally been most obvious in the world of industry, but it is a universal development and should be treated as a contribution to political theory of the first importance. The political philosophers have been far too prone to present an antithesis between The State and The Individual, whereas the conflict should always be viewed as between The State and the Voluntary Group. By presenting this false antithesis a bias is created in favour of State authority which is not really designed. The following passage, written in 1916 is significant: "The social order in which man finds himself and which has fashioned his being has its most comprehensive and best organized expression in the State, to which he belongs and which has helped to make him what he is" (112). We think that Sorley in this passage gives an impression which he himself does not intend to convey. Certainly the influ-

ence of the state is comprehensive, but the groups which "fashion our being" in this country are those of the academy, the trade corporation, our class, our church; these may "help to make a man what he is" far more than the powers of city or of central government.

Hence without the aid of any clear cut theory of relations the course of development in Great Britain has been to look to these voluntary groups as partners—junior partners—with the state authority, each of them by itself less powerful, but collectively far more influential in the growth of personality. The first significant example was seen as far back as 1870 in the School Board Act, which permitted voluntary schools to retain their status within the national system, a policy which was further developed in the Act of 1902. We are not concerned to discuss whether those compromises were in themselves wise or righteous: their political effect alone concerns us here. They established the precedent that non-political groups of citizens could be entrusted with the exercise of public authority and with the expenditure of public money. The same principle was more recently adopted in the National Insurance Acts, and if the principle is found to promote the common good we may be certain that no theory of state socialism or collectivism will prevail against it. It is no doubt true that voluntary groups often represent vested interests, both in the holding of property and in supporting anti-social customs: but it also is true, as we have seen, that the 'state' group tends to enlarge its own specific interest, controlling the public purse and resisting the public mind; hence the one serves as a wholesome check upon the other. We may anticipate therefore that the power of the state will be more and more hedged round by giving larger scope to all organized groups of citizens whose special experience and devotion make them worthy of recognition as partners in the exercise of public functions. This is the true inwardness of the syndi-

calist movement: Mr Cole's claims on behalf of Trade Guilds may be exaggerated but they represent a principle of social co-operation which is of universal application (113). When once this relation between the state and other groups is realized, we entertain a more reasonable frame of mind as regards the omnipotence of the state. We do not revert to Herbert Spencer's conception of a 'joint-stock protection society'—for we know that the state can do far more for us than merely protect our shores or our pockets: but we shall avoid the opposite error, of attaching any sentiment of reverence to this comprehensive group in comparison with other associations of citizens. The years of war compelled the officers of state to utilize voluntary agencies (114) to an unprecedented extent in order to rescue the country from military and financial disaster. At the present moment (1920) it looks as if state officials had forgotten the lesson and hoped to carry on in times of peace in sole reliance upon their own prestige, but it is safe to prophesy that the tide will turn.

Involving a new attitude of the individual towards his state.—(c) The War has also forced upon us a new conception of the relation of the individual to the state. Citizenship as conceived in earlier days imposed two tasks on the citizen: he was to pay his rates and taxes and to vote at municipal and parliamentary elections: all the rest was to be done for him by the agents of the state who were paid, as soldiers, policemen, teachers, inspectors and politicians to manage public affairs on his behalf. Under this theory he was a 'private' citizen, occupied with his own affairs, free to do as he pleased, with no obligation moral or legal to lend a hand in public business. The national crisis at one stroke demolished this separatist doctrine. Every man was called upon to 'do his bit,' and the women also, although their political status had been denied. In other words, the citizen was individually accepted as a servant of the

State, working side by side with public officials as special constable, as city clerk, as committee-man in all sorts of duties which before this crisis had been exclusively reserved for paid functionaries. Here again it may seem as if, with reversion to peace conditions, the Benthamite conception of citizenship would be resumed, but I venture to think that the trend of our times will compel us to give place to this finer conception of civic duty. The more comprehensive and embracing becomes the sphere of state authority and state officials the more estranged the private man will become from the spirit of citizenship unless he is actively engaged in state activity or in membership with associations which bring him into direct contact with public affairs.

Application to "the problem of national unity.—At the risk of prolixity I venture to repeat this line of argument from the standpoint reached in Chapter V. We saw there that the underlying principle in corporate life is to be sought in *unity* between members of a group; the group prospers just so far as its acts are the outcome of ideas and sentiments shared by these members. So long as this unity actually exists, the machinery of government by and through which the acts are performed does not distress the members: they are not critical of a constitution so long as their will is done. Parliamentary government would never have overthrown Stuart tyranny and Georgian stupidity if the rulers had obeyed the people's will: these monarchs were restrained not because the people had advanced greatly in political theory, but because Authority insisted on standing apart neglectful of unity with the people whom it claimed to control. Citizenship (in the sense employed by Hobhouse) replaced Authority: that is to say, a mode of regulating the State was achieved wherein the intention of unity was emphasised as the corner-stone of the social order: democracy in theory means simply that the people establish a government which carries out the

people's intention, and is in harmony with the common will. A classic instance is afforded in the White Paper (115) issued after the war broke out to justify the behaviour of the British Government. Being asked from Berlin whether Great Britain would remain neutral, "I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here." This passage is classic because it breathes the vital air of democracy, of that Whig and Liberal tradition which had replaced Authority by Citizenship and was in this very letter throwing down the gauntlet to the last of the Cæsars. Now if the agents of the State always displayed so fine a solicitude to listen to the voice of *Demos* as was displayed by our Foreign Minister on that unique occasion, we should be as ready to accept the orders of a Cabinet as our forefathers were to obey the voice of Queen Elizabeth. Now as then the basis for civil security is to be sought in unity of sentiment between governor and governed. And some hold that civil discord is threatening us because unity can no longer be maintained by a simple resort at intervals to the ballot box: our social life has become too complex, the rôle of the politician too professional, the juggernaut of state uniformity too crushing; we can no longer be content, it is said, with the verdict of the polls. Unity is broken, and the breach has been growing wider for many years past: we are now conscious of the alienation. It is no longer a question of ousting Gladstone by Dizzy, or the head of a Coalition by the leader of a Liberal Party or a Labour Party; these contests are important, but they do not meet the demand. We have grown beyond the swaddling clothes of democracy; we know how to depose monarchs and elect prime ministers, but we are

still outside the government and alien to it; we see how the wealth of great parties, the influence of a venal press of organised propaganda, the glamour of a popular hero has again and again seized the psychological moment to secure a majority (compare p. 29 above), and to reign not for us or with us, but over us. Unity is broken and must be restored by a revision of social relations. The State Government, based on divine right of the polling booth, has fulfilled a great purpose; it must now admit its infirmities, and be prepared to submit like all other institutions to a process of evolution. It is in vain for Members of Parliament and civil servants to appeal to the sanctity of law, to loyalty to the constitution, to the duty of patriotism: these sentiments only prevail when they are based on mutual regard and confidence. The constitution which compels our obedience was devised in an epoch when the government claimed very slight authority over its citizens; its motto was *laissez faire*; it preached free trade, free religion, free speech. But from that day to this it has belied the philosophy of its sponsors, until its power over men's lives surpasses the reach of the greatest despot of antiquity. Those who claim power must therefore be prepared either to revise their relations with private citizens and private groups, or anticipate the hazards of civil strife. We are here expressing in vigorous language what is said with even greater emphasis by writers of more than one Party. They witness the bitterness of industrial strife between rich and poor and look upon the contest for wealth and property as occupying the centre of the political stage. In the sense they do, but one can hold that wealth and property are being held by the few, and demanded by the many, not as ends in themselves, but as means to a finer mode of life; covetousness is no doubt a common form of vice, but it by no means occupies the entire stage. We are tempted to go beyond

the proper limits of this volume, and incur the danger of falling between two stools, attempting to expound in a few pages a theme which should claim a volume to itself. We may conclude, however, by stating in more positive form the drift that opinion appears to be taking.

Restatement of the position.—First of all we admit to the full the traditional duty, for which states originally came into being, of conducting all the relations of our nation with other nations. The nation as a whole must act with one voice so soon as any question arises in which our people, or a single one of them, come into contact with the foreigner. This function involves not only defence and preparation for defence, not only foreign policy and foreign trade, but the determination of citizenship itself, since you cannot define the term "alien" unless you first define "citizen."

Secondly, the state as a whole will regulate for the universal good all such internal matters, involving rivalry or conflict of other groups, as are found for the general convenience to require uniform procedure. In earlier centuries local diversities of custom prevailed on every hand, in family life, in the treatment of crime, in the holding of property, in civil and social status. The world rolled round without grumbling at these anomalies, for communication was so slightly developed as to make the hardships due to variety of little account. The authoritative groups, in their own interest, were always pressing for uniformity, and invented political theories of Divine Right of Popes or of Kings to justify their interference: but bounds were always set to their achievement by the attachment of men to rival groups; the lawyer enlarged the prerogatives of the crown, but he found himself opposed alike by the nobleman, the churchman, the merchant, and the squire, each holding a brief for his own group, believing that the predominance of his group, the uniform acceptance

of his view of life, would be the universal interest of the nation.

So in course of time this second great function of the state came into prominence—as a sort of stake-holder between clashing interests; and like other stake-holders the national government secured for itself often-times an undue proportion: for wherever the advantage of uniform national law were admitted, in contrast to variety of local customs, the King and his Council advanced a step forward in prerogative and power. First of all came the administration of justice, state law and circuit judge wiping out manorial law and feudal court, and herewith regulating, in successive centuries, all the main situations in which the individual and his neighbours may collide.

But the central organ of government had theoretically no obligation to *execute* the functions which it thus regulated. Thus as regards crime it was important that fairly uniform procedure should be adopted throughout the nation, but it was by no means necessary that the execution of criminal laws should be undertaken from one central source. Justices of the Peace, with diversity of tradition in different parts of England, dating back to Saxon times, served the purpose for minor crimes; for more important matters uniformity was needed, and so the judges went on circuit and established a uniform tradition. Thus a practical conception was worked out of the functions of the Sovereign Power, whether despotic or democratic in constitution mattered not. Such functions embraced all the matters included in the common law, relating to the family and property, and all measures concerned with the maintenance of internal peace.

In the popular mind of the nineteenth century the sphere of state control was limited to this range. But, as we have noted, in spite of the strength of individualistic philosophy supporting the popular view, there

was never any doubt that the practice scorned the theory. For when a group of earnest and capable people desire in any epoch to advance their aims, their very desire means that they wish to convert all men to their way of thinking, to turn what is specific and partial to what is universal and all-embracing. Inevitably, therefore, they are tempted to seek "State" countenance since the nation includes everybody; and as soon as a sufficient force, either in public opinion or in the state authority, is secured, the group will gain its point. In this way a common coinage, common posts, common (turnpike) roads, common regulation of transport, common weights and measures were accepted; and each in its day had to overcome the opposition of individualists. Each step meant, on the one side, a useful uniformity, but to balance that a loss in picturesque variety and individual initiative. In each case no theory of State duties or ideals could really justify the interference: for example, a nation can exist in independence and happiness without the benefit of a state agency for parcel post, as the United States still does; if private firms could really serve us as efficiently as the state firm, our desire for variety would lead us to prefer them: our acceptance of such interference by the state has no theory to back it, except our belief that in this and that sphere a uniform procedure is worth more to us than a picturesque but costly variety. And the business of those who guide public opinion is to find out as best they can when the public mind desires a new act of uniformity.

But, surely, the individualist will say, there must be a pause somewhere? Suppose a nation in a fit of madness, a social mind indulging for a time in lunacy, decrees that all men shall dress alike—and women, too! Does your theory of uniformity consent to such absurdity? Well, governments have before now, under other theories, attempted to regulate dress, as a cursory

examination of 16th and 17th century legislation would show; and during the terrible years 1916 to '18, for sufficient cause shown, some four million Britishers were dressed in uniform—without counting nurses; and they appeared in this costume with general approval.

There are two well-recognised objections to this extension of national service. (1) It is now acutely realised that the state, *i.e.*, the Government, may become too powerful. But if I and other citizens constitute the nation, if this large universal group of united citizens is *my* group, in which I, in my station, take an active and vigorous share, why should I object to an enlargement of its activities? If on the whole the common uniform arrangements which it imposes are, in my opinion, for the common good, it is not likely that any theory that "Government may go too far" will hinder me from approving its present policy. Obviously the common wide consent which is the basis of this policy is more likely to be forthcoming in the case of simple material benefits such as postage and roadways, where the opposition only arises from vested interests; if uniformity is sought in matters such as restriction of pleasure or imposition of culture, wherein large independent groups have always maintained their own ideals, in these instances I may be more cautious: for although I myself may renounce the pleasure or despise the culture, I may hold that the progress of the nation will be promoted by encouraging variety of procedure, or by maintaining a spirit of unity, even though the lack of regulation exposes shiftless people to disaster. Hence my willingness to submit to national service or state control by no means binds me to its indefinite extension; each case will stand on its merits.

(2) The second objection is more subtle, for it affects the mentality of the agents of government, who execute these laws of uniform procedure. For example, the National Insurance Act led to the conversion of some

thousands of my fellow citizens into civil servants, who forsook their previous vocation to be employees of the state. It is said with much truth that these state agents may lose their sense of citizenship and be excessively loyal or subservient to Authority. And if this prove to be so, every extension of uniform procedure will increase this transfer and thus endanger the commonweal.

Evidently this situation is felt to be dangerous, because the state service is regarded as something alien to the nation itself, as an Authority ruling and controlling rather than the organ of the universal mind. So long as this view of National Authority, based as it is upon age-long tradition, prevails, just so long will the danger be real. The state is conceived not as the expression of the universal mind, but as an aggressive group, contesting its rights with other groups, and thus inciting its agents, both by self-interest and by partisan loyalty, to find their sole satisfaction in devotion to state service and to the aggrandisement of state authority.

This danger is by no means imaginary; the history of state employment in France, for example, is eloquent on this point (116). Unless the evolution of such service carries with it the acceptance of reformed principles which may neutralise the danger, one may be justified in opposing an extension of state control, although material benefit might accrue from the extension. The nationalisation of railways may be taken as an example. The group which now controls this gigantic industry stands on its own feet, in competition or alliance with other groups, including among these the nation, which threatens to engulf it. Granted that the material benefit, in better service, will be in the general interest, am I convinced that the railway men will be better citizens, with a heightened sense of duty to the service, with an untrammelled sense of loyalty to the nation, if

they drop their independent status as railway men and don the state uniform? We may lack knowledge of the problem adequate to enable us to say "yes" or "no" to this question; but the answer to it reveals one vital element in the situation.

For so long as the state is conceived as an aggressive authority, functioning on its own behalf, in contest with other groups, whose function in life is equally important, so long must we dread the enlargement of its functions. This "State" and its employees are the enemy of all the rest; the transfer to its camp of a great industry threatens all other industries which remain outside of it; threatens ultimately all local patriotism; threatens religion, art, science; threatens the whole vast variety of social endeavour in which the individual finds salvation.

The collectivist has a ready answer to these fears! Do not stop at railways, he says; nationalise everything and then no one can complain. Bring every department of life under state control, and then the rivalry of groups will be at an end. It is true that the collectivist usually stops half way in his argument, and only demands an economic socialism by which incorporation would be limited to groups engaged in industry and commerce. But this half-way collectivism, if the argument be accepted, presents a truly terrible prospect! For we should then be faced with an authority of gigantic resources, both in materials and in men, set over against all the groups which foster the higher aims of life. All the prestige and power of national service would then be engaged in promoting material ends, and would crush to the wall those spiritual, intellectual, and æsthetic interests which make a nation worthy of its name.

These dangers can only be avoided by reform in two directions. Firstly, by so adjusting the relation of the State employee to his superiors as to leave him the

utmost possible freedom to abide in comradeship with other groups and to retain his full sense of citizenship. Secondly, by attaining a finer conception of the organisation of national service, so that all other groups can serve the nation, not in rivalry against an overshadowing power, but as partners, each in its place acknowledged as an equal, each employed on due occasion to advance the national welfare side by side with the officers of government. To illustrate again from the railway service: at this present moment (1920) the railway system remains under the partial control of the government; the financial credit of the system is for the time being guaranteed, and the national requirements have the first call upon the railroads. But the detailed management, both of labour, of capital, and of engineering remains with the railway directors. We have no means of judging whether this partnership between the Government and the Railway Directorate works so well as to be regarded as a useful precedent, now that the war is ended; it is evident from the current programmes of political parties that a large volume of public opinion tends to an extension of state service, and the urgency of the issue justifies our devoting so much attention to it in this Chapter, and in treating it once more in Chapter IX. as concerned with Representation.

Religion.—A complete account of sociology would include an enquiry into the principles which bind men together, or keep them apart, in their acts of worship. True enough man had organised his social life for many ages before he found a need to separate the Church from the Family and the State; the House of Aaron was a late development in the story of the Chosen People; but those universal principles of faith and hope in which religion finds its genesis trace back to the basal emotions of fear and wonder, long before the epoch when an organised fellowship in worship could be conceived.

As soon as the conception did become clear, the duty or obligation of religious observance could not be questioned. The sentiment of religion being universal, it was inconceivable to early civilisation that any one should stand aloof, or seek to interpose a personal view in matters which are in essence transcendental : as soon as heresy was proposed, a conflict began which the world has ever since been seeking to compose ; as soon as it became necessary to compel adhesion to a creed the social order was rent in twain ; nations could fight about boundaries and then abide in peace with boundaries determined by treaty, but where can peace be found if a fundamental desire of the human heart divides the closest friends ? “ I came not to send peace, but a sword—a man’s foes shall be they of his own household.” Hence the invention of toleration in the 17th century marked a profound sociological advance : it involved a capacity in man to maintain a distinctive and private communion in matters of faith alongside of other affiliations in respect of politics, neighbourhood, or vocation, or even of family. The defenders of the faith have always feared that this severance will lead to irreligion : when the ties which bind a man to his fellows are weakened, the source of power may itself be imperilled.

If such dangers are avoided, it is because man is coming to a clearer apprehension of the nature of religion : he distinguishes the practice of distinctive religious observance on the one hand from faith, on the other hand from morals. He conceives that every man, even the professed agnostic or materialist, must hold some relation to the Unseen and the Eternal, and that such relations will influence him in every sphere of behaviour ; but he finds it possible to keep even religion in its place, and to relegate his corporate life in matters of religion, his communion in prayer and praise, to their own time and season.

We must endeavour, however, to be clear as to the claim made on behalf of religion as affecting social relations, and the place which religious societies should hold in our classification of groups. We have admitted the right of the nations embodied in the concrete institutions of central and local government: these expect the obedience of each member, and if obedience be refused it is exacted by force. As regards religion no such claim is enforced, although in England the connection of the Established Church with the national government still leaves some colour of justification for the position that every Englishman is a member, by birthright, of the society which we call the Church of England. This membership, however, is no longer forced upon a man, but it is offered to him, and if he choose he can stand apart. It is clear then that if we are right in attributing to "Religion," along with "Nation" and "Class," a universal quality, this quality at any rate is very different from that concrete, visible alliance between the One and the Many which we discern in the national life. We have to admit that many people in these modern days do not actively share in any organized religious group, or if they do profess membership their adhesion is but nominal. If this be so, ought we not to relegate this type of group to a later chapter, where we deal with Leisure and Culture, with groups, that is, which men elaborate when they have fulfilled the minor necessities of the physical life and choose this or that employment for their leisure time? It would certainly simplify one's conceptions of the social order if one treated a religious assembly as a sort of Mutual Improvement Society, but the facts do not warrant that position. The impulses or intuitions out of which the religious sentiments have evolved are, it would appear, a fundamental character or feature of mankind (117); the species man cannot be fully described if this aspect of him be omitted. Those who agree so far will also

admit that fellowship in religious aspiration is a universal trait, although some can only erect an altar To the Unknown God; and although in essence the religious relation may be viewed as an individual affair between the man and his God, it becomes a social affair simply because every part of his behaviour is social; however intimate and private our sentiments may be we cannot wholly conceal their purport or refuse to share them with our fellows. We must not however interpret the workings of the social mind too grossly; fellowship is not dependent on times and seasons, on buildings or officials: these trappings of the mind no doubt evolve in due course, as we saw when discussing Time and Space, but in the deepest (and therefore often the vaguest) aspirations of men, no visible or organized expression of communion has hitherto been attained by all.

Class.—We quoted on page 7 above from an article written many years ago on *My Station and its Duties*: the use of Station in this sense is almost archaic; indeed the word has been appropriated to signify what our American cousins call a *dépôt*. But the idea remains: those formerly described as of “exalted station” are now called the “upper classes.” The change of epithet is not without significance: any word with “sta” in it suggests a fixed static view of life, bounds defined, lines rigidly drawn: terms like caste, rank, station are found in societies where a group maintains its position with fixity of tenure, where the individual abides by his order; when these conceptions are replaced by a distribution into ‘classes,’ society is more mobile and the individual may sometimes hope to change his class, if he desires.

We suggest this historic perspective for the consideration of those who hold that class distinctions are ‘wrong.’ The moral sense of our time certainly condemns us if we despise our fellows solely because they are not “of

our class": but there is nothing essentially modern in the sentiment of brotherhood which overrides class divisions. It has never been expressed more eloquently than in the epistles of St Paul. Let us regard the situation not in the first instance as one of morals but of facts. Are the differences which common speech describes as "class distinctions" of any importance in the social order? If so they demand our notice without regard to the disabilities which some members may suffer. Group life of all types involves penalties: we cannot remain Englishmen without foregoing the advantages enjoyed by Chinamen; children often long to be grown-ups and jump the limitations of their period of life, and much more commonly old men desire to backslide into childhood: women, in pessimistic mood, sometimes express a wish that they were men; but in all these groups the facts of nature and circumstance abide. Hence when men wax eloquent in determining to "abolish" class distinctions, they should be rather advised to criticize the archaic conventions by which some of these are maintained. The student's interest turns to the past for explanation of the phenomenon and especially to discover how far these lines of cleavage may be regarded as a permanent feature of society.

By treating of Class side by side with Nation and Religion we are ranking this feature as a permanent element in human life; ought we not rather to regard it as an offensive survival, a degenerate feature which will disappear as man progresses to a higher platform? We need not embark on prophecy: it is sufficient for our purpose to demonstrate that in the present epoch social distinctions abide and concern the life of every man and woman. All social classes take their rise in the general principle of variation, already noticed in Chap. IV. Group Life is impossible without variation: some one has said that nature abhors a vacuum; it is equally true to say that nature abhors an identity.

All the types of corporate life hitherto considered have illustrated this principle—sex, period, neighbourhood, nation, religion: those that follow, such as vocation, leisure, culture, are further elaborations of the same theme. Now every such group, so far as it lays hold of the intimate personal life, impose manners and habits which mark the man for life; he is tarred with the brush; he is known by the company he keeps. In earlier epochs of civilization a man's vocation or his neighbourhood were sufficient to mark him off from his fellows; in many parts of the globe, in India for example, occupation still severs society into castes: as regards locality there are many parts of Europe where a distinctive dress is still cultivated as between one district and the next; the dress is only a symbol of distinctions which penetrate much deeper. The adoption of better means of communication lead men to lay less stress upon differences due to vocation, or neighbourhood; we desire to identify ourselves with our fellows in spite of these boundaries, and thus there is a perpetual struggle between the desire for distinction (for preservation, that is, of those marks of origin and circumstance which have made us what we are in our own set and group) and the desire, as Trotter put it, to lose ourselves in "the major unit."

Moreover we cannot sever ourselves from our habits, however much we may desire to do so: if you take a craftsman from a busy city and plant him down with his wife and bairns in a village, he finds it hard to accommodate himself, not only because of the loneliness, the comparative lack of society, but because he is "out of his class"; speech, modes of thought, manners are different. Yet the adaptation is not in such a case impossible, for the social differences between city and country are much less than in earlier times, and the chief remaining distinction is based upon inequalities of income. If the craftsman lodges and feeds and dresses

pretty much on the same scale as his neighbours, he will soon find himself at home: but if he affects a different style, he will move in a different "class."

It would seem then as if the law of variation has simply shifted its ground; confining our observation to our own ancestors we find first of all distinctions due to birth, which we call "caste," or to public authority and office, where "rank" was distinguished; these distinctions were maintained side by side with differences in occupation: classes in such times are constituted from trades and professions, each of which keeps its members apart from the rest. When the extension of corporate feeling leads men to recognize a fellowship which transcends these limits, the differences of caste, rank and occupation do not disappear, but are supplemented and crossed by a new consideration which grows in importance and is maintained as a reinforcement to the desire for variation and distinction. This new consideration is found in wealth, and in all the benefits which wealth may confer on the individual and his circle.

J. S. Mill, a 'middle-class' man.—The employment of the word "class" in our language confirms this conclusion. Its introduction, replacing the words "orders" (as for example in "the lower orders") or "ranks," is dated at the close of the eighteenth century when the Industrial Revolution was in full tide (118); by the time Mill wrote his essay (119) *On Civilization* (1836) the term "middle class" had become popular. Mill argued that there was no middle class in earlier epochs, and he attributes to the growth of this class, especially in England, most of the advances in civilization. He pictures human society in earlier periods as divided between the masses, destitute and ignorant, and "a small number of individuals, each of whom, within his own sphere, knew neither law nor superior." We know now that this description gives a wholly false

impression both of the beginnings of society and of mediæval times; there was no middle class because there were no classes, in our sense of the term, at all; men were rigidly divided by caste, by rank and by occupation; those who possessed authority and power were pretty strictly confined within the limits of their rank; custom maintained its iron hand on them almost as firmly as on the meanest of their subjects.

Mill's essay needs therefore to be rewritten; his distribution of the English population into three classes, the aristocracy, the middle classes and the masses was not half complex enough to cover the position. He looked forward, as did many of his generation, to the spread of schemes of education which would penetrate the masses, and thereby enable them to use aright the power which, as he forecast, they would very soon wrest from the aristocracy.

After the lapse of fifty years Booth conducted his famous investigation into the economic position of the classes and the masses (120). But no longer is there a single middle class but there are eight classes, graded according to economic conditions, and among these the three lowest, comprising one-third of the population, are barely able to sustain a decent livelihood. Mill's vision of an improved scholastic machinery which would enable every child to grow up to be a thinking man, and thus to rise from the masses to the middle classes, has not been realized; Luther's vision of a new Europe, reshaped by enabling every child to read the Bible, was scarcely less utopian.

As we have said, our class distinctions in Europe and America are expressed more and more in terms of wealth and income simply because the enlargement of opportunity has enabled men by means of wealth to break through the earlier restrictions of rank and occupation; by this endeavour they do not achieve the abolition of privilege and separation, for they do not desire to lose

themselves in the crowd, or to "abolish" distinctions; they use wealth to establish new distinctions, and to preserve the distinctive characters of their own group. The change which Mill was at pains to expound was a change from a time when variations were clearly defined and supported by law to the present epoch when other variations are adopted, but these are only vaguely defined and do not demand the enforcement of law and government. This is a great advance, for if it does not confer freedom it at any rate gives the *illusion* of freedom: and, as we have seen, one of the chief benefits conferred by freedom is the sense of emancipation, the expansion wrought in the inner man.

From one point of view Mill was right in advocating education as an agent for bringing the masses and the classes together: in the closing words of his Dissertation, its effect should be "to put an end to every kind of unearned distinction, and let the only road open to honour and ascendancy be that of personal qualities." In other words class distinctions will remain, but the basis of distinction will be sought in qualities of mind and character: we shall witness the grouping of men in circles determined by their intellectual and æsthetic tastes; neither money, rank or office will avail to divide us. As soon as Mill reaches this conclusion we see that it is of little avail for practical purposes; it merely points to an ideal which all sensible men, emancipated somewhat from class prejudice, have for long desired. The earlier distinctions served, very roughly and inadequately, to sever the fools from the wise men. "This people that knoweth not the law are accursed," said the learned Rabbi. The bishop, the knight, the merchant prince believed that he and his were a stronger product of creation than the lower orders, and as a rule they were: the maintenance of rank was in their view, the sole means of distinguishing ability. To-day public opinion holds that wealth and

poverty roughly serve the same end. We agree with Mill that personal qualities should determine our classifications of honour and ascendancy : but we too often urge that if a man has got the qualities he should give proof by earning the money which attaches to his ambition. How else, says our modern man of the world, can you discern his quality? Certainly in some walks of life you can subject him to an examination, making him a First Class Clerk in one contest, or a Second Class Clerk in another, and you then attach to him the money and the privileges which alone enable his abilities to maintain themselves. But outside the Government service such tests are of small account; the stimulus of competition for wealth is regarded as essential to the cultivation of the qualities which distinguish one man from another : abolish distinctions of wealth, it is held, and you will abolish the motive which leads men to develop their powers. So far from education operating as a leveller, emancipating men from the desire for status, providing a ladder by which the masses can mount to a universal middle class, it serves very largely to accentuate distinctions; it forms the rising generation in each social group on the pattern of their neighbours; Public School, Secondary School, Public Elementary School each serve not only as a means of bringing together the members of varied classes, but as a separator, moulding the children in each type of school to distinctive habits, at once mental and social. If the series of streets and dwellings in any great city be surveyed, starting in the heart of the congested area and radiating outwards, the social strata can be traced, street by street, with differences of income, hygiene, schooling, dress, until ten or twenty miles from the centre will be found the wealthiest and most honoured families in the nation, retaining in their ranks and their traditions the atmosphere of bygone epochs.

We are thus presented from a new aspect with the

problem which has already engaged our attention in this book; we traced its origin in Chap. IV. to conflicting views on the evolution of Man. Biologists of the school of Bateson, politicians and soldiers like Bernhardi believe devoutly that the human species can only survive by cultivating the interests of a dominant class. In former epochs this class, or a variety of dominant classes, held their own by the mere suggestion of Authority (see p. 151), and they secured wealth as an accessory to status. The epochs during which Authority has been replaced by Citizenship have diminished the prestige of rank and title, and in so doing have exposed the true inwardness of the 'struggle': the status is reduced to hard cash:—hard because it enforces the hard facts of competition for food and other necessities or luxuries. It is not surprising therefore that scientific men like Trotter and Kidd, who dissent absolutely from a deterministic biology, look to the abolition of class distinctions as the means of social salvation: "The moral homogeneity—so plainly visible in the society of the bee is replaced in man by a segregation into classes which tend always to obscure the unity of the nation and often is directly antagonistic to it" (121). To overcome this tendency Trotter forecasts "a new step in evolution" which would "have consequences as momentous as the first appearance of the multicellular or the gregarious animal." We may certainly hope for new steps in evolution (see Appendix II.), but to forecast their horoscope by analogies drawn from insects is to repeat the faulty reasoning of the biologists with whom he contends. (a) In our social theory we have to ~~to~~ reconcile the increasing variety of qualities and 'characters' in the human species (which multiplies the number of groups or classes) with the increasing moral force of the passion for equality, which rejects in succession all the anti-social segregations of birth or caste or wealth. (b) In our social practice we have to

accept the group or class in which our abilities or the accidents of fortune have placed us while refusing to let the advancement of this class be a governing principle of conduct, or alienate us from other classes in the search for a better social order. (c) Since at the present time the pursuit of wealth appears as the main motive by which segregation is maintained we look to a reorganization of industry as the main direction for the advancement of society, *i.e.*, for the reconstruction of social classes on a finer moral basis.

Ranks divide; classes may intermingle.—One may regard the distribution of society into economic classes from yet another point of view, asking as to the kind of reward which a man expects when he has distinguished himself. When the first airman who brought down a Zeppelin near London received large gifts of money, many people thought an error was made : we are coming to feel that the award of prize-money for deeds of valour is a mistake. Such a practice is congenial to our epoch, because we abound in wealth and think of distinction in terms of money and property ; but the public was equally puzzled when Knighthood was conferred on the brave fellows who first crossed the Atlantic in the air. To an earlier epoch titles, decorations, symbols were more congenial than wealth, and all groups which have a long tradition behind them, the Court, the Army, the Justiciary and the Universities, retain these methods of rewarding merit. To a leveller like Veblen, the American sociologist (122), all such marks of difference are but signs of an immature development, alien to a world which when it ceases to worship wealth will bow the knee to technology ; but it is at least worth considering how far laurel wreaths and titles, robes and medals are of permanent value, symbolizing by outward sign those variations in capacity and in service which the community hold in esteem. These symbols in earlier epochs served as the necessary marks

which distinguished class from class, just as khaki to-day severs the army man from the civilian, and this severance carried with it distinctions in speech and manner, in authority and prestige, which accentuated class bitterness and to-day excites the scorn of the democrat against the trappings in which authority adorns itself : the American never tires of contrasting the unadorned appearance of his officials and judges with the parade of European Courts. And yet keener observers of modern society see indications of a deeper current of change : they search below the use of symbol and robe ; they see that class hatred can be felt more bitterly in economics than in heraldry ; rich and poor are still kept apart even though they dress alike ; it is noted, even in America, that when men come together in voluntary groups they often delight in symbols of distinction, either copying those of the old world or inventing new ones ; they resort to such devices all the more in groups where economic disabilities and political animosities are laid aside.

When we thus penetrate beneath the surface we find that antipathy to class distinctions is really a revolt against the *alienation* of class from class which these distinctions in earlier epochs carried in their train. Thus a mediæval knight was all courtesy and chivalry within his own group, but serfs and hinds were outside the pale ; a modern "gentleman" if he chooses to call himself by that term will, by contrast, find himself at home in his dealings with all classes, whether regarded above or below his own class : this is indeed expected of him, not as a virtue but as part and parcel of modern democratic life. The old distinctions no doubt are retained but he can keep them in their place ; while in khaki he is a soldier, but, returned to civilian life, he is a civilian like his neighbours. Classes, that is to say, are intermingled ; a man is expected to play his part and fit his behaviour to the group in which for the time

being he is a member. Classes do not disappear, but the man is something more than his class and finds pleasure in many associations with which class has little to do.

Such an amelioration is the more possible because, as we have noted, most of what is worth possessing in life is now available to all except the lowest classes: in spite of a narrow margin of income all raised above these indigent classes stand within a measurable degree of equality. And, as a result, Giddings declares that "it is possible for all classes in modern democracies to cultivate the gracious manners that were once characteristic of the gentleborn, to treat all humanity with an equality of courtesy" (123). This is the right line of progress for the leveller, whether in high rank or low: when once he feels within himself that "a man's a man for a' that" the minor responsibilities or disabilities of class and rank cause little trouble; he has escaped both from the modern vice of plutocracy and the ancient divisions of rank and caste.

CHAPTER VIII

OCCUPATION AND LEISURE

Occupation.—If the reader accept a line of demarcation between altruism and egoism the groups reviewed in the last two chapters display an altruistic quality while those to be now considered appeal, in their origin, to self-regarding sentiments. (i.) My trade is my own affair in a sense which does not attach to my family or my nation : I follow my occupation in the first instance because I must : “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.” I am fortunate if it has become mine from choice as well as from necessity : but any way it is mine, it marks me off from others ; I register it in the hotel register after my surname and Christian name. (ii.) And when I seek re-creation from the strain of following my calling, this too is my own affair, whether pursued merely as pastime or as an effort to achieve culture.

It should be noted that this element of choice in the personal life is a mark of modern society much more than of earlier epochs. A system of caste settles a man's occupation for him ; settles also very largely the limits within which he can employ his leisure. To some extent class distinctions continue these restrictions ; and in consequence we find the ‘masses’ asserting themselves against the ‘classes’ :—not really because they object to distinctions as such, but because a man's freedom in choice of calling and in the employment of leisure is restricted within such narrow limits. Hence

too the justification for shorter hours of labour: if a man finds neither freedom nor variety in his occupation, he seeks an escape by securing a balance of leisure time in which he can dispose of 'himself.'

It is true that most men follow an occupation because they need wages or salary, yet it would be a mistake to regard livelihood and occupation as synonymous terms. This identification of work with wages is an entirely modern conception. It is true that most men and women must earn their bread and that the labourer is worthy of his hire, but he worthy of something more than hire; for he is not a threshing machine, let out by the day or season, but he is a creature of thought and feeling, capable of finding meaning and interest in the toil of his hands or brain. This point is of capital importance in sociology since it affects the purpose for which industrial or professional groups are sustained. Can an Inns of Court or a Trade Union sink to the level of a gang of thieves, concerned solely to protect its group interests in securing a share of wealth, or do the members unite in order to become better barristers and better tradesmen?

By linking the vocations of barrister and engineer we see how far we have travelled in these matters beyond the ideas of mediæval civilization. The professions have evolved as successive differentiations of the general function pursued by the clerical order, who were set apart from other social orders, firstly as *ministers*:—preachers, teachers or physicians; secondly, as wise men, revealing the mysteries of religion and science or declaring the law and custom of the commonwealth. In theory these corporations of clergy, of physicians, of lawyers have never succumbed to the economic and individualistic view of life which culminated in the nineteenth century: so far as they have done so, they are identified with "trade." For the essence of trade was bargain: you exchanged your labour or the fruits of

your labour for a material reward. The theory of a profession implies a *service*, given to the community : the theory of a trade is exchange : if you make a gift of your labour or your property you are performing a charitable act, outside the function of your trade.

The economic basis.—One of the chief ethical problems of our era is to reconcile these alien points of view. The easiest mode of reconciliation is to hold that bargain is the basis for every type of occupation ; in other words, to accept an economic basis for society. It is pointed out that although the barrister or the physician are in theory bound to serve without fee, this restriction need be only obeyed in form : the bargain is found here as much as in the sale of goods : the practice of these professions is “private” and the practitioner contrives to withhold his services if the fee is inadequate : many would hold that both parties would be better satisfied if the price list of services were exposed with the same candour that the tradesman shews when he tickets his goods with the cash value. One could readily elaborate this theme, exposing the evasions to which professional life is often reduced in its endeavour to reconcile the ideals of service with the practice of modern commercial freedom. And yet, on further reflection, such an attempt to reduce canons of conduct to an economic “law” would be futile, simply because facts are against it. *Society has never accepted the economic basis* ; on the contrary it has always struggled against it, and many professional men hold by the earlier ideal of their calling. Our modern world continues to shew a respect to professions which it does not shew to trades, and it maintains this difference solely because it still differentiates Work from Wages ; we continue, as in mediæval days, to distinguish between services rendered and the remuneration attached thereto. Granted that many practitioners ignore this distinction and pursue their calling on the economic basis of our

epoch, we do not respect them for the skill with which they exploit their calling to raise an income, but for its fundamental quality. This abides, now as before, in social service and will still rest upon that fundamental fact, when the present epoch overweighted by devotion to wealth finds a new point of departure.

Must we then continue to maintain the alienation between profession and trade, which we have inherited from the ancient world? We are certainly not required to follow the judgment of our fathers; for if the attempt to reduce professional service to a cash basis is a modern error, the mediæval conception of trade and manufacture was just as false to facts. In essence the act of trading is a social act as much as a work of healing; the real success of a bargain lies in mutual benefit: it is not enough to say that "exchange is no robbery":—exchange is profitable to both parties or it is bad business.

From Adam Smith to Arnold Toynbee.—Why then did our forefathers ignore this basal principle of sociology and despise the trader and the manufacturer? To answer this question would carry us back to the origins of civilized society, but roughly speaking it may be asserted that the entire field of economics and industry was despised because its importance as an agent in progress was not perceived. The higher adventures of the mind were absorbed by politics and war, by religion and law; these occupations determined the nobler ranks of men; here was the arena for great emotion and struggle, for problems worthy to be grappled with: buying and selling, delving and weaving were, by comparison, toils fit only for men of mean estate, for hinds and labourers, for Jews and Lombards; the Turk is now being reduced to ignominy because he still holds to this mediæval attitude towards trade and manufacture. The distinction so far was valid, because the beginnings of trade and industry were primitive enough:

who in those days could foretell the vast scale of intelligence and adventure on which modern commerce and industry are conducted. Failing any such platform commerce and trade took their revenge; if they were expert in naught else, they would be expert in bargaining; over against a world that dominated them by its exaltation of politics and religion, of learning and law, they created a world which fostered the power of usury and wages; they would teach their haughty masters that subtlety and policy play their part in the humblest of trades; that money is power. The growth of commerce and manufacture during the eighteenth century produced a philosophy of trade. Adam Smith, living in a society of Glasgow merchants, brought the training of a scholar to bear upon the rivalries of the trader and the state: his theory of *The Wealth of Nations* came at exactly the right moment to provide manufacturers, if they desired it, with a doctrine which countered the vested interests of parson and squire by a 'free' organization of an industry and a free exchange of produce (124).

Statesmen accepted his teaching with reluctance, but with the onset of The Industrial Revolution a grand opportunity opened and in the nineteenth century trade achieved an overwhelming triumph, engaging the highest powers of intellectual adventure in the service of the competitive system and the cash basis. How unwillingly and reluctantly this degradation was accomplished the social history of Europe bears witness. If on the one hand the dominant order in professional life have maintained their institutions with the old-time profession of public service, no less assiduously did traders and craftsmen re-organize Guilds and Companies designed not merely to assist in bargaining but to maintain sound standards of workmanship and honest rules of exchange.

This brief excursion into history must suffice to indicate a better road to reconciliation than is afforded by the economics of Adam Smith or Ricardo. Trade is

“base and mechanical” so long as trader and mechanic see in their occupation no other field for intelligence and sentiment than is offered by the prospect of profit; the profession descends to the same level when the practitioner values his life by that same standard. The various movements now in progress for the exaltation of industry and trade (125) all have their foundation in one endeavour;—to create in the worker’s mind, whether he be capitalist, technician or labourer, a larger view of his function, as a co-worker with his fellows and as a contributor to human progress.

We can well imagine that some readers will regard this conclusion as fantastic. Common sense, they will say, tells us that the drudgery of mechanical toil is on a lower level than the most ill-paid task of teacher or medical man. It is all very well for a poet (126) to exclaim :

“ A servant with this clause
Makes drudgery divine;
Who sweeps a room as for Thy laws,
Makes that, and the action, fine.”

Domestic service is not conducted on that principle ! We would venture however to defend our pleading even in this lowly example; we would assert that a large amount of domestic service, paid and unpaid, is done and has always been done, in the spirit of craftsmanship, of pride in making the house “fine”; in the same spirit which, on the grander theatre of surgery, revolutionized the operating table first by antiseptic treatment and then by the meticulous cleanliness of aseptics. If the reader will turn to a little book in the Home University Library on *Evolution*, by Thomson and Geddes, he will see how justified we are in linking together the humblest labours of peasant and craftsman with the highest adventures of scholar and inventor.

For the situation is not thoroughly grasped until it is realized that the social imagination of the worker is

involved as well as his technical craftsmanship. We recognize that a Pasteur or Kelvin, absorbed as they appear to be in the laboratory, have a vision also of the benefits which their toil may confer upon mankind. But can we conceive anything analogous in the drudgery of a domestic servant? To be sure we can; the sentiments which sustain the industry of a Pasteur on the higher plane can be found in the fidelity of a general servant or any working woman who keeps her home tidy. They sweep the room for use, and the higher their regard for the folk who use it the more diligent the sweeping. No doubt, if one had space to elaborate the argument, many refinements on this position might be made. As George Herbert put it, the social purpose often takes shape as duty or religious sanction; but the sexton who swept the Church Porch at Bemerton made no fine distinction between his duty to God and his reverence for the poet-priest. The wages question played little part either with Pasteur at the one end of the scale or the housewife at the other (127).

We have designedly chosen the example of domestic service because this occupation is a typical survival of the social situation prevalent in mediæval industry, where the personal relation between workman and employer, buyer and seller was a prevailing feature. To revert to our earlier chapters, face-to-face intercourse was the rule, and however mechanical and simple the processes themselves might be they were uplifted and refined by a social relation. Systems of apprenticeship, regulations of retail trading, to mention only two departments of activity, bear witness to this position. But as soon as the occupation ceases to engage both parties in a personal relation the case is altered: when the employer becomes a "firm" and the workman a "hand"; when the seller deals wholesale and at a distance, with a buyer who is a mere buyer, then a novel situation has arisen; Ricardo and the Manchester

School appear to control the situation, "economic man" emerges furnished with tooth and claw (128). The triumph (and the tragedy) of modern industrialism seems to be achieved.

The effect of the War on the ethics of industry.—We cannot put back the hands of the clock : to attempt a reversion to the mediæval relations of master and man is as idle a fancy as that of the good folk in the Peasant Arts Society with their handlooms and their spinning wheel. And yet, human nature has not degenerated ; a man is still a man, even though he becomes director of a company ; and a employee is never a mere hand, although Scientific Management (129) may analyse his motions to the precision of a shuttle. If you shut down his social impulses in one direction, they escape and play their game in another. The rise and development of Trade Unionism and of Co-operative Societies is to the sociologist a record of the inventions by which the workman and the salesman is effecting this escape. Deprived by fate of first hand social relations with those who used to share with him in bargain or in craft, he develops a new social power, in *organization*. In the factory he is a mere hand, a poor substitute for a machine ; be it so, after factory hours he joins his fellows and finds himself a man again. In short, the true function of a Trade Union or of an Employers' Federation cannot rest upon the economic basis of society, but must re-establish, through organization and on a higher moral plane, the primary social basis which alone makes life, whether industrial or professional, worth living. No doubt the agents in this evolution have not been conscious of this higher purpose : they often laboured, and still toil, under the obsession of the "economic man," struggling for existence in the belief that wages and dividends are the final goal for all occupations.

If the accuracy of this interpretation be questioned

the evidence from what took place in British industry during the War can scarcely be disputed. The nation in its peril turned to the industrial world and demanded a colossal supply of munitions, perfectly and honestly made. In a few months many of the regulations designed to limit output, to secure the rights of labour and control prices, were abandoned : a Trade Union reconciles its rivalry both with other unions and with employers ; the latter in their turn dispense with competition and co-operate. Both were compelled to adopt new procedure simply because wages and dividend had to yield pride of place to quantity and excellence of output. We do not question that good money in most shops was being paid for the work ; nor need we assume that this gigantic effort was always inspired by patriotism. But no one can question that under the urgency of a great impulse the real function of munition making was exposed ; its essence consists in the production of sound munitions by men whose attention is absorbed, whether as directors or labourers, in that supreme purpose and not merely to the economic end postulated by the theory of Ricardo. In other words the Trade Union and the Employers' Federation exist *to do the work of the Trade*, to produce the goods ; since this task has to be performed by many workers, each a human being, with social impulses, the union is necessary in order that every man according to his capacity may find society *in* his work ; when so organised and socialised the group can achieve the finest results, both in quality and quantity.

It is often said that this war has given our country a finer appreciation of the nobility of the soldier's calling : the millions of peace-loving citizens who have crossed the Channel on our behalf have indeed taught us to respect the uniform as we had never done before ; but may it not also lead us to a truer insight into the function of Trade ? Alas, that in both instances the

lesson of devotion has been learned in the maelstrom of dreadful war ! But citizen soldier and citizen craftsman will not have toiled in vain if, as pioneers of a new epoch, they have taught men to believe once more that life is more than meat.

These last words may suggest that my argument is only a repetition of an old story, which Carlyle and Ruskin resumed once again, seeking in vain to wean their generation from the love of money. Why pretend that Christian Ethics have a basis in real experience ? Why revive the outworn theme ? (128).

Why, indeed, unless the story happens to be true ? Unless somehow we can discern in social evolution a current of design which retains for man, with heart and brain alive, some spark of the divine raising him and his occupation above the steel of his machinery. In his blind groping for life he had thought that wages were the sole outcome of work, that the machine had conquered his manhood ; that he could live, if live at all, only in the short hours of leisure. But the ancient laws of comradeship and corporate life which first gave his race the title and rank of Man, imbedded in his religion, organised in the professions, practised in his mediæval crafts, once more emerge in novel forms, but with all the imperative of long-tried wisdom. Thus, through Uniformity, Conflict, and Unity, hope may arise for the humblest sons and daughters of toil.

Face to face intercourse in one's occupation.—Before leaving this ethical enquiry, let us confirm the position by noting two or three other movements in the socialisation of industry. (a) Group life, as we have seen, maintains itself at need by conflict with alien groups ; the war having intensified the unity of the nation in conflict with the Central Powers, compelled the captains of industry to relax somewhat their domestic rivalry and seek new modes of co-operation. Powerful associations of quite a novel kind are being formed, in

Engineering, in Textiles, in Chemistry, not as in earlier days to protect the salesman, but to improve the quality of goods through research and the exchange of trade "secrets"; also, it may be hoped, through efforts to instruct the apprentice and prepare a new generation, more qualified than their fathers to understand the purpose and method of Industry.

These new groups provide a better social atmosphere for the leaders of industry—managers, researchers, and the like—better because they bring together in personal relations the men who care for the real purpose of industry: as we have repeatedly seen, the large impersonal groups depend for their efficiency upon small first-hand groups where the right people can meet each other.

Among the lower grades of industry the study of psychology is leading to a recognition of the same principle, *i.e.*, the need a man has for association with his fellows in a common job. The need here is still more pressing, for the immense increase in the numbers of workmen relied upon to increase the quantity of output tends to diminish efficiency in the long run simply because a man cannot work like a machine. In his discussion of *The Organisation of Happiness*, Graham Wallas described the position finely, and we cannot do better than reproduce his words (130):

"In his relation to his fellow workmen, the most important factor to be allowed for is the quantitative limitation of our powers of forming that kind of sub-conscious and complete acquaintance with other human beings upon which ease of intercourse depends. A man may 'love' his whole species, but he only 'likes' those whose names and faces and characters he can recall without conscious effort. If he is employed in a business with two thousand other hands, and if his relation to no one of them is more permanent and particular than his relation to any other, there will be no one whom he can 'like.' The number of his fellows with whom a man can maintain easy personal intercourse varies with individual variations, with the conditions of work, and with the time which any body of workmen can spend together. Perhaps it does not often exceed eighty, and is normally about twenty or thirty. I do not know of any important attempt to organise mechanical work in

relation to that fact, though sometimes the success of a gang system may accidentally depend on it. . . . In armies it is found necessary . . . that the officers in each regiment and the men in each company or platoon should be deliberately formed into groups, generally numbering about twenty-five. . . . If one inquires, as I from time to time have done, into the happiness or unhappiness of the employees in a great commercial business or government office, perhaps the most frequent complaints turn on this point." (Compare Chapter II., p. 25, above.)

(b) **Welfare work, so-called.**—The factory institution to which the term Welfare (131) has been attached has a similar purpose in view. The provision of Welfare is not a discovery due to the war; the idea should be traced back to efforts dating from the first Factory Acts, and emphasised greatly during the early years of this century. But the impetus given by the production of munitions for national purposes has been enormous. It is realised, as never before, that a factory is a society, a group of men and women living a common life; that the factory processes are turning out not merely shells and weapons but human lives; and that since so much of a man's time and energy are spent in an occupation, his qualities, call them individual or social as you please, are enhanced or otherwise by the conditions of his life during the hours of employment. Even if the captains of industry who control the factory are bent solely on attaining the maximum output for the minimum expenditure, they are realising, far more than in earlier times, that Management must take account of Welfare. It must be borne in mind that this conception of Welfare covers not only the provision of suitable sanitary conditions within the factory or of recreation and decent housing after the day's work is done; it aims directly at the point we have urged above: the interest to be secured in the worker's mind on the problems which the work itself presents. The more this work in certain aspects becomes mere repetition of a mechanical sequence of acts, the more necessary is it for the worker to be better than his machine, realising both the technical and social situation in which he lives and

moves. At present social efforts of this nature are distrusted by Trades Unions, for they are financed and controlled by the employers; but in themselves they are a manifest advance in sociality.

(c) **Variations in capacity.**—We saw in the last chapter that the prevailing type of class distinction in Western Europe (and still more in America and the Dominions of the British Empire) is based on differences of wealth. The distinctions now before us tend to cut clean across class distinction; the more men in a given profession or industry are trained to understand its larger bearings the more easy is it for the corporate bond to be strengthened (132). This position is seen most favourably in the established groups, such as law and medicine, where the humblest practitioner is socially on a level with those who earn the largest fees. It was seen also in earlier epochs of industry and commerce, when apprentice and master were in close association: it can be still witnessed to some extent in small factories and workshops, where the master has risen from the ranks and is hail-fellow-well-met with the employees, who have been at school with him and know nearly as much as he does about the technique of the business. But the possibility of continuing such a social relation was destroyed firstly by the rapid accumulation of wealth by the master, who with his family entered a wealthier class; secondly by an equally rapid advance in variety of skill, producing a whole series of gradations from, say, the Civil or Mechanical Engineer, whose range embraces an entire industry, to the labourer, fit for little more than sweeping out the workshop; or, in commerce, between the Selfridge who commands the sale of every description of merchandise to the 'Sweets and Tobacco' round the corner.

Now this diversity in skill and talent is partly inherent in the variety of human capacity; and it is a diversity with which no one can quarrel; so long, for

example, as engineering works flourish there will continue to be grades of occupation like those, *e.g.*, analysed by Fleming and Pearce (131)—Managers, Supervisors, Researchers, Manual Workers (Craftsmen, Repetition Workers, Labourers). These grades will continue, and will be subject to further elaboration not only because industry will require a further diversity of talent but because the diverse types of human capacity fit into the diverse grades; a worker who is really satisfied with repetition work on a machine would not be happy if turned into a moulder or a salesman. And, as a result, the group life arising out of these occupations tends more and more to take on a bewildering complexity. Thus, as regards teachers, thirty years ago there were only three or four associations of teachers which displayed any great activity, but when recently the Teachers' Registration Council was established by an amalgamation of many such societies, it was found that more than sixty societies made a claim for inclusion. And this vocation is simple indeed compared with the ramifications of, say, the Textile Industries.

Further, it goes without saying that a group whose members are highly paid and educated are able to command all the modern machinery of communication, printing press, clerical and official agencies, and the like, whereas the lower grades are non-effective because they lack the means to purchase such aids and the wits to use them, even if for a time they achieve a competent organisation. The unskilled labourer can indeed join a General Workers' Union; if all the labourers in England, collected from every industry, belonged to it, they would prove a most powerful social group, but the energy of such a Union is spasmodic and depends largely on the capacity of leaders, whose efforts are necessarily directed chiefly to "agitation," for this alone keeps the body alive. The career of John Burns or Ben Tillett afford well known illustrations. Current rivalries

between Craft Unions and Industrial Unions illustrate the same position from another point of view.

Unions produce class consciousness.—(d) It is recognised to-day far more than formerly that every one who follows an occupation should join his fellows in an appropriate organisation; only a few obscurantists sigh for the good old days when every man did that which was right in his own eyes; and it is only in backward occupations, with little money in them and less prospect, that masters refuse to combine with masters, or employees with employees. This is particularly the case as regards employments open to women, extending from teaching, which is deemed the most genteel, to the dreadful occupations still pursued, with very slight interference from the nation, in the Potteries and the Black Country. Where these obstacles to combination prevail it is because the worker is still limited to face-to-face intercourse; she is unaffected by the larger problems which impersonal groups present; neither the foresight nor the sympathy are available.

When, however, public opinion has accepted the view that combination is as much a matter of social and national progress as of individual benefit, it becomes a public duty to encourage the formation of suitable unions; the Women's Trades Union Councils established in great cities were largely financed and managed by men and women of larger sympathies, initiating and guiding the early ventures of women who by their own efforts could not create an organisation.

For we should emphasise the point that, for all but a select few who live on dividends, occupation claims the largest amount of time and energy in everyone's life, and therefore the group life which arises from it is of prime importance. Organise as we will for politics or religion, for leisure or for culture, if we leave industry and commerce to be the prey of crass individualism we are leaving unsolved the most pressing problem of

modern civilisation. The rise of syndicalism in France and the sporadic efforts in England to copy that programme are just evidence that the manual worker, conscious of his worth but forced to perpetual conflict with the wealthy, is going to claim adequate recognition of his status. Naturally the bitterness of conflict may drive him to excess : having developed a strong group consciousness he comes to believe that his group can answer all human needs, and maintains a theory which appears to place the destinies of civilisation under the control of the producer. We are well aware that Cole's exposition of Guild Socialism (133) does not carry the syndicalist doctrine to this extreme issue, but the increasing support which he receives from working men is due to the class consciousness which has evolved from a century of effort to organise industry with increasing attention to the function of labour.

The problem of the future:—a redistribution of power.—(e) While immense progress has been achieved by the Union movement and the counter movement of employers and capitalists, each of them enabling the individual to enlarge his personality by membership in a group, the ethical basis of industry remains unchanged : the inspiring motive is still that self-interest which lay at the basis of Adam Smith's philosophy ; the strengthening of industrial classes only accentuates the conflict between employer and employed and between both of these over against the consumer. Hence from Robert Owen (134) and the Rochdale co-operators onwards men have experimented with the possibility of reconciling these conflicts. The theory, as we have described it above, on which a professional occupation is conducted in contrast to a life of industry, is simple enough ; but the experiments so far undertaken have only met with partial success : the most promising results have been witnessed in the distribution of goods by working-class Co-operative Societies and by Housing

Societies, formed under the Friendly and Industrial Societies Acts. Attempts at co-partnership, at nominating workmen on a board of directors and the like, have made little headway. When Adam Smith wrote in 1770, the principle of the joint-stock company, originally devised for foreign trade, had only just begun to be adopted for national industries: no one could anticipate that organised capital would stand in such tragic opposition to organised labour, or that the State would be compelled, in defiance of the sociology of Adam Smith, to invest public capital in industrial enterprise. Before the war many people prophesied that the conflict would be resolved by the State uniting the consumer and the employer in its own public organisation, imitating the methods of many continental governments, where many forms of transport as well as some of the sources of power in coal or oil are nationalised. (Compare p. 173 above). But nationalisation affords only a partial solution of the real conflict between employer and employed; it leaves the labourer where he was, the hired servant of a corporation, with no recognised interest in his employment beyond the self-interest he feels in competing for his wage: in his eyes the City Council or the Woolwich Arsenal are still employers, differing little from joint-stock companies. If the fundamental position we have taken above be accepted, some new type of industrial group, based on the interest of the worker in his work, will be evolved. The joint-stock company was not the last word in industrial combination: even since Adam Smith's day it has undergone substantial changes at the hands of the law; and these changes will proceed further. Up to the present the labourer distrusts any proposal by which he shall be identified with stock or capital; he has won his freedom (so far as he has gained the victory) by fighting the employer. But the first stages of a new theory are already being ushered in: certain trades,

especially the building trade, are finding it possible to adopt the principle of the Whitley Council, where the basis of combination is laid in the improvement of the trade, both quality and output, and not in the mere enhancement of wage or dividend. It is true that such Councils are only designed for discussion, and do not entrench on the economic rights of any of the three parties who share the argument. But history repeats itself : groups which are first brought together for consultation tend to develop a sense of brotherhood, and end in new forms of corporate action. If, for example, in the furniture or pottery or building trades the great bulk of the employers and employed (aided by scientific experts and representatives of the state on behalf of the consumers) get associated on equal terms, understanding each other's point of view, and at the same time as a result are able to improve the output and quality of their goods, it is reasonable to anticipate that this alliance will be carried to a further stage : the cash basis will not be discarded with contempt, but will be reduced to its proper level, subject to the higher and more practical ends for which industry is maintained. The time will then be ripe for evolving an organisation in which the producer can take his share in control : but, so far as an outsider can judge from what both parties contribute to the argument, the hour for a second Industrial Revolution has not yet struck.

Leisure, as Pastime or Recreation.—Every language affords some term to mark off the time devoted to one's occupation from the time available for rest or change from occupation. When a race like the ancient Greeks has a keen sense of intellectual and æsthetic need it is not content to pass its idle hours solely in rest or amusement ; it fills up the leisure time with Schooling ; the Hebrews devoted their Sabbath to the exercises of religion ; the leisure class among the Romans gave a large place to *otium cum dignitate*.

Our English language indicates no specific direction in which this time should be filled, but we speak of *rest*, which just indicates a position of repose, or of *leisure* where the etymology reminds us that occupation is bondage from which we are set free for a while. For the great majority of mankind this view of the day's routine suffices; the succession of sleep, meals, occupation and rest until one can resume occupation, are followed by sleep, meals, occupation, and rest.

Not that everyone consumes the hours of rest in mere idleness: the affairs of the groups we have already treated absorb some time; the family circle, friends and neighbourhood, politics and religion, all make their claim: very often a business man has so little spare time from week to week that he makes the acquaintance of his children only on Sunday or when the holidays come round; and the majority of men who take an active share in politics are either of a temperament that can stand the strain of continuous effort with little rest, or they make politics their occupation. Such interests are not therefore to be grouped under the head of leisure; we class them as obligations or duties: as the catechism prescribes, my *duty* to God, my *duty* to my neighbour; and among the duties to my neighbour citizenship is included, duty to the nation.

It is clear that the conception of mere leisure, of time available for personal use when these social duties have been discharged, is a late product of civilisation. It has prevailed only among the few whom Veblen marks off as *The Leisure Class* (135), a group in society who from one cause or another are released from the excessive strain of occupation or of social duty. Veblen regards that group as an excrescence, equivalent to what is popularly known as the idle rich. Together with their parasites or flunkeys, who are kept busy assisting the masters in wasteful consumption, that group is a canker; the health of society in his view

finally depends upon devotion to industry and to the technology which enhances the quantity and quality of the goods produced thereby. We are loth to regard this conception of leisure as adequate, for the argument flows in a vicious circle : it is true that wealth is very unequally distributed, and that in consequence a few are enabled to secure for themselves or their class the means to be idle if they wish to be at leisure ; but a better distribution of wealth would not of itself create a perfect social order ; it would only secure a better distribution of leisure. Now this, so far as it goes (and certainly it goes a long way), would be a great achievement. The (Eight) Hours' Day is a legitimate aim for men engaged in arduous industrial occupations ; and it can properly be secured at the expense of a class who capture an excessive usufruct from the enormous increase of wealth.

But the final question would still remain :—what is a man, working man or millionaire, to do *with* his leisure when he has secured it ? He has spent adequate time on sleep, meals, occupation, and in rest from fatigue ; he has fulfilled his duties as father, as worshipper and as citizen ; what else is there to engage his mind ? I repeat that the immense majority of the human race have never desired any such engagement ; the large mass of mankind, so soon as they are released from desk or forge or loom, turn to one or other of their ' duties ' as a matter of course. Not only so, there are many who think that off-time is harmful, that neither children nor grown-up people should be able to dispose freely of much time. " Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do."

On the other hand, there are two demands which a man makes when he is allowed time to think and to feel :—(a) The first finds its origin in the young, the unreflective animal, to whom life is just expansion and joyous adventure. He demands not only to live but

to enjoy life; just so far as the trivial round of repose and occupation are tedious and mechanical, just so far will be call for time off in which to live, to "walk in the ways of his heart and the sight of his eyes." It takes time for use and wont to break him in. If, as he grew older, his Occupation proved to be rich in interest, then he would not ask for shorter hours. Coal-getting, for example, is not only a very fatiguing but a very dull affair: the miner claims and secures a lengthened period to call his own, for he needs ample time to re-create himself to endure another six hours facing coal. So (b) the demand changes its shape as we pass from youth to middle life; at first it is a rebellious, skittish insistence on having our own way: it shows itself most characteristically in sport, beginning with the tribe of Nimrod and ending in golf. By the time a man has built up his physical frame to maturity, the demand for *mere* enjoyment diminishes; the middle-aged man is satisfied with watching a football match or reading about it; enjoying, that is to say, the sight and memories of what formerly was a personal experience. Moreover, if his life has expanded happily, so that occupation and duties afford an adequate supply of pleasure, absorbing his best energies, he can abstain from any association with sport without feeling that he is missing the good things of life. The history of sport in England among the civilian population of all classes in society during the war sufficiently confirms this position: racing, cricket, football, golf declined not merely because public opinion frowned upon them; men, young and old, found new interests in life, in occupation as well as in duties. Nevertheless, since personality is an individual as well as a social affair, the demand for leisure time in which one can do as one likes is not to be dismissed as immoral.

Leisure for Thought and for Personal Development.—This second demand strikes a deeper note: it

only comes when a man pauses in the midst of the daily round to inquire as to origins and purposes. The impulse of curiosity works at first on the plane of sense-perception, and part of the enjoyment of the young consists in an avaricious desire to know the why and the wherefore. Among the select few this impulse develops into a life-long curiosity to understand and to feel the deeper meaning of life in all its tangled maze. From another point of view the demand appears as dissatisfaction not only with the trivial task of earning salary and producing goods, but with the prescribed scheme of duties. The biological concepts of survival and succession no longer satisfy (compare p. 59 above); the authoritative exposition of the chief end of man fails to convince; time is demanded to probe and learn, to invade the unknown. The quest is pursued on many paths; some turn to print and read at their leisure the *Hundred Best Books*; others visit the Art Gallery or listen to a band. Not always do men pursue these employments of leisure with an elaborate design of self-improvement or of adventure into the unknown: our mental processes and motives are not so clear cut. But when we analyse group life we can find abundant evidence of organisation directed mainly to achievement in intellectual and æsthetic adventure.

As a rule, however, the demand is met within the circle of organizations whose ostensible purpose is concerned with other groups. For example, a Church will set on foot a Mutual Improvement Society, or a Brotherhood, in which social and secular problems are discussed under the ægis of religion; those who take part in such a group are fulfilling at the same time their duty in religious affiliation and their private desire for progress and enlightenment. Many institutions of learning, so-called, duplicate their functions in a similar way; the student is ostensibly preparing for an occupation as craftsman, let us say, or physician; but he has

other things in mind, and if time off is not arranged for, he takes it for amusements, time also for debate, for grappling in quite a serious way with the larger issues of life. Even in politics there is many a political club which depends for its existence not upon the Party under whose ægis the club finds countenance, but upon the billiard table and the bar. The first glass of beer makes the member sociable; a few more and he is excessively sociable. Conversation and gossip are the favourite mode of recreation for the majority of people all the world over: men try to get a job where they can talk and work at the same time; and they go on talking, at home or at the club, when work is over for the day.

It may be argued that there is overlapping here with the groups arising out of Friendship which we noticed in Chapter V.; and this is true enough. The only difference is in the motive which leads to union. The motives now at work are predominantly self-regarding, while the intimacies considered under the rubrics, Friendship and Secret Societies, spring from an altruistic source; at least that is their origin if they are true to type. No doubt we make use of our friends, but a man does not convert acquaintances into friends if he regard friendship as a means of personal advancement. No doubt again some freemasons join a lodge because the alliance will help them to get on, but, although not in the secret, we may be pretty sure that a good mason is good simply because of good-nature, possessing a friendly and benevolent nature towards his fellows; an altruism not perhaps on the lofty or passionate scale, but genuine of its kind.

Since the depressed classes toil for longer hours than the more fortunate classes we cannot expect much organization of leisure at that level; the street corner and the public house are the most obvious devices, and in these we can scarcely speak of membership. When

we advance in the social scale, this side of life comes into prominence : *Who's Who* takes pain to discover and record Recreations and Clubs as a sequel to Family and Occupation ; and rightly so, for your curiosity about your neighbour can only be fully satisfied when you know the company he keeps.

Enough has been said to warrant our specifying Leisure as a separate motive in social grouping : (1) leisure for mere recreation ; (2) leisure which involves more effort, directed towards self-development.

Leisure Time in Cities.—Our purpose in these last three chapters has kept pretty strictly to definitions. We have sought just to arrange and classify groups into species or types. In this problem of leisure, however, we may usefully spend a moment in reflection upon its immense importance in the present social order, in a community, that is, where the great majority of the population are urban. The countryman, with stock and produce growing all about him, is always occupied with tasks whose variety exempts the worker from ennui ; he carries on, if not joyfully, at least with equanimity until physical fatigue compels to rest and sleep. The town worker finds a greater need for leisure since his labour, whatever form it takes, tends to fatigue after a shorter spell of application. At one end of the scale is repetition work on lathe or sewing machine, at the other extreme the brain work of organiser or thinker, with a new problem every day.

The most recreative form of leisure for the town worker is to spend his spare time with the countryman, but the more restricted and urbanised classes cannot get out of town. Hence they turn to one another and find enjoyment in society : often at the expense of health, but with a great stimulus to social efficiency. The problems of city life, conceived in terms of civic development, can be reduced to the one issue : how can we arrange the city, its housing, its social fashions,

its civic activities, so that every one can find outlet for his leisure. The lonely shop girl in a mean boarding house; the railway porter newly arrived from the country; the children crowded on to the back streets, all have leisure, but have neither space nor society in which to be at leisure. A practical sociology will address itself to the details of civic life in order to answer this question; the reformers by many avenues are approaching a solution. No city however wealthy and cultured has a right to call itself by proud and honourable titles until it has spent its best fortunes in such improvements and amenities as will enable the meanest and the humblest to enjoy their leisure time in 'good' society.

SECTION III. ORGANISATION.

“ Friendship must have a *machinery*. If I cannot correspond with you, if I cannot learn your mind, if I cannot co-operate with you, I cannot be your friend. And if the world is to remain a body of friends it must have the means of friendship, the means of constant friendly intercourse, the means of constant watchfulness over the common interest.”—President Wilson in the Manchester Town Hall, December 31, 1918.

CHAPTER IX.

THE LEADER, THE OFFICIAL, THE REPRESENTATIVE.

Precise meaning of the term organisation.—The distaste felt by many men for such studies as we are engaged upon is increased when we invite their attention to organization. The word itself calls up a picture of men and of measures which they abhor. Many of the best workers in all trades and professions avoid committees and meetings : they want to do work, not to talk about it or vote upon it : some one no doubt must serve on committees but they find plenty of men ready to take office and pose as expert managers : they themselves will not waste valuable time and temper on what had better be left to the officials. Eventually they find that their work is being impeded by the machine which they have despised : and they are compelled to play their part as members of the body. The best organizers are not found among those who like power for its own sake, but among those who are driven to take their share because progress depends upon co-operation ; they reluctantly follow the rule of the Mean, giving a fair proportion of time to organization while refusing to let their life be absorbed by committees and rules. Some of the best workers, however, especially in the fine arts, always refuse what they regard as an interference with their craft : to be anti-social seems a necessity of their existence. They thus become as helpless, when a crisis arises, as the humblest labourer in the fields.

In pursuing the study of organization we continue to

be embarrassed by technical terms. Even Graham Wallas who has insisted (see p. 21 above) on our keeping clear of "organism," uses "organization" in two senses. For example, he speaks of a Trade Union as a Will-organization, meaning what we mean by a social group; but he also speaks of *The organization of Thought*, *The organization of Will*, *The organization of Happiness*, meaning the schemes or processes by which the many are enabled to think and feel and act as one. We wish to confine the term to this latter sense. It is true that people sometimes speak of "the organization" when they mean the executive committee or caucus which manipulates a group: but this is incorrect. The passage quoted (p. 22 above) from Herbert Spencer is clear enough and we may reshape it thus:—We find that men not only share thoughts and feelings but desire to act upon these; any form of union by which a group, a common mind, can realize its ends or seek to attain them is called its organization. It is true that some groups can be described as unorganized because they have not yet endured long enough to be self-conscious: a crowd or a company of children at play has no organization until a leader appears. But as soon as common action is desired, organization of some make-shift kind is demanded.

In a sense we may call organization the machinery of corporate life, as Woodrow Wilson does in the passage prefixed to this Section, but these analogies easily lead us to take a false perspective: an organization that works like clock-work, that shews best on parade, is not likely to be doing the best kind of work for human ends. We cannot therefore agree with Mackenzie's view "That German civilization is in certain respects the highest, must, I think, be admitted. It is the highest in almost everything that can be expressed by the term Organization" (136). He is using the term in a sense other than that employed by Spencer or Graham Wallas or

Hobhouse (137): a high standard of civilization is, not in reality manifested by that type of organization, although it achieved most powerful and disastrous results during the fifty years in which the German Empire was maintained.

The problem of organization is in principle the same whether with Graham Wallas we are concerned with the life about us, or whether we go back to primitive times. The group is to act *as one*; but since the many members are not organically connected unity will not follow as a matter of course. St Paul hits off the situation quite clearly—"the eye *cannot* say unto the hand" etc., for the organs of the body work under a fixed system of control; brain and mind direct both hand and eye. In social affairs one man *can* say to another "I have no need of thee"; and if this be repeated often enough the group dissolves. First comes the sensibility to comradeship, the recognition of likeness, kin-ship, kind-ness: thereupon a group emerges and if the group secures stability we may call it an *institution*: the instruments by which it expresses and fulfils its will we call its organization.

The Leader (the stage of pre-organization).—When a group of little children are set free to play a leader very soon emerges: he tells the others what to do and the game gets started. No doubt there are quarrels; emulation and rivalry play their part, but the group cannot play without direction. So in primitive times the Leader, the Chief emerges from his fellows, not only because he is assertive and compelling but because the group must act as one body. Both in early man and in animal species individual differences shew themselves in the quality of courage more than in wit or cunning. Fear is the overmastering impulse which inhibits, so its opposite expands and carries the group forward. The captain knows what the people want, and can shew them how to get it, therefore he, literally,

represents their mind. No election is required; the Leader "takes" power, having tested his strength in emulation with rivals. He is visibly there, taller, stronger, fiercer than the rest. We can scarcely speak of organization as yet, for if the leader disappears the group becomes a prey to panic. When Moses retires to Mount Sinai in search of Jehovah the people lose faith, "as for this Moses, we wot not what is become of him."

It must be borne in mind that leadership lies at the basis of all beginnings in group formation and never ceases to play a great part. The rôle of the individual, conscious of power, *must be* to associate others with himself; he may create new groups, or he may secure ascendancy in such as are already organized, but his "individuality" cannot work in a vacuum. In more cultured societies the quality that ensures leadership may not be those of the stature of King Saul; the real leader of a group may be a writer of songs or a student like Darwin; but he only leads the crowd when they accept his influence.

So long as a group only acts through a self-appointed captain, so long as the bond of union centres round a personality, it seems better not to speak of organization; we are in the *pre-organization stage* where unification is achieved, as it is in the relations of body and mind, through the supremacy of a single will. In the simplicity of the early Christian Church this pre-organization stage suffices "One is your teacher, and all ye are brethren." The analogy as traced in St Paul's epistles holds exactly:—all the organs and limbs subordinate to the personal leadership of "the Head." Organization begins first so soon as the group finds the need for rule, for continuity, for settlement. The rivalry of leaders compels to some rule of election: the leader becomes a chosen representative, an official; the rule becomes custom and eventually law; the group

becomes an institution. Just so far as custom and law prevail leadership loses some of its status, or at least seeks to maintain itself by other resources : brute force no longer suffices : the leader must conform to the code, or perhaps become its interpreter. Since his office is now sanctioned, those who sanctioned it are to some extent partners in authority ;—thus an executive is foreshadowed, sharing with the leader in government, or even putting his function into commission.

But it is a capital point to remember that individual action never ceases to play a part in corporate life. Some one person, in the last resort, always gives the order, drafts the minutes, acts as spokesman, signs the death-warrant. Limit his responsibility as much as you please it is always a single person who acts for the group. The creation of offices is the first step in passing from un-organized to organized groups : the officer may or may not be a leader, but he must be an instrument, either of the entire group or of an inner circle who act on its behalf. Naturally the officer, steward, Mayor of the Palace, secretary, has great opportunities for exercising the arts of leadership, and when such offices are first created they are designed, as we have seen, merely to regulate the exercise of power. In the family at one time the mother (on the theory of the matriarchate) and at a later epoch the father, takes the headship ; in the state hereditary succession on varying schemes was accepted as the right tradition. But personal ascendancy, the essential fact of leadership, does not disappear : the legal head of a family may be the father, but often enough the mother keeps the house in order : in every type of community strength and capacity are as necessary as in elementary forms of society ; but it is found possible, as organization develops, to distinguish the leader from the official. The art of social organization consists largely in utilizing varieties of personal force so that the group may achieve

its ends, perpetuate its existence, enlarge its borders, without the disasters incidental to the infirmities of a hero. The first chapter of a constructive sociology was written by Carlyle, in portraying the Heroes whom men have worshipped from the dawn of history to the days of Carlyle himself; but *only* the first chapter. The modern hero must disguise himself; his power is no longer displayed in thunder and violence, but in the influence of a still, small voice. The development can no doubt best be observed in the sphere of politics because so much is in print about politics; constitutional history records the invention of all sorts of plans to enable a political group to get the maximum of service from leaders; political theory is the outcome of attempts to find a rational basis for such plans: some assert the existence of a *Contrat Social*, others tell us of the Divine Right of Kings, while others declare *vox populi vox Dei*. Similar processes, however, are obviously at work in every sort of group; in a football club, a Limited Liability Company, a Yearly Meeting, the force of personal ascendancy plays its part as powerfully as in a caucus. Many considerations of a practical character will suggest themselves to a reader who reflects not only upon the part played by captains in the great world of politics, but upon his own actions and those of his neighbours in the humble scenes where most of us are content to play our part.

Party as a product of leadership.—What has been said above of the nature of parties should be recalled. The use by our English political parties of the term "Leader" to indicate the outstanding man of the Party is quite appropriate. It serves to distinguish the Government Official from the avowed partizan: both of whom are evolved from an earlier epoch when the head of a nation or tribe was chief officer as well as leader; when there was no party and no opposition. This is not the place for considering the

Party System as it has evolved in English political life (138), but little thought is needed to recognize the *principle* of party organization in any large group which maintains a stable life. For when once discussion is admitted as an element in organization, differences appear, and out of the clash of opinions, parties come together. Thereupon the party leader emerges; the man who has gifts of leadership finds his opportunity for exercising these in leading his party. In small groups and coteries where face-to-face intercourse prevails the organization of party spirit would break the harmony of comradeship, but wherever large impersonal groups are federated, with branches and sections, one can witness the operations of parties and leaders.

And the philosophy of parties and party leadership always rests on one basis;—on the need for securing in due course for the party and for its leader the approval of the whole group, or at least a majority of the group. A party and its leader look forward ultimately to being in possession of the government; they intend to put their policy into operation, and that intention, however delayed or thwarted, governs both the tactics of the party and the substance of the programme.

Hence party leaders are always liable to inconsistency; they are not as a class double-faced or pliable but their function is to lead and to lead their party to success. They are compelled therefore to put forward just so much of their programme as will answer two purposes; firstly, it must be such as will hold the party together, stimulating their enthusiasm and eliciting their energies; secondly, it must be such as will attract, sooner or later, outside support and so win to their leadership the common mind of the whole group: this second purpose often makes it necessary for the leader sometimes to jettison a part of his programme and at other times to adopt new 'planks' in the platform which

may be dovetailed with the rest. The student of history in any great field of endeavour, for example, in Ecclesiastical History, in Constitutional History, in Industrial History, watches out for the policy of the leaders; for he knows that their actions and words are not only the product of their individual will, but are the expression of a developing social mind. An outstanding personality, such as Napoleon or John Wesley or Keir Hardie, may create his own party and infuse a multitude with faith in his programme; but as soon as the group he has created takes shape and secures power he has to make terms with his creature, who will often lead him in paths which he himself would scarcely have chosen.

Qualities of the Leader.—The qualities of mastery, élan, magnetism which attach to the open exercise of leadership appeal most forcibly to primitive races and to backward groups, to societies of any description where safety and progress depend upon resort to emotion and to quick decision rather than to reflection. The slums of a European city and the immigrant population of an American city are alike subject to the ascendancy of the "boss"; in industry, the autocratic employer and foreman are needed and obeyed just so far as the workman is of a low type; in religious organization, a "General" Booth discovers that martinet leadership provides the readiest form of ecclesiastical organization for the unsophisticated toilers who seek salvation and light in the dark places of the earth. The same qualities prevail in adolescent groups (139). Secondary Schools and Lads' Clubs and Boys' Scout Troops demand for success teachers with bright and forceful sympathies; and pioneer communities on the frontiers of civilization, where the world renews its youth, submit readily to the control of a commanding sheriff or marshal.

In all such societies there is uncertainty and danger. But where the people are more sophisticated, or have more leisure to reflect, the leader still plays his part,

but a different kind of personality is needed. He does not require to display his power; indeed he is more effective, very often, if he is not conscious of the part he plays. He is followed because his arguments are sound and his sympathies wide and generous: if organization is demanded he will not force himself into dictatorship, but his group or party will trust his judgment and his own satisfaction will be gratified by finding that his counsels are followed. Professor Ross traces the influence of personality with charming vivacity and rich variety of illustration, but he concludes on a false note: "The democratic tendency to do away with steep gradations in the prizes of State and Church is a sign that society, having installed new machinery of control, need no longer bid so high for personal influence. On the whole it appears that personal ascendancy will play no such rôle in the future as in the past. It is a precarious thing, being bound up with fragile lives. It is hard to manage and very liable to abuse" (140). We can see no evidence that this prophecy is sound: for personal ascendancy is based on individual differences; the man or woman of high native quality, of disciplined character and of personal charm will continue to rule, in groups great or small, of which he is a member; the only change in his position as civilization develops is that he will be content to exercise his sway with less outward acknowledgment in the shape of pecuniary reward, of title, or symbol; he reigns by influence rather than by office, Prophet instead of Priest or King.

Union between leaders and led.—For a third question suggests itself and can now be answered. Does the leader really belong to his followers? Is he a part of the group which he directs? For example, is the monarch "one with" his subjects? Is the teacher a part of his class? Is the foreman of a weaving-shed one with the weavers who mind the looms? Does the political boss, working on the suggestibility of an ignorant

crowd, share their mind? The criticism made by Ross gives the clue to the answer. He idealizes a community whose members are fully grown in ability and intelligence and holds that in such a society the leader need not be and should not be cut adrift from the members. But just so far as a group needs to be directed above by "authorities" or rulers, just so far is the ruler set apart from the mind of his "subjects." In schools the teacher by age and experience stands apart, and in the traditional view of education the gulf is kept as wide as possible; the educational reformer, from Pestalozzi to Arnold of Rugby, or from the Kindergarten to the University, seeks a truer psychology; he does not ignore the separation, he does not try to sink his adult status, but he bridges the gulf so far as may be by studying the ways of his pupils and thus, as we say, *enters into their mind*. The same position holds good in the control of inferior races and of the depressed classes in congested areas; the successful leader is necessarily a man of higher type, if not morally then socially and intellectually. However much he may love them and seek their sympathy he knows that his own associates belong elsewhere: as a leader he is lonely, cut off from the intimate fellowship with those who follow him. How forlorn for example is the isolation of the Indian Civil Servant, sent out to settle the fortunes of thousands of his fellow men of ancient race and long tradition, who cannot be one with him since they are unfit to cope with the problems of Western civilization.

Officials.—Such loneliness cannot be endured for long; a ruling caste or class inevitably emerges in all communities where large affairs require to be permanently conducted. The same tendencies which create a Council or Committee, surrounding the leader, and helping him to govern, create thereby a small closely-welded group cut off in a measure from the multitude;

and when the original leader has passed away the inner circle who have shared his mind will continue his tradition; thus the solitary thought and impulse of a pioneer takes shape not only in the extended allegiance of a multitude of followers but in the more exclusive attachment of the few to whom he revealed his heart. Every great movement in religion, philosophy, or politics bears witness to the working of such a process.

A similar process can be traced in official life, and a like reconciliation must be sought by a like extension of sympathy. As we saw in Chap. VII. (p. 173 above), the official necessarily belongs to his official class or group; he holds "the official point of view"; but so long as he is a mere official he is an enemy of society. His greater task is to keep in touch with the larger body whom his office serves, to understand the common mind and share the universal aim; he must play a double part and be able to feel for his own order without denying fellowship with the world outside. An illustration is to hand from an experiment made by the Premier during the War in the selection of leaders and officials in 1916 and '17. He found that the usual plan for the selection of office bearers could not meet the exigencies of that extraordinary crisis: the official politician who had served his time in parliament and party seemed to be out of touch with facts and conditions of Trade and of Education: so he boldly took a man at one jump from his professional employment and placed him among the chief servants of the state, introducing him as a newcomer not only among seasoned members of parliament but among life-long permanent officials. The experiment will only succeed if the new ministers bring with them to these tasks not only the definite knowledge and skill of the expert, but the intuitive sympathy and feeling of the public mind which the isolated leader and the still more isolated official so often lack.

The aftermath of conflict as affecting Leadership.—The events of our time bring forcibly to mind the consequences to society resulting from bitter conflict. We have described control by the personal authority of leaders as standing at a stage of pre-organization, and the advance to organization with discussion, government and law as a decisive step in social progress. This step is an advance in harmony and goodwill, in sympathy and unity. Now when the forces of evil gather strength and create an actual disruption, the fear of anarchy or dissolution invites the members to retrogression, submission to a dictator, that is to a leader, who (whether or no he pretends to rule by public sanction) rests his claims in reality on prestige and force of will.

All forms of competition, whether between nations or classes, offer scope for anti-social sentiments and ultimately open the avenue to physical struggle and violence. The forms of organized government, whether in states, in industries or churches, are designed to limit the area of competition and struggle. If this design fails then the cry is raised: "To your tents, O Israel!" every man's hand is against every man, parties are dissolved, and the strong man takes the helm. When the chaos has subsided, the group must find a new constitution, a re-organization. If the struggle has been intense and has endured for long then the reversion to stability will be delayed. For anarchy in government is the sequel to scepticism: men have ceased to believe in the well-tried formula which had kept the members in stable equilibrium: quiet and order can only be expected when the members have time to reflect upon and adopt new formulæ: in the interval the strong man holds the reins until the community can give expression to its new needs.

If history repeats itself, the condition of Europe, including Great Britain, cannot be contemplated with great hope, after the orgy of violence and destruction

endured during recent years. Fortunately for the human race, history does not always repeat itself. It is just possible that the diffusion of intelligence and sympathy among multitudes of men and women may cause a rapid reversion to sanity, contrary to what is recorded of earlier epochs after a period of violence. This, it seems, is what is meant by statesmen when they tell us that the Covenant of the League of Nations is waste-paper unless its sentiments really represent a change of heart in every country which has engaged in violence. "If the nations of the future are in the main selfish, grasping and warlike, no instrument or machinery will restrain them" (141).

The logic of this process of retrogression does not however apply solely to political groups and nations. Every group depends for its existence on the activity of its members striving to fulfil its aims, as well as upon their goodwill: disharmony and treachery means anarchy: anarchy leads either to dissolution or to dictatorship; before the group can recover its strength leadership must run its course and give way once more to an ordered system of fellowship under rule and law. We hold no brief for dictators or martinets, but they are the inevitable masters in all societies that break the eternal laws of fellowship and self control.

The elements of organization.—We have noticed that the first step in organization is either to surround the leader with an inner circle of aristocrats or to transform the leader into an official: but we have also indicated the other steps which are involved in this change:—the members of a group *discuss* their proceedings; some of them, or all of them, in common assembly, *execute* their decisions; and the repetition of these processes of thought and action creates social habit which in its earlier stages is *custom* and in later stages takes shape in regulation or *law*. Discussion, Law, Government appear to present the three features of organiza-

tion to which every group has to pay regard. The purpose of discussion is to elicit the opinion of the group, the purpose of government to execute its will; the purpose of law is to maintain stability.

It is not to be said that all groups of a stable and consistent type require separate institutions for each of these three purposes. Small primary groups can get along with face-to-face intercourse in which both discussion and execution are performed without specific machinery, while unregistered custom suffices to guide procedure, so long as the members are used to each others' ways. But when organization develops the machinery of organization falls into these three departments and has to provide for their efficient working.

Most people do not need to analyse the process of development, for they accept membership in groups already established: the emergence of the three elements can be discerned either by the historian tracing the growth of institutions in primitive society, by the traveller noting the steps by which pioneers in the backwoods pass from leadership to an acceptance of conventional forms of association, or by any one who takes part in the inception of a new group.

Representation.—Before treating of these three parts of organization, we need to dwell further upon the principle of representation to which reference was made when we noted that every successful leader represents the mind of his group. If he be a tyrant, self-chosen and submissively accepted, no organization is required, for there is no discussion of his acts and his caprice may even override custom. As we have seen he represents the members but there is no scheme of organized procedure which clothes his authority with sanction; he only endures so long as custom and opinion unite to support his prestige. Undiluted tyranny is, however, rarely found without some restrictions; the sanctions of religion or of caste are usually employed to give the

tyrant's control the semblance of a representative character. When we pass forward to the complex organizations familiar to our age, we see that men have invented a thousand plans by which they can secure, with more and more certainty, that their social mind is really represented by those who execute the common will (142). The study of these inventions, as regards political groups, is the theme of constitutional history. We must not trespass into details but we can readily trace the outlines of the story; but first let us be clear as to what is involved in the principle of representation.

The acceptance of the principle of representation, in any field of experience, indicates a comparative advance in intelligence; the symbol $(x+y)^n$ represents the addition and multiplication of certain quantities; it is not the same as those quantities, but to the mathematician it is an effective substitute; it is re-presentative. All the arts are re-presentative, recording and recalling memories which otherwise would be lost; and they depend on the power of the artist to accept the sign, the re-presentation, as valid. So it is in corporate life. While a group is still un-organised, the self-chosen leader represents members who are not conscious of the process; intuitively they accept a situation which has happened. If he really does express their mind, happy are they! If not, disaster ensues, and a better leader must force himself to the front for their salvation.

When, however, the members are so far educated as to appreciate the possibilities of choice, then the theory of organisation has made a start: you may choose your man by combat, or at the hustings, or by acclamation, or by a Salic Law, but you have *made* him your representative: his success, in the long run, depends upon his consciously behaving as the instrument of the group. Not necessarily as a mouthpiece for it often happens that the group do not know what to say: they may trust him both to say and do according to his absolute discretion:

they have chosen him not only to speak for them, but to think for them : they trust him, and so long as unity in sentiment between representative and constituency prevails no criticism will avail to disturb his power.

Aristocrats as representatives.—The earliest representatives of a society are chosen by a small coterie. A country ruled by an aristocracy has not chosen the aristocrats ; but with more or less willingness it accepts them as the “ best.” During the hundreds of years that elapsed between the first assembly of a House of Commons and the epoch of the Reform Bills, the historian traces the development of all sorts of devices for committees (143), cabals, boards by which the executive business of the King’s government could be carried on with some regard to the needs of the people, but by means of individuals whom the King or his immediate adviser selected as the best. We must distinguish not only in national but in many other organizations between the wide constituency of members within the group, and the few ruling members who actually exercise a voice in affairs. A nation like Great Britain, which certainly claim to be democratic, includes millions of Britishers, men and women, who have no vote in public affairs. (Compare p. 147 above.) The voters (freemen, rate-payers, householders) represent the entire people. There are not a few societies in which grades of membership are established ; inferior grades pay a small subscription and receive in return certain rights or privileges ; but they have no share either in meetings for discussion, in government, or in legislation ; they are represented by superior grades, who purchase authority by paying a larger fee.

It may be objected that this is a misuse of the term representation : that no man can claim to be our representative unless we have chosen him, nominated him for that purpose ; certainly when the American colonists threw tea chests into Boston Harbour with the cry “ No

taxation without representation," they were using the term in quite a definite sense; they declined any longer to permit King George and *his* representatives to act as their representative in controlling affairs of trade. What they meant to say was "No taxation without elected representatives—elected by the taxpayers."

A great Anglo-Saxon invention.—It must be borne in mind that our modern principle of organization, by which the institutions for debate for execution and for law are all constituted by nomination and election, is by no means congenial to the great mass of the human race. It was a peculiar development of Anglo-Saxon and other homogeneous Teutonic tribes and has been imitated, with varying success, by many other races. In the United States it has been applied with logical precision to every kind of political activity; the "ticket" on which the Mayor and Councillors of a city are elected usually includes also the magistrates and the chiefs of police; for "the people" claim a direct control of all public affairs. The East however by no means accepts the policy of the West: the subjects of a Sultan regard it as a law of nature that he should represent them; only very slowly do they come to realize that membership in a group should carry with it the right first of all to discuss, and thereafter to legislate and to nominate the officers of government. The history of the English Constitution is partly a record of new inventions to test the value of election as a basis for organization (144). In primitive times election could only be conceived when the business to be discharged was within the reach of the popular assembly; the device by which representatives, knights and burgesses could be chosen from distant communities and assembled at a capital was unknown to Greeks and Romans: its adoption by our forefathers was an immense advance in political design, and was the basis of the evolution which we now call democratic government (145). Some historians hold that if the

Greek cities or the Italian cities of a later epoch had invented such a plan they could have anticipated the achievements of modern democracy.

One hindrance to any such development was the lack of means of communication. (Chapter III.) One reason at least why burgesses and knights of the shire could attend the King in Westminster was because they could journey to-and-fro with a reasonable prospect of safety; the sea which cut apart our forefathers from European culture gave us compensations in so much as it kept us free from much of the misrule prevailing on the Continent. We were able at an earlier period to ensure safety to representatives when travelling and thus establish a reasonable measure of unity and uniformity in political life; so England experimented with plans of representation which now serve as a model to the rest of the world.

And as a model not only in politics but in every variety of social life where large groups seek to express a common mind through organization. Religion, industry, science all seek to develop their resources by novel applications of the same principle which the genius of the English people first applied in the thirteenth century. If, as we shall notice presently, the present epoch offers unexpected problems in re-organization, it is because, side by side with the evolution of national organization, the Great Society has evolved these complicated but highly efficient schemes of federation which control the individual life and stand as rivals to the Sovereign Power of Parliament.

The democratic principle not always effective.—The issues involved in these diverse models of representation merit further consideration. On the one hand we see group life organized and controlled by individuals acting through traditional right, divine right, right of birth, right of property, right of title, right based on knowledge or skill. On the other hand, the democratic

principle, if we like so to describe it, asserts the right of the common member, regardless of birth or title or property, to choose his governors, his parliament of talkers, his lawgivers. Logically viewed the principle is simple and that is why it is so widespread; and yet all sorts of stipulations are needed in order to carry it into effect. For the root of the principle is concerned with the social mind; the members choose representatives to express their mind. But for how long will he continue to do so? Not only may he change his mind, but they may change their mind! Are not the people entitled to change their representative when they change their mind? Without labouring the point it is clear that regulations affecting the period of representation are of the essence of the contract between representative and constituent. If you desire stability in your social order you give a lengthened period of office: if you distrust human nature when dowered with authority you impose a short time limit. You re-elect, say, your churchwardens every year; you arrange that certain directors in your Limited Liability Company shall not be eligible for re-election until after an interval.

This distrust of elected representatives goes further. Since organization covers three branches, Discussion, Government (or Executive) and Law, you can devise systems of checks by which one branch, say your Senate or Shareholders' Meeting, can interfere with the executive; or your Judges, mainly concerned to declare when the law has been broken, can interpret the law contrary to the intentions of a House of Commons or a Congress but more in harmony with the social mind.

You can go further: while professing sincere belief in representation by popular election, you can retain many remnants of the old doctrine of representation by right; you can maintain the monarchy, for example, satisfied with the good fortune which has provided the British Empire with so excellent a royal family. Of

course you run risks; you may once again be ruled by a man like George III., who took pride in opposing the mind of his Parliament, keeping a Court party in opposition to the representatives chosen at the hustings. But this very illustration shews how hard it is to follow a principle to its uttermost logic; it is certain that George III. in some matters understood the common mind better than the Whig Lords who had so long ruled the House of Commons. If to-day our gracious Sovereign Lord, King George V. abstains from grasping at political power, he so behaves not only because he follows the good sense of his immediate ancestry, but because he shares the mind of his people and does represent their wishes. They know and he knows that representation by election is now a genuine procedure; and also that the mind of the people can be ascertained not only by the vote of the House of Commons but by many channels of communication which were unknown to the eighteenth century.

We might extend this discussion indefinitely, arguing for or against the appointment of judges on a life tenure, the referendum in national affairs, or a poll of the members of a West End club, as checks upon the authority of an elected government; or again the employment of delegates, who represent by a voting card, as in the Trades Union Congress.

Methods of electing representatives.—When the members of a group are of small number and can meet on equal terms in one place of assembly it is an easy matter to make choice of a leader or of a committee. But when the electors are already divided by ranks, classes, varied occupations, when they are separated over a vast space and never meet, the complications multiply.

The current scheme followed in choosing members of Parliament or county councillors is based upon the ancient plan when each locality had its own independent

government; with a place of meeting at which all the electors, the Folk-Moot, could gather and make their choice. Thus the division of a great electoral body was determined by locality; the wards of a city, the divisions between constituencies, are matters of geography, indicated on the map.

But the most cursory examination of the methods employed to constitute governing authorities shews that other schemes are often preferred. A Federation of Trade Unionists is created not by the votes of all unionists in geographical areas, but by trades; an Education Committee under the Act of 1902 may be constituted in part by persons nominated by outside bodies, possessing expert knowledge of certain aspects of education. Constantly we find the effort made to give weight to special status by awarding right of election to distinctive grades or classes. Even for the House of Commons a quaint survival is maintained in the members chosen to represent Universities:—an electorate scattered over Great Britain, who exercise an extra vote for a University representative, over and above the votes they may possess as householder or landowner.

There is nothing sacro-sanct about the geographical basis for election of representatives; it is just the easiest method of securing that every part of the group has a fair share of representation; it is readily understood, and when combined with the rule of one man one vote, reduces the problem to the simplest terms; it does not, however, rest upon any eternal principle which calls for veneration (compare p. 168 above). The theory on which the plan is defended is that all men are equal, or in the language of the American Constitution are "born equal"; and that equality is best maintained by voting in electoral areas; but in any group where inequality is admitted and approved, electoral divisions based on the inequality are likely to be in vogue. Thus in the "Church of England as by law established," the

ranks of bishop, priests, deacons, laymen, are a part of the organization and any attempt at grouping on a theory of equality would be repudiated. At the same time those who are of superior or inferior rank in this religious affiliation may be equals in other social groups as ratepayers, for example, or as shareholders. When therefore we find a large social group, such as a federation of trades, or a Teachers' Registration Council, combining a number of ranks or classes or divisions of any kind, a method of election which gives distinct representation to every "interest" is adopted in preference to voting from areas. Whatever the theory of equality stands for it does not obliterate the diversity of interests and activity pursued by free men in their various callings.

Representation in the State.—An acute difficulty is presented when we contemplate election in the groups which we call universal or political, *i.e.*, the national authorities, local and central, with an electorate including every grade and class, and with universal responsibilities affecting life on every side. As we have seen, the current method is to allot one representative or more to each geographical area, ward, county, or county borough. The representatives when chosen are supposed to be concerned for the public interest, and yet everyone knows that their relationship with their constituents compels them to pay special regard to local needs. If a citizen of Manchester has a grievance against Whitehall he goes to his local M.P. and uses that influence to secure redress. From one point of view the County Council or the House of Commons can be regarded as a collection of representatives of rival local interests, brought together to see how much each representative can get out of the pool to satisfy the people who have elected him.

The detailed treatment of this problem falls to the sphere of political theory as an application of general

sociological principles, but I wish to indicate the nature of the difficulty, for its solution affects debateable regions of corporate life, quite outside the field of politics. Let us state the problem in the most general form, and for simplicity's sake confine it to the case of the British House of Commons. We are in search of six or seven hundred men who shall represent the mind of Britain; the ideal representative is a man solely governed in thought and feeling *by* Great Britain, its welfare and progress; free, that is, from any sectional or local bias; purely engrossed in the affairs of the commonwealth. We know that such perfection is impossible, but we expect and we often attain some approach to it. A member of parliament has usually followed a profession or trade, he has local affiliations, social alliances, religious connections: but in a measure he sets these on one side and is expected to pay regard to a more abstrast relationship, something we call the public good; he must display public spirit, he adopts a political creed, which in theory is of universal application.

Now in a similar way the elector is expected to discharge his part of the transaction; he assumes the rôle of a patriot; he should, and often does, lay aside the specific interests of his trade or his church or his class and votes for the best available man, *i.e.*, the man who to his mind is also a patriot. How else can we account for the fact that while the immense majority of voters in Great Britain are of the working class, they make choice most frequently of representatives from men of a wealthier class? The fact that the Labour Party now (1920) claims some sixty or more members, only proves that the working classes cannot entirely trust the public spirit of the classes from whom in earlier days the House of Commons has been constituted. And if Labour members, as seems likely, extend the position they have secured, it will be because they are

able to represent the public needs of all classes as well as the specific needs of workers.

The elector and the elected each play a special role.—The general principle underlying this position has presented itself in others shapes in earlier chapters;—every member of a group, whether an elector or a representative, can *play a part*, adopting in every group or sphere where he operates the appropriate rôle (compare Chap. V., p. 93). In church life he is a churchwarden, in business groups he behaves as a merchant;—in politics he can subordinate church or factory or estate and rise to a conception of the public welfare, in which no doubt religion, and trade, and labour, play their part, but they are subsumed in the universal conception of public spirit. Now the extent to which the body of electors can rise to this conception is the measure of success which representative institutions can attain; and conversely, until a nation is fairly certain that its electors can reach to this level, adherence will still be found to those more ancient plans for conducting national affairs through representatives who are not selected by popular vote. For it must be borne in mind that this quality of Public Spirit (p. 106 above) is the fine flower of civilization; it pre-supposes both breadth of sympathy and a detachment of mind involving careful cultivation. It is based *on the heightened capacity of modern man to hold many threads at one time*, to share in diverse organizations, distributing and balancing his sympathies; finding consistency not in stolid adherence to one interest but in assigning due weight to an increasing variety of interests.

It is true that this view of the sociological basis of national unity is distrusted in many quarters; the movement called Syndicalism is perhaps the most striking example of an endeavour to maintain an opposite theory. It is natural that syndicalist doctrine should arise first in France, for the traditions of local

government which led England to regulate elections on a geographical basis have far less hold on the French people than on the Anglo-Saxons. The Syndicalists believe it possible and desirable to capture both national and local government in the interests of the Trade Unions. They believe it possible to overturn the existing schemes and to secure not only that all occupations shall be controlled by those who follow the occupation, but that the bodies entrusted with national government and legislation shall be elected from the Unions, trade by trade. One need not pause to discuss the validity of syndicalism, but the spread of that movement in France is evidence that the existing plan for electing the masters of the French Republic has, to that extent, failed in public support because it has failed to shew fair consideration for the needs of the working classes.

It is more remarkable however to find that there are signs in England, at the opposite pole of society, of a desire to replace the election from localities by election from "interests." A series of Letters over the signature "D. P." appeared in *The Times* newspaper during July and August 1916 exposing "the central idea about which any scheme of Imperial reconstruction must be grouped; this idea is of economic syndications upon a national or Imperial scale." Subsequently the author republished them (146) giving his name, H. G. Wells, and their importance was enhanced by a eulogistic introduction from Lord Milner, a member of the War Cabinet. The following passages give the gist of their policy :—

Now our case is that our Parliament as at present constituted is but a gathering of representatives not of interests but of localities, and, considered as representatives, very badly elected even at that. It is not equal to this vast and intricate task in its present state, and so we have either to perform an operation upon our Parliamentary institutions far more drastic than any previous Reform Bill, or to contemplate a still more novel possibility in the appearance of, so to speak, a collateral state, a conference of labour and capital outside Parliament, reconstructing the economic life of the community regardless of Parliament, and

quite possibly developing friction with Parliament from the very beginning of its attempt. The possibility will be so alarming to conservative-minded people that they will be strongly disposed to recoil from either, to fall back upon the dignified passiveness of "wait and see; it will last our time," and so to leave our children to drift on to the decline and humiliations, the internal conflicts and national disasters, of a national obsolescence that we, at any rate, may never live to witness. Anything, we submit, is better than that counsel of despair. The alternative we would advocate here is the bolder and more hopeful one of political reconstruction, of a courageous recasting of our Parliamentary institutions to meet the needs of the new time.

The modernization of the House of Lords that these speculations have worked out does not present itself as a very terrible or revolutionary process. The essential idea in most of these suggestions is to extend the method of representative peers, already used in the case of the Irish and Scotch peerage, to the entire peerage. All the peers now either sitting in or voting for representatives in the House of Lords will become, it is proposed, members of a new body of electors, to whom will be added a considerable number—some thousands, certainly—of leading men, directors of great businesses and public services, men of science and learning, lawyers, administrators, soldiers, admirals and so on, all the people who ought to be placed or whom it is advisable to place upon the honours lists. Whether these electors will bear titles or not does not matter here. But they will be classified by functions; there will be a faculty of transit, for example, a military faculty, a faculty of literature and education, and so on, and each faculty will elect its quota of representatives to sit beside the law lords in the Imperial Upper House. In this way, it is pointed out, with the minimum of revolutionary disturbance, we can get a modernized House of Lords. This is clearly no mere Utopian project. It is quite a workable and practical method for the rearrangement, for the simplification and clearer responsibility of those unco-ordinated persons who already "exist" as our directors and leaders; it is the minimum change needed to give an efficient Upper House.

And for the Lower House, if we want to get a clear statement from and a clear understanding with the mass of the people, if an Imperial plan is ever to be made plain and acceptable, it is equally evident that we must be prepared for a rearrangement of our population for the purposes of Parliamentary elections into national occupational constituencies, so that instead of labour being partially and imperfectly represented by men subsidized by levies made upon more or less representative Trade Unions and socialistic societies, and sitting ostensibly as members for Hanley or Halifax or Blackburn, we shall have groups of members directly representing Scotch Minerals or Australian Transport or British Textiles or the Army and Navy. Instead of a crowd of vague and amateurish legislators representing with a conscientious unmeaningness unmeaning areas, we shall have men representing

certain national functions intensely, and just as a diagram of the circulation or the nervous system or the muscle shapes out the whole body, so these men through their special wide interest will shape out the whole nation and the Empire. In both Houses we shall gain enormously in sincerity, directness of method and authority. We shall have the real living interests of the country in direct touch with legislative and organizing power, and the vast series of misunderstandings upon falsely conceived issues and all the passion, social conflict, disorder and delay that are otherwise inevitable in the time of great reconstruction ahead will be cut out. We shall no longer have labour represented often by mere mischief makers, maintained and returned to Parliament in the queerest ways, boasting that they are "rebels," and conceiving their highest purpose as the obstruction and annoyance of the national administration. We shall, instead, get men as keen as the masters for effective national action.

We need not be apprehensive lest this form of syndicalism should be adopted for the British Empire;—no more than the proletarian syndicalism invented across the Channel: but in this case as in the other, the tenour of the proposal serves to indicate a defect which calls for a remedy. The national organization, if sound at heart, should stand in harmonious relations with other large groups in society which engage men's powers. At an earlier epoch an adjustment had to be made between the nation and its military defenders; later on the nation had to adjust and readjust the claims of the Catholic Church over against the national consciousness; in our generation we feel the full force of what are called occupational activities, because the Industrial Revolution has mightily enlarged the province of technical and commercial life. These "interests" are found to affect our national well-being at every turn: this is in fact their great achievement;—they have thrust the power of trade, capital, labour, manufacture into every corner of human life. The War has brought the situation home to us in startling fashion; it has created Ministries of Munitions and Labour, of Pensions and Food: the Board of Trade has been as indispensable as the War Office. Clearly an adjustment is necessary. Just as in earlier days the soldier kings, Norman or Angevin, claimed to

dominate the national life, or a Papal Legate on behalf of an overmastering Church; so to-day these reconstructors of Parliament believe that we must reshape our Imperial organization with trade and labour as the dominant factors: to think imperially we must think chiefly in terms of shipping and machinery, of the pay roll and the dividend. It is not that we are baser than our forefathers in this recognition of the claims of industry; but the sudden onslaught of the material resources thrown to us by science with so lavish a hand has for a century of two disturbed the balance of our sanity. A readjustment is required both in our private practice as individuals, in our personal ethics and in our social and national relations.

The state making use of other groups.—I am trying as I write this book to explain to myself as well as to my readers, the trend which this readjustment is taking. In Chapter VII. I have dealt with this problem, but it seems to bear so closely upon the history of our times that I am tempted to discuss it again from the standpoint of representation. Let us take an illustration from the events of the War. A stupendous supply of clothing is needed for the army from the textile industry. Before 1914 there was only one way of satisfying this need:—the War Office turned merchant and bought on the mercantile basis of bargain. The manufacturer and his employee were not in the Government; as sellers they were opposed to it; they were perhaps justified in making a smart profit if they could, for they knew the War Office, if it could, would do the same at their expense. But another way is possible and was to some extent adopted under the stress of the late crisis:—the state itself may become manufacturer and employer; it may through its representatives adopt the textile industry as its own and convert a certain proportion of its citizens who live by textiles into civil servants; this is the method of economic socialism.

The state on this plan extends its own organization and authority, becomes super-merchant and super-manufacturer, taking over the responsibility for equipping its citizen soldiers with clothes. It engages a certain number of expert managers to direct and a multitude of humbler artisans to work in mills, and thus at a stroke secures the necessary clothing. Socially it does far more than this : these thousands of men and women are brought *into* the government, and *out* of the general circle of citizens (compare p. 172 above) : their relationship to the nation is now determined chiefly by their occupation and not by the universal interests from which the ordinary citizen regards his government. Moreover, this new relationship is one of subservience ; no question is raised of representation. The government just steps into the shoes of the private manufacturer and pays wages and salaries for services rendered. Just as a local authority supplies water and gas, engaging a certain number of ratepayers to labour in gas works and water-works ; or supplies schooling, engaging other ratepayers as caretakers or teachers ; so the central authority turns employer on a vast scale ; and by so doing, I repeat, reshapes the attitude of these citizens towards the nation-employer on whom they depend for bread.

There is however a third alternative, a compromise more difficult to realize and to organize, but on that very account more necessary to appreciate. Both the plans now sketched are based on the assumption that the national welfare and our national government are opposed in matters of trade and occupation to the interest of the trader ; that a citizen may support his state in all other respects, but when he sells cloth to it he is entitled to stand outside it and strike a hard bargain with it. But suppose this assumption is false, or at anyrate partly false : suppose that a merchant, inspired with devotion to his country is as ready to manufacture good cloth for it, just as he sent his only son to Gallipoli for it !

Is this assumption wholly false? We know that it is not. We know that many manufacturers and workmen are better than their creed; they have come to see that the state is but the organ, the representative of the nation, *i.e.*, of themselves; representing them, one with them not only in foreign affairs or in law and police, but in everything and all the time. And the state in its turn discovers a new attitude towards the merchant and the artizan: instead of regarding them as sharp dealers, concerned merely to strike a bargain with an outsider, it finds that they are *one with the state*, part of it, doing its work, although not in its pay. This is surely the true democratic discovery, the real direction for patriotism: I am in the government not merely when I vote or attend a political meeting, but when I sell to it or buy from it; when I invest in its loans; when it calls upon me for expert advice: it treats me and I treat it in all our relations in the spirit of unity. During the late War we were no longer two alien groups in conflict, but brothers-in-arms.

If this be in any sense a true picture of what happened during the War in the world of industry and trade, a union begun in times of calamity might continue the brotherhood when the clash of arms has ceased. For it makes possible a new principle of organization. There is no need for the textile industry either to stand aloof on the one hand, subjecting the state to the pitiless laws of supply and demand, or on the other hand to be swallowed up in a vast political machine. The industry, possessing already its *representative bodies*; Unions, Federations of Employers, can organize its manufacture and supply in the national interest; its officials and experts can be placed by the industry at the disposal of the state, not as civil servants but as free citizens, contributing generously their resources in skill and knowledge to the government of which they are a part, although not in subjection to it.

Here it seems to me is the true line of criticism both of Syndicalism and of Economic Socialism. The nation says in effect to those of its citizens, *its own members*, who follow the Textile Industry : ' I do not want either to incorporate your labours in my government or to constitute my government by representatives of your industry ; but I want your aid through your elected representatives in all matters where I have to deal on the national behalf with textiles. Your representatives shall be associated on equal terms with the officers of my government, for we are all alike partners in the universal society which we call the nation. If in a great crisis we require extra millions of yards of cloth, the executive will not make them itself, nor will it buy in the open market : but its officers will communicate with the chosen representatives of the industry and leave it to them to " deliver the goods " : it is their job, they know the resources of the trade ; they can settle rivalries and share proceeds ; and they will do this with diligence and success just so far as the officers of the government on the one part and the Textile Industry on the other conceive their relation as a sacred trust, as a public service ; for which their reward is not only in a fair cash payment but in the honour and respect which comes from devotion to a great cause.'

This illustration may not be accurate in description of the incidents as they occurred : but the principle at stake is universal in its bearing. It involves a reconstruction of the citizen's attitude towards the executive, and of the attitude of the state towards the citizen. The citizen's duty is not discharged when he has registered his vote and paid his taxes, or even when he has called on his neighbours as a Derby recruiting agent or as a Special Constable ; it is only discharged when he has placed all the resources of his occupation and profession at the disposal of the nation. And the nation's duty to the citizen is *to use him for all he is worth*, and to

use all the organizations which the enterprise of free citizens has created; created it may be in the first instance for the selfish purposes of a sectional group but now available for the universal cause.

We might expand this theme to much greater length, for one can discern the operation of this theory, dimly appreciated by those who are practising it, in many directions :—not the least in the profession of a teacher which claims my regard. But we have perhaps said enough to clear the position as regards representation. The principle of representation by election has permeated every type of trade and profession, and by its operation has given each group an authority and force which the state has to reckon with. This reckoning can be made by inviting all such groups to join hands, in organized schemes of common action, with the officers of government, each in its own sphere contributing its special knowledge and influence to the common stock. No doubt such organization will be complicated; many adjustments and readjustments will be needed before the jealousies between politicians and state officials over against the representatives of occupation can be adjusted. But the complexity of modern life demands this reconciliation : and we may expect that the lesson we began to learn in days of war will be forced upon us as we proceed to reconstruct our social order in days of peace.

If the reader has already made acquaintance with *The Great Society*, to which we have so frequently referred in earlier chapters, he will see that the treatment here offered of Representation overlaps to some extent those pages of the chapter on *The organization of Will* which treat of Individualism, Socialism and Syndicalism.

“ Neither Individualism, therefore, nor Socialism, nor Syndicalism afford by themselves a single sufficient basis for the Will-Organization of the Great Society. It may be that no satisfactory Will-Organization of human beings with their present limitations, in a society on so vast a scale is possible, that we must ultimately choose either to live on a smaller scale, or to pay for the advantage

of the larger scale by constant dissatisfaction with our relations to each other. But the effort of inventing a better Will-Organization than now exists is at least worth while.

"That invention will require the co-operation of many minds and the experience of many years. It is clear, however, that it will have to contain all the three elements which I have just discussed (Individualistic property, State Socialism, non-local Syndicalism). Socialist thinkers both in Germany and in England seem to me to be realizing this. They seem ready to allow scope both for the instinct of Property in its original and simplest form, and for the co-operation of men and women, whether as consumers and producers, on different bases from that of local residence, and they seem anxious to invent machinery which need not involve complicated plans of 'Proportional Representation,' but which should weigh votes as well as count them, would allow, that is to say, greater proportionate influence to the strong desires of minorities (whether local, or racial, or religious, or consisting of a smaller body of producers opposed to a larger body of consumers) than to the weak desires of merely numerical majorities." (147).

Thereupon the author reviews tendencies to compromise in each of these quarters and offers a most interesting series of illustrations from recent movements in various trades and professions.

The Great Society was written before the War broke out; a war which has applied the severest of all tests to our principles of Socialism, Property, Syndicalism. Already the waters are deeply stirred; Committees and Boards without end have been set to work; the relations of the state to all the groups who dwell within its shadow are being revised. Every day it becomes more clear that one of the chief tasks of statesmanship will hereafter be concerned not so much in governing the people by superior authority as by organizing in harmonious schemes the manifold groups devoted to occupation, to locality, to culture; and by using these, in friendly rivalry with each other, for the highest purposes of national and international advancement.

Summary.—We have discussed the problem of representation chiefly as concerned with the supreme position of the state, but the principles at issue have a wider application. The underlying principles from which we

set out looks to an advance in human capacity, at once social and moral. We saw that a man when acting as a representative can play many parts and can steer an even course among conflicting interests. It postulates this line of advance as more important, *i.e.*, as more likely to be effective than any device such as the representation of minorities by proportional representation or the representation of Occupations as conceived by the syndicalist. Proportional representation is no doubt a just and reasonable line of reform; its success will be due to the increasing capacity of an electorate to grasp with intelligence the issues set before them. It will not, however, by itself create a government more capable of acting on the nation's behalf: the representation of minorities can merely serve as a check on the tyranny of a majority, which has captured the machinery of state in the interest of a political group. The needs of our time seem to indicate not so much a reform of the electoral system as a restatement of the relations between the supreme authority of the state and the increasing power and consciousness of other groups with whom the state departments, both local and central, should share their power. While therefore giving due concern to the conditions under which electorates are constituted, whether by the emancipation of women or by provision for minority votes, the student of group life needs to keep his attention on the more complex problem of the relations between all sorts of competing groups and the distribution or delegation of power by the state as well as by other large corporations. We are thus carried beyond the question of representation: or rather we realize that social progress can no longer be promoted, either in politics or in other spheres, by confining our regard to those doctrines of liberty and equality which we have learned from our forefathers. Instructed by these doctrines the Anglo-Saxon race has developed its group life, in every branch of human activity, with

societies, committees, boards without end. In all of these scope has been found for an endless variety in devices for representation so that the best men can interpret at its best the social mind of the members. On this side of sociological and political theory we have immensely advanced: a new region now waits to be explored, far more difficult because it will demand great complexity of organization:—the various groups which, under the ægis of the democratic state, have developed self-consciousness and power, must now be brought into harmonious relation with each other and with the state which claims to be their master.

CHAPTER X

DISCUSSION, GOVERNMENT, LAW, SYMBOL AND FORM

Discussion.—There is a certain opposition between Discussion and Government. The man of action settles his course by intuition; no doubt he deliberates but his thinking processes are often unconscious; he can do what is right, but cannot always give his reasons. We must assume the psychological basis for this cleavage and recognize it as one of the grounds which lead strong men to distrust the people. The duty of the leader or official is to fulfil the mind of his group: if he knows their mind why deliberate further? Deliberation always involves delay; he who hesitates is lost. Trust your representative whether elected or self appointed; give him a free hand and leave him alone.

There are two situations in which this plea is accepted: first of all in a crisis, where rapid decisions are essential to safety; no one questions the authority of the captain on his deck; ships' company, sailors or passengers, when once they have chosen to step on board, cease from discussion with him. The second is found in a group which has a settled routine; its life sails along in smooth waters to a fixed destination; there is no discussion because there are no problems to discuss.

The great majority of situations in life lie between these two extremes; we claim to argue upon social affairs simply because change is necessary to life (p. 61 above); we survive because in the midst of a changing world we also must change.

Thus organization for discussion has been an essential feature of corporate life at all times, although it is seldom that a mechanism instituted for discussion remains content for very long with mere debate. Parliaments originate in the willingness of governments to listen to palaver, but a group summoned only for discussion with its masters soon asks for power as well as speech. It is for this reason that we doubt the extent to which Graham Wallas' distinction between Organization for Thought, for Will, and for Happiness, can serve us in analysis (148). As soon as you separate discussion from government you become "academic," and in fact the genuine examples of groups established mainly for "Thought" are those which engage his attention in the first paragraphs of his chapter under that title, those namely of which a college or a Debating Society afford typical examples.

People use the term "academic discussion," "merely academic" precisely in this sense, meaning a discussion which helps the members to think generally about the subject in hand, but does not pass over into overt decision. Hence the greater part of Graham Wallas' chapter is concerned with the relation of discussion in political groups to efficiency, *i.e.*, to getting Thought transmuted into Will. And he rightly points out that the number of members in a Council, or Parliament, or Committee, is of capital importance. If sociology had been reduced to a science fifty years ago some useful principles for the creation of Boards and Councils would already have been established. How many City Councillors can usefully be brought together under the ægis of a Lord Mayor? When the Education Committee of the City of Manchester was formed there were fifty-one members, but the Chairman found that this number was unwieldy and he presently procured a revision of the Scheme which reduced the total to thirty-seven, quite large enough for business purposes. During the same

period, however, the City Council, which these thirty-seven served as one of its Committees, was being automatically increased to over a hundred members by extensions of the city boundaries.

Graham Wallas also emphasizes the changes wrought in our era compared with, say, the eighteenth century, in the use of the printing press and laments the neglect of "oral group-dialectic" (149). We need not repeat what has already been noticed under this head in Chap. III., but may notice some of the wider consequences involved in the conduct of affairs through discussion, both oral and written.

First of all, one is impressed by the possibilities opened up to the individual in our modern world for taking a share in group life, whether in his occupation, his religion or his politics. He is still dependent upon face-to-face intercourse (150), to use Cooley's term, or upon group-dialectic, of which Wallas speaks, but he can now prepare his mind by reading, either solidly in the books or incidentally in the newspapers, so that he can approach the personal debate with all the information which in earlier days a man could only secure by word of mouth. Hence the long apprenticeship and intimacy with the affairs of a large social group, which in former ages created a special class of governing people, is no longer so indispensable. The consequence is that any man (and increasingly this is true of women also) who discovers in himself a taste for what is called public work can find plenty of scope. If he serves in a workshop the organization of his fellow-employees lies to hand; as soon as he takes his share in their discussion the scene expands and he finds himself of use in the wider group, which unites the members of his trade first of all and thereafter all the members of all the trades; finally, with the extraordinary chances thrown up by the Great War, a shrewd steel-smelter may become the first Labour Minister and help in the critical task of super-organiza-

tion which proposes to unite the antagonized groups of capital and labour.

In contrast to this painfully serious activity, let the reader take up Sadler's novel called *Hyssop* and see how Laddie forms a Society at Oxford.

"The Sepoys are just any old bunch of men. We shall make a society the very image of every preceding one, even down to the detail of its own conviction of utter novelty. They are called Sepoys because, when I invented them, I had just been to a lecture on Hobbes, and I could not call them Leviathans because I don't believe there ever was more than one. Anyhow he always came my way in the singular. . . . And Sepoys seemed the only other name there was."

"So it is of course" says Philip. "But who are they?" (151).

And so the fun proceeds. The burlesque is sound philosophy: student life is designed as a prelude before the real drama of life grips the man. Just as the infant plays at practical life before he parts with infancy and gets to 'work,' so the youth, if you give him a breathing space for playtime, mimics the society in which to-morrow he will have advanced from dialectic to purposeful organization.

There is much to be said, when we seek to consider education in its social aspects, for giving youths like Laddie an extended time for play and mimicry; the man who enters late on the serious business of life has great advantages over his wage-earning rival; and yet one should emphasize again the levelling force of books and all the accessory means of communication. "Jack is as good as his master" is far truer to-day than it has been at any period of the world's history since master and man stood apart. The working classes to-day ask for publicity (p. 51 above) as a chief agency of progress, for they realize that as soon as facts are published there are multitudes of obscure men ready to assimilate them.

Secondly, let us recall that while the activities of group life make a universal appeal they work out very differently in differing individuals. This is particularly the case as regards the art of discussion. We all know people of great ability who refuse to serve on committees or to take any part in public life simply because they have not formed the habit of thinking aloud. They can give or receive orders, they can quickly size up the meaning of a page of print, but in argument round a table they are silent: if necessity compels them to occupy a seat at a Board they give a silent vote. At the same time they may be very useful to a group for they may be able to conduct an argument on paper or draft a report with great skill.

And there is the opposite type who thinks that committees and councils are places for speech-making, or for thinking out one's private philosophy. Mr Birrell in his *Essay on The House of Commons* (152) tells us how quickly the young member, who has enjoyed a campaign on the stump, is disillusioned when he comes to Westminster.

Since, as we are constantly pleading throughout this book, progress to-day depends upon organization, a man is greatly handicapped in getting his life's work done if he cannot overcome these two disabilities. And there is a third type who accepts membership on committees and attends them, just as other people attend public meetings, not in order to take an active part, but just for the pleasure of watching and listening. Some men greatly enjoy the contemplation of their neighbours' schemes and are content to sit hour after hour on committees, deriving something of the same pleasure that one gets from listening to actors on a stage; if the dialectic is duller, well, one has a compensatory feeling that one is doing what England expects every man to do. There are many thousands of men more or less retired from the absorption of their calling who enter

what is called public life and thenceforth spend a colossal portion of their waking hours in hearing discussion and making quorums. The few more active comrades do not object, for unless some one kept silence the business would never be got through. On the other hand a member who never contributes more than a vote to the elucidation of policy is abusing the function of a representative.

Work of Committees and Conferences.—It seems important therefore to give more attention than is common at the present day to devices for making the labours of committees, conferences, councils effective. There is the problem of training young people in the arts of committee work, but it lies outside our present study. Let us spend a moment however on the actual methods by which it is sought to convert deliberation into action. There are at least three successive stages through which a cause or policy must be passed before the goal is reached. First of all the group concerned must be approached by a broad exposition of salient facts and arguments; secondly, the combat between differing views and arguments, with facts and counter facts, must run its course; thirdly, resolutions and amendments must be drafted and redrafted until a succinct statement or series of statements are tabled; the discussion is then closed and the executive enters on the scene.

In many public controversies the first stage is covered by the irresponsible activities of books, magazines and newspapers, or by congresses and conferences reported more or less fully in the press. In calling these discussions irresponsible, we mean that those who engage in them stand apart from those who will have to execute the policy when the final stage has been reached. The gulf yawns so wide between public discussion and executive act that the official is partly justified in his contempt for leading articles and platform speeches:

too often the public speaker and leader-writer relies on his irresponsibility and is only concerned to 'let himself go.' And the organizers of conferences, having a vague aspiration towards forming public opinion, are satisfied if the attendance is good and the speeches eloquent; they hope something will come out of it; they know that public opinion moves slowly; they proceed to plan for the next annual conference. To a degree they may be right, but with a better conception of the relation between cause and effect our conferences and councils could make more rapid headway. We could for example make far better use of print. The ease with which we travel has multiplied the number of congresses and committees and therewith of course the number of problems which they handle; but we have not done half enough to bring the printed word into relation with the spoken word. One has attended many meetings where X, Y and Z have "read papers"; but why should a man read his paper to an audience?; they are as capable as he of reading it. The plan pursued by The British Association is more commendable; every one who presents matter for discussion is expected to send beforehand a resumé of his views to be printed on half-a-sheet of note-paper. He can then either read from a manuscript, or he can look his audience in the face and tell them what is in his mind; in either event he knows that the printed resumé will supply every one, and especially the subsequent speakers, with material on which discussion and resolution can be based.

In all important conferences where responsible people assemble in order to make up their minds and adopt a common policy, one would urge that the principal speakers should be required to print and circulate beforehand either their entire argument or a summary of it, so that the conference when assembled can immediately proceed to counter argument and to the shaping of resolutions. There is often a reluctance to proceed to

definite resolution, partly because the intellectual effort required for drafting careful statements is fatiguing, partly because both speaker and audience enjoy the emotional flavour of stirring speech; and in the background they have a secret misgiving lest their ardent desires might cool when moulded into brief and binding terms to be put to a vote.

But there is no better mental exercise than to be required to draft a resolution; the sociality of this act is its chief merit; you have to carry on the margin of your attention an awareness of members, to each of whom your proposition must carry conviction. The best resolutions are those drafted in a small committee or alone; many a conference has only half succeeded because in the stir caused by a volume of speeches no one can quietly sit down and put into a sentence the intention of the majority. The general impression one hopes to leave with the reader from this chapter is the capital importance to our modern life of the work done in committees and councils, in directors' and shareholders' meetings, and in all the infinite variety of gatherings where the spoken word combines with the written word to move men to action. Thus, to draft the conclusions of a Council of Trent, of a Newcastle Programme in 1892, or of an Education Reform Council in 1916 (153) such work when really good marks as high a standard of intellectual achievement as the essays of a great philosopher. One might rate it even higher, for such an achievement requires both the gift of abstract thought and the moral qualities of self-effacement and unity with the neighbour.

The popular mind still regards the proceedings of such assemblies in the same light as it regards the sermon from the pulpit, as means perhaps to edification for such as seek to be edified but as concerned only slightly with the real business of life. On the contrary we would urge that any man, or group of men, who are ambitious

to play a man's part in the modern world should begin by taking due pains with this first chapter in organization which we call Discussion.

The Platform.—We have emphasized here that side of Discussion which stands in closest relation to subsequent effect in organization, *i.e.*, in the act of an executive and in the laws or rules which the group will have to obey. Our grandfathers however were far more deeply impressed by the importance of the set speech, composed with a regard for style and delivered with a glow of feeling; designed, that is, not so much to put a new policy into set terms, as to give the hearers a right attitude both intellectual and emotional. Their effort was in fact directed to make communication (Chap. III.) really effective to a large group. Both this and the following paragraph on The Press are equally concerned with the theme of Chap. III.; discussion is only effective so far as the arts of communication enable all concerned to possess adequate knowledge as a basis for discussion.

Some thirty years ago Henry Jephson made an elaborate investigation of *The Platform* (154). He shewed that both religious and political life entered on a new phase in the eighteenth century when John Wesley an Oxford Fellow, Edmund Burke (155) and John Wilkes went out of doors to stir public sentiment. He did not explain why this phenomenon arose in that era after having disappeared from society, except in the pulpit, for many centuries. But it is obvious that when once rediscovered, free speech was destined to take its place, alongside a free press, as a powerful agent in enabling large groups to maintain and develop their existence. We are in fact so familiar with the organized conduct of public meetings as to wonder how the world got on without them; so narrowly are we limited by the current procedure of our environment. When in an earlier chapter (p. 218) we traversed the opinion that

Germany affords to-day the finest example of an organized state, my memory recalled a famous meeting on the Marktplatz at Jena in 1894 where Bismarck, dismissed into opposition and nearing the end of his life, appeared before 20,000 people to make a speech. It was a privilege to be present, for a man of heroic qualities and fame was attempting a new rôle; one could not help contrasting the scene with the Midlothian campaign of his contemporary in Great Britain. The German people then as now are great debaters, they argue all over the place, but they are a century behind the Anglo-Saxon race in the organization of discussion for civic and national purposes. Bismarck at Jena in 1894 was doing badly what Burke was doing finely at Bristol in 1774. If the reader agree that adequate machinery for discussion is an essential element in organization, he will agree also that the German Empire and the German States before 1918 were imperfectly equipped as political institutions. The revolutions in Central Europe have opened the floodgates to a free platform and we need not be surprised if it takes some time for all ranks of society to get used to the emancipation of speech as well as the realization of its limitations.

The Press.—If we extended our survey still further to the East we should find that The Press as well as The Platform play a very minor rôle. We may be pardoned for offering another illustration from the accidents of travel. By a curious chain of circumstances which need not delay us I found myself conducted one afternoon a few months ago to two newspaper offices in Stamboul. The editors of these Turkish broadsheets were imitating Western methods and sought to procure an interview with an English gentleman in khaki who happened to be in Constantinople. Their failure was a matter of small moment, but the interest to a spectator like myself was to compare those dingy quarters housing the most

important newspapers circulating in the metropolis of an Eastern Empire, with Printing House Square or Carmelite House. The newspaper and the pamphlet appear to play as small a part in shaping opinion in those regions as among our ancestors in the eighteenth century. If our Government desires to employ the arts of propaganda among the Turks it must devise methods very different from those adapted to Russians or Greeks.

In our Western world the prestige of The Press is unquestioned and its methods have been thoroughly explored; for that reason we have dwelt more fully on The Platform. The two stand however in a relation which has scarcely received the attention that it merits, the relation, namely, between the written and the spoken word. The point is the more needful to be borne in mind by students of sociology because we *are* students, relying upon our ideas, upon books and journals, and too little upon what we 'pick up' from talk and discourse. What appears on paper is, after all, but a partial reproduction of the animation that possesses the mind of the journalist who holds the pen in his hand, speaking to an audience without the aid of 'expression' and gesture. In imagination the writer of any book or article is addressing an audience and his special art—particularly when he is seeking to control opinion (156)—consists in producing the emotional effect of face-to-face speech although he is deprived of actual contact with his readers. All great arts are pursued under limitations of a similar kind, and the technical training which some journalists are now offered should include a study of the psychological relations between public speech and public writing. It is very seldom that a writer like Edmund Burke or John Morley becomes a distinguished public speaker, for the limitations of his art require him to forego some of the habits necessary to a man who sways an audience in bodily presence; and yet the mental disposition in the two

arts are closely associated : in his inner mind the dramatist and the journalist ' speak ' their parts as much as if they were performing on the stage and on the platform. Successful technique in both these crafts depends in part upon a sympathetic appreciation of the mind of the audience : the journalist is a debater who is not required to make an immediate reply, but his readers are listening, in a very real sense, to his voice.

Government.—As our purpose in these pages is to clear the ground of sociological theory we shall not attempt to examine various theories of the executive. In our study of principles we have indicated the general spirit in which authority should be exercised in groups whose members realize the meaning of unity. With small face-to-face groups this result is not achieved by organization : the committee of a Scientific Society of a West End Club are elected from the best people available : if these possess soci-ability in a high degree then the group prospers. If otherwise disposed then sooner or later, in confidence or openly, the members will discuss the proceedings of their executive and will make a change. We say that such changes are not matters of organization because the immediate contact of members with their governing body causes both the procedure of election and the exercise of authority to be affairs of minor importance : ' everybody knows everybody ' ; if things go wrong they can be readily adjusted, and at the worst no great harm is done. In the family the same position holds good : whatever rules may be found useful for the conduct of a household the value of the corporate life does not greatly depend on these.

The difficulties of government are only really encountered when we pass beyond face-to-face intercourse and demand of men that they shall obey the behest of impersonal authorities. Some readers may think that we have only touched the fringe of sociology in this

volume because we have not elaborated any formal doctrine which will guide the organizer. But we must go slowly : it may be said that the theory of corporate life is only now being realized in its essence : treatment of the social order both by philosophers and by publicists has been dominated by doctrines based on other foundations. Sociology has been derived from religion or politics or biology instead of seeking its foundation in the development of human nature. The organizer therefore can only get from sociology an indication of general principles, assisting to a clearer analysis of the technical terms and of the data involved in any given situation. Thus as regards government a great step was made when Burke made clear the difference between a delegate and a representative (157) and when Mill separated the function of an executive from the function of an elector (158). They were treating of politics, but their principles have a universal application. We have sought for other principles in assigning a separate field for the organization of Discussion. In many associations the same institution is engaged both in Discussion and in Government; our House of Commons is both a debating society and an executive body, but the amalgamation of these two functions does not obscure our recognition of diversity between the two functions.

Its distinctive function.—The essence of government consists in the issue of orders which are to be obeyed : discussion, formal or incidental, organized or not organized, is now closed and the members must either yield to the executive or stand apart from their group. The formal bond of union may not be dissolved, but in the inner spirit they are opposed to the executive. Now the great advance in human nature which we have noticed from many points of view is our capacity to reconcile obedience with diversity of view ; the private member can tolerate heresy, injustice, rapacity ; he can submit to loss, to indignity, to oppression—not

because he is stupid or cunning but because his intelligence has been infused with a keener social sympathy : his sense of fellowship leads him to postpone the day of reform until a majority of his kind are ready to share his views. This same capacity tends, but much more slowly, to animate the official and the representative who carry out the orders of an executive. The old watchword was discipline ; the new era demands co-operation. A wise ruler to-day may insist on obedience as rigidly as the autocrats, but he is solicitous to win the understanding and sympathy of the society from whom he exacts obedience. Our social heredity all over the world is training men by a thousand subconscious influences, in every circle of society to substitute co-operation for discipline ; every individual has to grow by inner conflict and by experience to a recognition of this substitution as the saving grace by which personality reaches a summit outside of and beyond its own grasp. Once the organizer becomes possessed of this conception he secures a clue which will guide him on committees and boards although the sociologist may fail to present him with a creed.

Let us try and put this principle in a negative form as a guide to the relationship of large groups to smaller groups, as well as to groups whose interests are found to be in conflict. For example a federation is formed uniting a number of local branches into one body ; the federation as we have seen becomes a new group, with a new social mind, with outlook and policy extending beyond the local vision of the branches. Now the agents of such a federation if they maintain lust for power, if they are impatient of opposition will impose rules and exact compliance with little regard to the sentiment of solidarity which called them into being. If on the other hand the advanced capacity of man for sociality lays hold of them they will shape their government so as to leave a maximum of liberty to the

branches, effacing themselves and their office wherever the common interest makes such retirement feasible. An American publicist gave expression to this view in a volume entitled *Government by Influence* (159); he shewed how the modern trend in executive control is to get one's way by persuasion rather than by force; he was dealing more especially with the control of education but he extended the principle to cover all the transaction of state government. He shewed how much can be done by a government animated with social sentiments to secure obedience to rule by the simple expedient of giving information. *Tout comprendre est tout*—A prudent organizer in these days takes every pains to associate Discussion with Government; he supplies materials for discussion, so that his executive acts may find response in a prepared mind. He may no doubt pursue this course in an ignoble spirit, corrupting the press, and pursuing a propaganda which shall hoodwink rather than inform the members of his group: "for the children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light." Yet the very fact that politicians of the baser sort find it necessary to use such influence shews that democracy has achieved a partial triumph: no longer can a master of multitudes impose his will upon us without at least some apology for tyranny.

But we may easily fall into the opposite error if we suppose that an executive can replace authority by persuasion. For the business of government is precisely—to govern: if a uniform rule has been devised then uniformity has to be imposed: consideration for exceptions, for hard cases, have their place but the first duty of an executive is to compel obedience. We should only be repeating the argument of Chap. II. if we enlarged on the loss of freedom which is incurred by every one who accepts membership in a group. Nor is this loss of liberty confined to groups in which

membership is a matter of choice. It is often assumed that the state is the only group in which membership and obedience are forced upon us whether we will or no. Very little reflection makes it clear that we are surrounded by compulsion at every turn. For example it is true that a man may choose his occupation, trade or profession, and may withdraw from it; but when once a member he must in most cases join the union and obey the orders of his executive. In most callings the pressure of such orders is quite as restrictive as the compulsion exercised by the state. We boast of Free Trade and rightly exalt the services rendered to our country by removing state restrictions on the interchange of goods: but no one now deceives himself into supposing that a merchant is really free from the compulsions exercised by combines and boycotts. These powerful industrial groups may or may not serve the common good, but they are authoritative and their compulsion is no less effective because it is exercised under the sanction of national law or custom: they profess, no doubt often with sincere belief, to be agents for the enhancement of trade and manufacture, but their orders are equally effective when exercised in restraint of trade and in the pursuit of anti-social ends.

The present-day problem in reconstruction.—This illustration serves to indicate a principle which seems to underlie many efforts to reconstruct our social order. If we are right in attributing to our present age an increasing desire for co-operation as an animating motive in place of discipline we readily see that combinations created for the sake of gain (whether by masters or men) can never in the long run triumph over those which serve the commonweal, since they must always rely for success upon an autocratic control; in essence they are anti-social since they are devised to enable the members to increase personal wealth: they have to hold their own by sheer force of power; their hand is against

every man. And on this account they contain within themselves the seeds of dissolution: sooner or later some of the members will break loose from discipline, and the spell of authority which alone gives power to the combine will be shattered. If this were not the case there would be no hope for humanity. At the present time a few packers in Chicago are said to control one-half of the world's supply of foodstuffs, exercising a power far vaster than that of Joseph in Egypt. Now if these packers are using their monstrous power to serve their private ends they are certain sooner or later to quarrel over the proceeds: in spite of the gigantic temptation to unity which is presented by the colossal size of their plunder human nature breaks loose and the individualism which brought them into partnership will divide them into hostile camps. The hope for a new social order, in which the conflicts of industry will cease from insane strife, turns therefore to the discovery of some new principle of co-operation, not as a substitute for disciplined obedience to rules, but as embodying the spirit of sociality: it insists that man is not a tool of industry, but that industry must be socialized in the service of man. However difficult it may be to find concrete expression for this new spirit in trade and manufacture no one can now-a-days question that on this road alone can the peace of the world be maintained. Those who maintain the opposite view do not look for the progress of mankind in terms of solidarity, but they contemplate evolution as an external round of competition, 'red in tooth and claw.'

If therefore one is asked what contribution can sociology make in guiding the practical business of governing an association the first point to attack concerns the aim of the association. If its purposes conform to the general interests of mankind, if they can be squared with a just regard for the interests and needs of other groups, then the spirit of its government, the

attitude of its officials can be one of tolerance and goodwill towards the members of the association as well as towards the world outside: if on the contrary the association, at bottom, serves only the private ends of the members, then autocracy and harsh discipline will and should be displayed by its executive. The reason why such groups as the Family, the Church, the City, the State maintain their hold upon mankind; why professions such as medicine, law, teaching are held in honour; why expert employments such as that of the engineer and the chemist are highly esteemed is because they are conceived as serving the ends of the humanity as well as those of the individual. The changes in their government and in their relations to anti-social groups are all based on a desire to bring the social ideal which they profess into closer relation with a developing social conscience.

Rule and Law.—The psychological basis of rules and laws concerns the individual life equally with the life of a group: our behaviour must be stable and uniform, brought under the control of habit. It is true that we desire change, but we cannot endure in time if at every moment we change our course. When we associate with our neighbour the demand is more insistent, simply because we run in harness and accept the uniform procedure which we discussed in Chap. III.

What we have said above as to the difference between small face-to-face groups and large impersonal groups in regard to Government applies also to Law. Friendship requires no rules; the village school can dispense with them almost as much as a family. The uniformity which is necessary in the conduct of such intercourse can be maintained with a minimum of prescription; Organization only steps in when a group enlarges its membership. And we should only be repeating previous arguments if we inquired at length into the choice of those who make laws for us. In primitive society the

leader frames the laws and they receive supernatural sanction : Moses brings the sacred tables of stone from Mount Sinai; Mahomet when troubled by the jealousies of his followers dreams a new chapter of law for the Koran : the divinity that "doth hedge a King" gives a like super-natural sanction to law. The historian makes clear that Law and Religion to our ancestors were among the primal things of life, not to be questioned or discussed : *tabu* is just *tabu*, thou shalt not : the mysterious lawgiver, bearing the awful symbols of the Unseen has spoken. The student of sociology needs to give all the time he can spare to learn about his ancestry, taking for example the book of Leviticus, or coming closer home, Stubbs' Select Charters, so as to realise not only how far we have passed beyond the submissive attitude of early human groups, but how dependent we still must be upon social sanctions. If our social behaviour were consistent with our intellectual power we should break laws and rules every day of our lives, for we constantly discover that one or other of them is foolish or unjust.* Our ancestors never thought in this way at all : to reason about the law was impious : the individual was not planted in this world to ask question about *tabu*. But we do ask questions and our reason prompts us to rebel : we are individualistic and resent the immersion of the self in a group. What keeps us from anarchy? We suggest that one of the balance wheels comes from our personal past

* A critic notes here: Should not a distinction be made between the small group which is the whole primitive society and the small differentiated group *within* the Great Society? I mean that you can live within the latter and be comparatively unconscious of law, but the small society, primitive or modern, seems to have divers laws and ordinances all over the place. It is in a village or a small college that friendship and choice of religion have *tabus*, not in a city or a university. Is it because the existence of law in the large impersonal society is pervasive, but not often personally noticeable that writers like Bertram Russell assume an easy "Road to Freedom" (160) through an amiable anarchy?

history : each man, however radical, has passed through a stage of existence when he accepted tabu without criticism, when the group settled his behaviour for him : and as he grows up to a higher stage he carries with him traces of his earlier view of life : he may question and quiz, he may even scoff, but the traces of an earlier habit are strong enough to repress individualistic feeling and enable him to function usefully and happily in obedience to laws, even though he discern many of them to be unjust.

This balance wheel is all the more necessary because of the ever-widening range of group life : a modern nation of ten, forty, a hundred million of inhabitants is a portentous institution to keep running in stable fashion year by year, with its members educated so as to be capable of criticising all the venerable bulwarks which keep it in cohesion. Great ideas and sentiments pervading the general mind are needed just to prevent society from falling to pieces ; and among these deep-seated sentiments respect for Law keeps pride of place. The innovator and reformer may assure us that this sentiment is a fetish and a survival ; the historian and anthropologist may shew us how in select communities, where crime is unknown, penal codes and social tabus can be dispensed with (161) ; the theologian can interpret the New Testament and shew how the Gospel emancipates a Christian from bondage to the Law ; yet we still hold by convention, by accepted rule ; every effort we make in social progress unites the individual to his community with a stronger chain.

Constitutional Law as a pattern for other groups.— This position helps to explain why the laws of nations in our present epoch hold pride of place. In earlier chapters we have referred to that political bias (p. 32 above) which appears to throw out of focus many studies in sociology : we have deprecated a treatment of corporate life which exalts the state at the expense

of other groups, whether of ancient or of modern origin : the officers of government tend, in democratic as much as in despotic states, to encroach upon public liberty. The explanation of this process is not however to be attributed solely to the ambition of anti-social rulers ; it rests finally upon our conception of the state as the supreme *law-giver* rather than the supreme executive. Somewhere within the body politic there must be found an ark of the covenant, a deciding voice which keeps the members from dissolution and this is expressed in our abiding respect for the High Court of Parliament, for the Supreme Bench, for the statutes, the acts, the decisions which are all comprehended by the common man under the word Law (162).

This situation makes it easier to understand why politics bulk so largely in any study of group life. Since national law holds pride of place in men's imagination, its rules and methods tend to be imitated in the organization of lesser groups. For example we manage clubs and associations by committees with chairmen, secretaries, with bye-laws, minutes, regulations : in so doing we are working on models which were first tested in the development of the constitution ; and the student of constitutional history witnesses in the evolution of the state the establishment of social procedure which now makes it easy to create new groups, with rules and laws, with penalties and sanctions adapted to their specific purposes. Every man who serves on a committee, who drafts resolutions and obeys or disobeys the chairman is enjoying a social inheritance reaching back to the days when thegns and priests and kings wrought at the foundations of the modern state.

The Supreme Law-Giver.—But the debt which he owes to the Law-giving State is not merely one of inheritance. The nation stands before us as the guardian of community, as the sanction for social behaviour, in every sphere where man's inner life reacts upon his

outer conduct amid his fellows. Any important object which men seek to obtain by association comes of necessity under the purview of the law; this fact is often ignored in our 'free' country simply because the majesty of the law holds itself aloof and encourages liberty. The War however has brought home to Englishmen the real facts: we had thought that free public speech and a free press were at least part of the birth-right of a Briton, but we have found that in times of stress the sanction of authority, armed by D.O.R.A., can put a stop to discussion even at a street corner or in a railway carriage: it can prevent men forming a joint-stock company; it can forbid you and your neighbour to exchange your produce. We are not concerned to argue whether such restrictions of social freedom have been either necessary or wise: we are considering them solely as illustrations of the place of Law in the organization of group life. They enable us to discern the relation between all the groups which we have discussed in this volume and that universal group which we call the state. This august institution not only makes laws for the nation's governance, and revises these from time to time, but it declares the law, it pronounces and decides between opposing groups, its judges and law-lords stand behind the proceedings of every man and of every group of men: and we honour their function as the ultimate power which binds our national life into coherence.

Distrust of national law the herald of social dissolution.—The platform and the press in these days publish disquieting news: it would almost appear as if the hotheads, the younger generation both in the employer and in the worker class, are losing that traditional reverence for law which we assume to be the balance wheel of society. If this proves to be the case it will be the logical aftermath of War, for War teaches every one ultimately to depend on his own right hand,

defying with violence and passion even the most sacred of institutions. One half of Europe is at this moment convulsed with social agony, and our horror at the terrible events witnessed on the Danube and the Volga should warn us to look nearer home. It is a romantic exercise to read the history of England and note how bravely Cavalier and Roundhead slew each other in this dear land of ours; until 1914 few dreamt that such a tragedy could again imbrue our soil, either from domestic strife or from foreign foe; in 1920 we realize that if such is to be our fate the conflict will be no mere shooting affair like the "crowning mercies" of Cromwell; it will destroy the very marrow of our civilization; we shall be the victims of a disruption at which the nations in days to come will shudder. At such a time no one who studies the principles of society, the meaning of government with its force, of law with its sanctions in human tradition, of unity the bond of peace, can refuse to ask himself and his comrades where the basis of civil security is to be found. On the one hand large bodies of manual workers declare that government is their enemy; in the opposite camp many men of power and wealth seem to think that force is a remedy and that Acts of Parliament and Courts of Law are an adequate support for Government. If such opponents, each believing in their cause and confident in their strength, continue their distrust a looker-on can only prophesy disaster. As hostile feeling increases and passion throws prudence to the winds that spirit of concord, which alone enables civilized man to endure, forsakes the scene and leaves the brutes to struggle for mastery with fire and sword. A warning of this kind was given our nation, at a lesser crisis in our history when Edmund Burke appealed in vain to "the spirit of the English communion." Now as in 1775 statesmen who care for country rather than for power will seek for measures which will hold men together by affection

and trust, for only on such a foundation can the sanctions of law and order be reinstated. Unless the common people of these isles can find that the constitution is generous enough to adjust the organized claims of wealth and class to the organized claims of industry neither the majesty of law nor the force of government can save the state from convulsion. Burke spoke to the House of Commons at a juncture very different from the crisis now before us, but the spirit of his message will never cease to fire the patriotism of the British people, for it tells of those "ruling and master principles" which underlie the entire fabric of society. We quote the passage in full for its eloquence is unmatched.

"My hold of the colonies," said he, "is in the close affection which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges and equal protection. These are the ties which, though light as air, are as strong as links of iron. Let the colonies always keep the idea of their civil rights associated with your government; they will cling and grapple to you, and no force under heaven will be of power to tear them from their allegiance. But let it be once understood that your government may be one thing and their privileges another; that these two things may exist without any mutual relation; the cement is gone, the cohesion is loosened, and everything hastens to decay and dissolution. As long as you have the wisdom to keep the sovereign authority of this country as the sanctuary of liberty, the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith, wherever the chosen race and sons of England worship freedom, they will turn their faces towards you. The more they multiply, the more friends you will have; the more ardently they love liberty, the more perfect will be their obedience. Slavery they can have anywhere. It is a weed that grows in every soil. They may have it from Spain, they may have it from Prussia. But, until you become lost to all feeling of your true interest and your natural dignity, freedom they can have from none but you. This is the commodity of price, of which you have the monopoly. This is the true Act of Navigation which binds to you the commerce of the colonies, and through them secures to you the wealth of the world. Deny them this participation of freedom, and you break that sole bond which originally made and must still preserve the unity of the empire. Do not entertain so weak an imagination as that your registers and your bonds, your affidavits and your suffrages, your cockets and your clearances, are what form the great securities of your commerce.

Do not dream that your letters of office, and your instructions, and your suspending clauses are the things that hold together the great contexture of the mysterious whole. These things do not make your government. Dead instruments, passive tools as they are, it is *the spirit of the English communion* that gives all their life and efficacy to them. It is the spirit of the English Constitution, which, infused through the mighty mass, pervades, feeds, unites, invigorates, vivifies every part of the empire, even down to the minutest member.

Is it not the same virtue which does everything for us here in England? Do you imagine, then, that it is the Land Tax Act which raises your revenue? that it is the annual vote in the Committee of Supply which gives you your army? or that it is the Mutiny Bill which inspires it with bravery and discipline? No! surely no! It is the love of the people: it is their attachment to their Government, from the sense of the deep stake they have in such a glorious institution, which gives you your army and your navy, and infuses into both that liberal obedience without which your army would be a base rabble, and your navy nothing but rotten timber" (163).

Enlargement of civic duty since the days of Burke.—Burke's impassioned appeal fell on deaf ears, and for seven ignoble years Britons fought with Britons across the seas. But the lesson was never lost and since his day we have extended the basis of civic fellowship and therewith the scope of the constitution and its laws far beyond the limits of which that great Whig reformer could have dreamed. And in so doing we have found a new significance in the meaning and method of democracy, the facility in the arts of communication, extension of the franchise, the social inheritance of habits of freedom have made the Anglo-Saxon race the pioneers in social organization all over the globe. Democratic man now employs discussion, government, rules and regulations, associations and committees in endless forms to advance the interests of his kind. We have already noted this as a distinctive phenomenon of modern civilization and noted also that there are still a large percentage of the population, both men and women who stand aloof from all such activity even if they belong to a club or an association, they think it waste of time to sit round a table and listen

to other people talking. They do not realize that the law and constitution of their country is bound up with the law and constitution of every circle to which a man belongs, that a trade committee, a parish vestry are doing work which in its degree is linked with the safety and security of the realm. To that master principle of unity on which Burke relied we have now to add the obligation to practise the arts of organization and of democracy wherever social or professional duty makes its claim. The sentiment of unity by itself will fail unless it be expressed in the thousand and one experiences which corporate life affords, not only in politics but in all the groups which are the theme of this volume.

Only by such experience can citizens be qualified to confront the perils of social catastrophe to which we have referred. In the eighteenth century the opportunity was afforded to but a few; to-day the privilege is open to men of every class: neither the lowest nor the highest are prevented from sharing with good will in the drudgery and the reward of organization. It is not for us to stand helpless over against the mystic sanctity of a supreme Law or an unchanging Constitution. This overwhelming national power, with all its prestige and all its sanctity, is now wielded by men of common clay like ourselves (p. 165): if we decline to take a hand in the game we are despising the heritage of our race and we invite the dissolution of society.

Form and Symbol.—It is not only laziness or selfishness which lead people to avoid committees and meetings; the reluctance touches a deeper level of human nature. We want some colour and form in life: the abstract and systematic, the organized and departmental offends our taste: the society of friends we enjoy, but the Monthly Meeting of a Society of Friends, each with a capital letter, leaves the outsider cold.

There is no escape from this dilemma unless we can conceive of organization as containing within itself the

elements of art, *i.e.*, as something which appeals to our taste and conscience (164). This appeal does not depend upon argument; the theories of a book on sociology may not stir the reader to social activity; all that theory can do is to help us to see that organization is rational, in accord with the order of developing nature; it can help a man to see how social ends are achieved. If, however, he begins to take a share in organized life, joining his fellows for the sake of some cause, then a secondary interest may develop, an interest in committee work, in propaganda, in achieving organized ends. And when this has occurred the work becomes actually a work of art, an affair in which taste and conscience has something to say, quite apart from theory and discussion* (compare p. 34).

Now all the arts have a tendency to exchange benefits: since they exist only in persons, who practise them in a united experience, they cannot fail to come into relation. And so one finds that every group manifests its life by the aid of symbols and forms which it borrows from other arts: corporate life only gets born so to speak when it puts on the garments of language, and colour, and symbol. Language first of all because language was and is the standard device to enable man to ally himself with man. (*Per contra* to

* My critic again adds a note: It is clear that the special technical arts of committees and parliamentary procedure, elaborated by the men of the Anglo-Saxon race and confirmed by their prestige have been copied by other peoples; and are being copied by women to a great extent uncritically. But it is improbable that traditional forms and symbols can be taken over wholesale without loss of that fitness to the situation which gave them vitality. We might compare the forms of social organization to the tools with which, in Bergson's view (165), the material world is mastered; the airman and the engineer who are at home with their machinery are more and not less human for their skill; in the same way the Trade Unionist reaches his friend on the *Internationale* with the tools of organization. As Carlyle said: 'The tools to him who can handle them!' However hallowed may be the symbols of social intercourse, they must shape themselves afresh to meet new situations.

enable men to keep apart at need, eschewing vulgar tongues.) We need not expand the theme: all the great societies which have won the hearts of men speak in their peculiar tongue and the members find a large part of the enjoyment of life in identifying the organization with a rich symbolism of language and painting and sculpture. We have Church Architecture, National Drama, Dialect Poetry. In groups such as an army where great effort has been made to create and sustain communal feeling constant attention is paid to uniform, and all other points of appearance and style. In many respects army organization supplies the best type which a student of sociology can study in order to witness the operation of sociological laws in their purest form, for efficiency depends upon the possession by its members of special sentiments and ideas attaching to a deliberately organized life. The life is strictly controlled and manipulated by rules openly designed to create and sustain the army sentiments. The army provides a man not only with food and drink and raiment but with pomp and circumstance, with social habits, with everything in fact that 'the natural man,' resigned to fate and fortune, can look for. Some of the great religious organizations, the Jesuits and the Salvation Army exhibit the same phenomena (166).

The point need not be laboured, but it is necessary to bear in mind that every type of corporate life exhibits in a greater or less degree the same dependence upon symbol and form. Even friends shake hands when they meet; even the family has its distinctive name and title; what would Russia be without the samovar? So it comes about that those who organize group life often of set purpose design symbols and emblems, of a conventional and artificial type; a coat of arms, a motto, a sign manual, a procession, all of them planned to give embodiment to an emotional ideal: the more abstract or impersonal or elevated are the aims of

such a union, the more will its promoters find the need for form and ceremony; when these do not spring naturally out of the historical or æsthetic situation they are often devised with artifice. The leaders know that if a wide appeal is to be made, if the multitude is to be drawn into the net, the doctrines of the faith must be pictured, attachments must be created for labels and images. A fine taste and sensitive conscience will repudiate such schemes wherever they are intended to achieve power at the cost of character, but in this modern epoch one may readily fall into an opposite error (compare p. 33 above), putting physical and mental, corporeal and spiritual, into wholly separate compartments. We know too little of the nature either of spirit or of matter to be able to dogmatize with the assurance of *The Age of Reason*. Both in the high matters of religion and race and in the commoner instances of corporate life, the demand is made for style and colour and warmth. If a man refuses fellowship with his kind because he has to reach down to them, or up to them, through the crust of tradition and speech, of uniform and custom, he abides an alien.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I.

I.—A NOTE ON PROGRESS

MACIVER rightly points out (p. 169) that sociology cannot limit itself to description; it must face the inquiry into progress: the very idea of evolution implies direction towards further evolution. At various points in this book the idea of progress has received incidental notice and the index will enable a reader to put the passages together, but the theme is too important to be dismissed without further reference. I refrain from a full treatment for two reasons—(1) these pages have extended to the limits proposed for them; (2) a satisfactory account of Progress should not only review the evolution of the idea, but should take up specific groups in society and make studies of these as exemplifying the general principles. Any student of the subject does as a matter of fact project his mind into one or other of these fields while handling the descriptive and classificatory side of the subject. So I confine myself to this Note, as a *précis* or syllabus for further study.

A.—History of the *idea* of Progress.

B.—Scientific data for belief in Progress, leading to

C.—Directions in which Progress may be expected.

[The three sections necessarily overlap to some extent.]

A.—1. DEFINITION. Progress a social affair: distinguished from conceptions of personal development or personal perfection. MACIVER, *Community*, pp. 160-73 and 406-10; ALEXANDER, *Moral Order and Progress*, pp. 131-9; MARVIN in *Progress and History*, p. 19 and throughout; HOBHOUSE, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, Chap. 1 and 2, and earlier works; *Morals in Evolution and Mind in Evolution*. These and the more popular books by Hobhouse may all be regarded as culminating in the conception of a progressive evolution of mankind.

II.—CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF PROGRESS

(i) Among *thinkers*:—from the Greek and Roman (see reference to Lucretius in Marvin) to the 19th century.

(ii) Change in the *common mind* of man, both as regards personal development and social progress, beginning with Egyptian and Jewish conceptions to the New Testament, the Mediæval Church and finally to the standpoint of a poet philosopher like Browning, or a democrat poet like Walt Whitman, expressing the new mind of their age. But how far at the present day is the ordinary man or woman influenced by preachers, poets or philosophers either to adapt his conduct to ideals of personal development during his lifetime, or by hope for the future of his race? A scientific answer to this question would only be given after an exhaustive inquiry into public opinion as recorded in the current popular literature of platform and press.

(iii) *Wide influence of Darwin* and his contemporaries. Beginning as regards sociology with *The Descent of Man*, Chaps. IV. and V. (1871). These biological discoveries enormously strengthened the philosophic view expounded by Herbert Spencer: *On Progress* (1857), with his "single law," from homogeneity to heterogeneity. After thirty years, Alexander's *Moral Law and Progress* offered a new prospect in a second law of 'comprehension,' and after another thirty years Maciver's *Community* offers laws of environmental control; while Kidd's *Science of Power* directs Progress on the "force of an emotional ideal" and refutes the fatalism of the biologist. Specific problems in Progress, such as the relation of physical heredity (The Eugenists) to social heredity and the relation of the individual to the state continue to claim the adherence of rival schools.

(iv) *Deep cleavage of opinion*, which divides not only the thinkers but large classes in society. The study of inheritance and the decay of orthodox belief have united to shape a deterministic attitude, based on personal and class struggle, and on the belief that savage impulses are the main source of human efficiency. This belief is opposed by thinkers who accept even more absolutely the principle of evolution but regard man as developing new powers in sociality, which control the self-regarding impulses derived from his ancestry (see Note, p. 89 above).

" . . . the conception of social progress as a *deliberate* movement towards the reorganization of society. Its possibility rests on the fact of evolution, of the higher tendencies of which it is indeed the outcome " (Hobhouse, *Soc. Ev. and Pol. Theory*, closing sentences).

B.—Scientific data for a belief in Progress.

1. ACHIEVEMENTS UNDER THE LAW OF DIFFERENTIATION (Herbert Spencer).

(a) Increased facility of communication and diffusion of knowledge).

(b) Increased care for physical well being, for food and clothing for production and all the amenities of civilized life. These make it easier for men to love each other, if they wish so to do.

(c) Increased capacity for organization:—frequently discussed in this book. The young acquire social sympathies and outlook more rapidly than their elders did; thus they can reconcile altruism and egoism in a larger variety of groups, if they wish to do so. Evidence: the advance described in Dicey's *Law and Public Opinion*, pp. 62-70, from old Toryism (1800-1830); Benthamism (1825-70) to philanthropic Collectivism (1865-1900). If the arguments of this book are sound it would appear that the present time is witnessing a further advance in sociality which one might label (after Alexander) the period of Comprehension (Voluntary Groups accepted within the sphere of State activity). Compare Laski: *Authority in the Modern State*, Chap. I.

All these achievements are merely the instruments of Progress, and help humanity only so far as the individuals who promoted them were inspired by the emotion of a social ideal (Kidd). Thus skill in organization can serve as a dreadful agent to set class against class, nation against nation.

2. EVIDENCE FOR RETROGRESSION.. There is abundant evidence of backsliding, in this or that group, even in this or that epoch. But retrogression is the sequel to previous advance, by the aid of achievements noted above (*a-d*). The rhythm of good and evil, of momentum and recoil is undeniable. If we accept Kidd's review of the evidence we believe that the advance towards sociality carries the human race forward beyond the reaction of evil. Those who hold that the belief itself is an illusion should admit that progress has been and is maintained by the widespread conviction that Good does triumph over Evil.

[But some anthropologists are sceptical as to advance—see reference note 64 and reference to Wallace, page 58.]

3. EVIDENCE FOR PROGRESS IN MORAL IDEAS, *i.e.*, in conceptions of relation between self and alter. This can be sought partly in the history of the past (Section I. above) or in comparative sociology treated by Westermarck, Hobhouse, etc. Impartial investigation is difficult because the inquirer cannot escape from a personal bias, the result of his own ethical development. This criticism is unavoidable, and lands every student of sociology in the paradox between science and faith. No profession of agnosticism can evade this dilemma; is not behaviour always guided, at long last, by a man's belief, however much he may regard himself as superior to its influence? Faith remains faith and not fact: it is faith in the expansion of life: "I am come that they might have life; and that they might have it more abundantly."

C.—DIRECTIONS in which Progress may be expected to evolve.

(a) *In public opinion or the common mind.* Each epoch has hitherto advanced in certain specific directions while neglecting others. (i) The present crisis has accelerated the spirit of internationalism and we may anticipate that this tendency will gain

in momentum, although reaction will constantly beset progress. (ii) The nineteenth century in Europe diminished the animosities of class and caste; this movement will extend over the world, but (iii) it intensified the antagonism between wealth and poverty, and we may anticipate that the coming years will witness an endeavour in public opinion to reconcile the institutions of property with the common good.

(b) *In the philosophy of society.* The thinker looks to the advancement of the individual in a heightened capacity for mastering his own behaviour and his social relations. "The last enemy that man shall overcome is himself. The internal conditions of life, the physiological basis of mental activity, the sociological laws that operate for the most part unconsciously, are parts of the 'environment' which the self-conscious intelligence has to master and it is on this mastery that the *regnum hominis* will rest" (Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*, p. 443). Many thinkers are now engaged, from one aspect or another, in the search for principles of harmony between opposing groups, *e.g.*, in industry, in religious institutions (see the writings of Dr Figgis), in the relation of the sexes; these will unite men in a finer grasp of the universal principle of solidarity. It is a reasonable speculation to suppose that during the next hundred years discoveries in these regions may exert a greater influence upon the fortunes of the human race than the astounding discoveries and inventions in the realm of matter during the last hundred years.

(c) *In the oversight of the rising generation.* That naïve faith in schooling as the grand panacea for human ills, which characterized the age of Bentham and Brougham, no longer sustains (see p. 161 above) nor can we trust implicitly in the diffusion of knowledge. Nor, even when we accept with Kidd the mighty force of an emotional ideal "imposed in all its strength through the young," can we trust one generation to settle the destiny of the next. The instances of Germany and Japan which he presents shew that such forceful imposition may exert a terribly baneful influence. The schools and the teachers are not the pioneers of a new gospel; their activities are the sequel to the advances and reactions of adult society. But if this faith in education is a faith in the Young, in their plastic and generous mind, it is justified, for it is a faith in Progress itself. Death is necessary to life. The Young may see visions and practise arts adapted to its own environment which are beyond the capacity of the Old: Youth takes from its environment not only the knowledge, the traditions and the manners of the time, but seizes on its ideals, and with a favouring wind may sail to distant shores. But the *systems* of school and college education only play a subordinate part. Progress in these institutions is a sequel to the ideas which have grown familiar to other fields of reform. Self-Government, so-called, in schools (see p. 134 above) may be cited as an illustration. The Educational Reformers (see Quick's volume under that title) have therefore

always been social reformers and often out of touch with the traditional habits which society in self-defence seeks to cherish in the young.

To limit our faith in Progress, or our social activity, to a display of zeal on behalf of schooling is a confession of social bankruptcy: above all in a generation which has plunged the world in hideous conflict. The Young are entitled to turn on us and bid us do our own reforming; in due time they may be ready to take our place and mend this sorry world after their own fashion. The obligation to maintain and improve these systems is not diminished, but their efficiency must be sought in the progress achieved by society: they serve as effect not cause. If the case were otherwise: if a theory of education adopted and administered by a select pedagogic class were able, as Kidd believed, to mould the young to a new pattern, then the summit of human achievement would be solved and therewith the riddle of existence. Fortunately or otherwise all groups in society seek to capture the young in their own interest (as Lord Salisbury bade his followers capture the School Boards) and the measure of progress in education will keep in step at long last with the progressive reconciliation of other groups. The present position of Continued Education is a capital illustration of this position: the State, the Employer and the Workman, the Parent and the Churches all make a claim to the control of the adolescent; an effective scheme of Continued Education will wait upon their advance in concord. (See Reference Notes No. 85 above.)

(d) *Relation of evolution (social) to development (personal).* While at this moment Youth makes a special claim, it is rather a question of adjustment between Age and Youth than of exclusion by one of the other: the young with all their assurance welcome the guidance of their elders. The remarks on p. 135 suggest the parallel between phylogeny and ontogeny. The conception of a developing life, 'life more abundantly,' is seldom applied by the individual to his own personality. Reformers usually seek to improve other classes or individuals; self-development does not stand in the focus of attention. What anthropology hopes to do for evolution genetic psychology may some day do for development: Shinn's *Biography of a Baby* (Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, U.S.A.) makes a start, in exact observation of development during the first twelve months: it will be a long while before child study carries such investigation forward to the ensuing stages of development. And yet something is gained in outlook if the principle of development from birth to death is granted. For if the general position taken in Chap. I. of the relation between the individual and society be granted, our conception of Progress will embrace not only the human race as spiritual and material, but the individual as mind and body. Our systems of theology and philosophy, our theories of the Past and the Future (except in the case of a poet like Browning), are the creation of men who scarcely conceived of themselves as

developing to old age: but if the thinker himself be a case of arrested development his system must needs be short-sighted. The paradox (p. 16 above) of life and death, growth and decay, confronts every scheme of evolution alike in the material and the spiritual world: we suggest that any ray of light thrown upon personal development will aid the philosopher in seeking to restate his theory of evolution.

APPENDIX II.

REFERENCES WITH NOTES

- (1) Hart, *Psychology of Insanity* (Cambridge University Press), gives a popular description of these processes.
- (2) Workman, *The Foundations of Modern Religion* (C. H. Kelly, 1918), pp. 127-130 and 150.
- (3) Cooley, *Social Organisation* (Scribners & Sons, New York), p. 7. Also *Human Nature and the Social Order* (same publishers), Chap. V.
- (4) F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies* (Constable & Co.), Chap. V. My Station and its Duties. On the whole subject of this chapter, see also Muirhead & Hetherington, *Social Purpose* (G. Allen & Unwin), Chap. I.
- (5) Compare Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, pp. 131-141, especially p. 140.
- (6) Cooley, *Social Organisation*, as above p. 3. Compare Bushnell in *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1919, p. 56.
- (7) Ross, *Social Psychology* (Macmillans), Chaps. III.-V.
- (8) Hart, as above.
- (9) Graham Wallas, *The Great Society* (Macmillan & Co.).
- (10) Richard Lovelace, *To Althæa from Prison*.
- (11) Maciver, *Community: A Sociological Study* (Macmillan & Co.), 1918, pp. 74-80.
- (12) *Transactions of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science* (Longmans, Green & Co.), vols. from 1851 onwards.
- (13) Moore, *Origin and Nature of Life* (Home University Library), p. 188.
- (14) Herbert Spencer, *On Progress* (*Westminster Review*, 1857), republished in *Collected Works* and in Everyman's Library with *Essays on Education*. The principle of differentiation (p. 176 in Everyman's Library edition) stands in his view as the chief factor in social progress. (See Appendix I. above).
- (15) Columbia University Press, New York, Chap. V.
- (16) Robert Browning, *Rabbi Ben Ezra*.
- (17) Graham Wallas, as above, p. 250. Compare Maciver, as above, pp. 70 and 202.
- (18) Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. ii, p. 244.

- (19) Maciver, as above, pp. 125, 6.
- (20) Boodin, John E., in the *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xix, No. I.
- (21) Hart, as above.
- (22) Graham Wallas, as above, Chap. I.
- (23) Woodrow Wilson, *The New Freedom* (Dent & Son, 1917), p. 20.
- (24) Cooley, *Social Organisation*, as above, Chap. III.
- (25) Adams, *Evolution of Educational Theory* (Macmillan & Co.), exposes the danger in the sphere of organised schooling.
- (26) Maciver, as above, p. 22.
- (27) Hobhouse, as above, No. 15, p. 34.
- (28) Graham Wallas, as above, Chap. VIII.; Ross, as above, Chap. III., and his reference to Le Bon, etc.
- (29) Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (Macmillan & Co.), Chap. I. As regards religion, Joseph McCabe, *Church Discipline* (Duckworth & Co.), devotes Chap. VI. The Calendar, to an exposition of the time element in the religious life. Mr Vaughan, to whom these references are due, adds Von Hugel, *Eternal Life* (Mansel & Co.), p. 325, etc.
- (30) Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (Fisher Unwin), p. 126.
- (31) Maciver, as above, p. 151.
- (32) Hobhouse, L. T., *Morals in Evolution* (Macmillan & Co.), Vol. I., Chap. VIII.
- (33) Bateson, Dr. W., *Biological Fact and the Structure of Society* (Herbert Spencer Lecture at Oxford, 1912). Jenks' *History of Politics* (Temple Primer Series, Dent & Sons), pp. 93-107, can be read as a corrective, giving the lawyer's common-sense view of the evolution of property. Kidd, Benjamin, *Science of Power* (Methuen) offers a dramatic and more contentious refutation.
- (34) Tawney, R. H., *The Sickness of Acquisitive Society* (*Hibbert Journal*, April, 1919).
- (35) Trotter, as above, p. 212.
- (36) Cooley, as above, p. 81.
- (37) Ditto, pp. 86-90.
- (38) Ministry of Reconstruction, *Trusts, Combines, etc.* (Pamphlet No. 31, price 2d). Compare Lester Ward, *Pure Sociology* (Macmillans), p. 487, for the philosophy of business secrecy.
- (39) D. P. (H. G. Wells), with preface by Viscount Milner, *Elements of Reconstruction* (Nisbet & Co.), p. 62.
- (40) Compare remarks in Alexander, as above, p. 9.
- (41) Wallace, A. R., *Social Environment and Moral Progress* (Cassell).
- (42) Darwin, Charles, *Descent of Man*, final paragraph.
- (43) As above, p. 66.
- (44) Macmillans, 1915.
- (45) Baldwin, *The Story of the Mind* (Geo. Newnes), Chap. IV.
- (46) As above, p. 191.

- (47) Browning, Robert, *Mr Sludge, the Medium*.
- (48) Dreever, *Instinct in Man* (Cambridge University Press), p. 190 and Chap. XI.
- (49) Moore, as above, p. 227.
- (50) Ditto, p. 188, 9. Compare Herbert Spencer in No. (14) above, p. 177, in Everyman's Edition; also Lester Ward, as above, p. 234, and Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution* (Macmillan & Co.), p. 375.
- (51) McDougall's Supplementary Chapter on Sex in his *Social Psychology* (Methuen), offers an excellent treatment of this theme: valuable especially to those who have the oversight of young people.
- (52) Maeterlinck, *The Life of the Bee* (Geo. Allen), Chap. V.
- (53) Trotter, as above, p. 106, etc.
- (54) Maeterlinck, as above, the closing pages.
- (55) McDougall, as above, Chap. II.
- (56) Trotter, as above, p. 167.
- (57) Galton, *Inquiry into Human Faculty* (Everyman's Library Edition), p. 49.
- (58) McDougall, as above, p. 84.
- (59) Trotter, as above, p. 166.
- (60) Geddes and Thomson, *Evolution* (Home University Library), p. 85.
- (61) Trotter, as above, p. 153.
- (62) Geddes and Thomson, as above, p. 92.
- (63) Bergson, as above, p. 147, etc., seems to lend weight to some such view of instinct. And compare Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*, as above, p. 9 and Chap. VI.; also Dreever, as above.
- (64) G. Elliott Smith, Proceedings of the British Association, 1912, p. 595. The bearings of anthropology upon theories of society can only be glanced at in these notes. The work of Dr. Rivers, Professor Elliott Smith, and Mr W. J. Perry in this field opens up a large vista. See, e.g., Perry, *The Golden Age* (*Hibbert Journal*, October, 1917) and various publications by Elliott Smith and Perry issued by the Manchester University Press.
- (65) Hobhouse, *Soc. Ev. and Pol. Theory*, as above, p. 161; and *Morals in Evolution*, as above, Vol. II., pp. 280-4.
- (66) As in (54) above.
- (67) Nelson's Popular Library (T. Nelson & Sons, Edinburgh).
- (68) Browning, Robert, Epilogue to *Men and Women*.
- (69) Sully, *Studies in Childhood and Children's Ways* (Longmans, Green & Co.); Earl Barnes, *Studies in Education*; Stanley Hall, *Youth* (Appleton & Co., New York), an abridgement of his exhaustive work on *Adolescence* (same publishers); Slaughter, *The Adolescent* (Geo. Allen and Unwin). These are only examples of a rapidly increasing literature on genetic psychology. Waddle, *Child Psychology* (Harrap, 1919) gives full references to this field of study.

- (70) Findlay, *The School* (Home University Library), Chap. V.
- (71) Kidd, Benjamin, as in No. 33 above, pp. 178 ff.
- (72) Cooley, *Social Organisation*, as above, p. 264.
- (73) Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (Macmillan & Co.), Chap. XIII.
- (74) Lovelace, as above (10).
- (75) Bryce, as above, vol. iii, p. 56.
- (76) Bartimæus, *Naval Occasions* (short stories).
- (77) Galsworthy, *Moods, Songs, and Doggerels* (Heinemann), p. 9.
- (78) For the philosophic treatment of altruism, Alexander, *Moral Progress*, is by no means out of date although published in 1889; and compare Lester Ward, as above (51).
- (79) Graham Wallas, as above, p. 60.
- (80) Trotter, as above, p. 123.
- (81) Bryce, as above, vol. iii, p. 614.
- (82) Compare again Graham Wallas, pp. 65-70.
- (83) Bligh, *The Direction of Desire* (H. Frowde).
Pelmanism and the ethical outlook of its advertisements are also a sign of the times.
- (84) See (28) above. Muirhead & Hetherington, as in (4) above, p. 65, employ another scheme of classification. Their discussion of *The Family* should also be consulted.
- (85) *The Young Wage-Earner*, edited for The Uplands Association by J. J. Findlay (Sidgwick & Jackson), p. 29, etc.; also the references in No. 69 to Stanley Hall and Slaughter.
- (86) W. H. R. Rivers, Pres. Address to the Anthropological Section, British Association, Portsmouth, 1911, pp. 497-8. Plans for classifying groups merit far more attention than can be here allotted to them. An interesting starting point is suggested by A. E. Heath, *International Politics and the Concept of World Sections* (*International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1919). The author distinguishes "vertical" sections, such as those created by languages, from "horizontal," such as industry, spreading through all the vertical sections. It could be applied, e.g., to the contrast exposed on p. 154 between Hebrew and Christian.
- (87) Lester Ward, as above, p. 353, and No. 64 above.
- (88) McDougall, as above, p. 69.
- (89) If one is not mistaken, something of this kind is implied by Rivers in the address referred to above: "The deepest layer of the foundation, the very bedrock of the social structure."
- (90) Pearson, Charles H., *National Life and Character* (Macmillan & Co., 1893), was in its day accepted as a standard view of society. Chap. V., *The Decline of the Family*, expressed the common note of pessimism. It is the sociology of an elderly man who feels himself declining in a declining epoch, "passing into the old age of Humanity." By way of contrast Earl Barnes, *Women in*

Modern Society (B. W. Huesbsch, New York), gives the more hopeful contemporary outlook.

- (91) Earl Barnes, as in 90.
- (92) McDougall, as above, at (51).
- (93) Stanley, *Life of Arnold*, Chap. III. (John Murray); also Arnold's Sermons, preached in Rugby Chapel (same publishers).
- (94) As in 70 above.
- (95) Caldwell Cook, *The Play Way* (Heinemann); Simpson, *An Adventure in Education* (Sidgwick & Jackson), offer examples from Secondary Schools. Mr Horner Lane's *Little Commonwealth*, the plans for "prefect systems" so-called in Elementary Schools, especially in Warwickshire under the guidance of Mr Bolton King—see L.C.C. Education Conference, 1913 (King & Co.), the system of Madame Montessori, are examples from other types of school. See also Josephine Ransom, *Schools of Tomorrow* (Bell & Sons). As regards America, the various studies of Professor Irving King give a wide survey.
- (96) Robert Browning, Poetical Works, vol. vi, *Dramatis Personæ*.
- (97) R. W. Emerson in *Collected Essays*, various editions.
- (98) W. R. Tarpey, *The Ethics of Intercourse* (*Hibbert Journal*, April, 1919). Kenneth E. Kirk, *A Study of Silent Minds* (Student Christian Movement, Russell Square, W.C.), in Chaps. I. and IV., gives a fine sketch of friendship among "silent" British soldiers in France.
- (99) Haddon, *Races of Man* (Milner & Co.), p. 37.
- (100) Tarpey, as above.
- (101) Maurice Hewlett's novel under this title.
- (102) Redlich and Hirst, *Local Government in England*, 2 vols. (Macmillan & Co.).
- (103) The Regional Survey Association, various publications. Also Patrick Geddes, *Cities in Evolution* (Williams & Norgate), and his recent series on reconstruction, in collaboration with Branford and others (Williams & Norgate for The Sociological Society, 1917-19).
- (104) Hobhouse, L. T., *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, Chap. VI. (Columbia University Press); *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. I., Chap. II. (Chapman & Hall).
- (105) Zimmern in *Progress and History*, edited by Marvin (Oxford University Press), is invaluable. Contrast with this the earlier work of Henry Sidgwick, *Elements of Politics* (Macmillan & Co.). "A. E." (G. Russell?), *A Nation in Being* (Mansel & Co.), especially Chap. VI. He writes, of course, chiefly of Ireland, but the principles extend more widely. For use of the term State, see Figgis, *From Gerson to Grotius* (Cambridge University Press), pp. 11-16. This writer in other books, e.g., *Civilization at the Cross Roads* and *Churches in the Modern State* deals with the theme we discuss on pp. 163 ff.

- (106) Elizabeth Barrett Browning, *On Napoleon*.
- (107) Westermarck, vol. ii, p. 183 ff. For a discussion of Internationalism in present-day politics, Ramsay Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism* (Constable & Co.), or Stallybrass, *A Society of States* (G. Routledge). A reader points out that the sentiment of internationalism is now transcending the bounds of sentiment, and is uniting many minds all over the world in conscious activity as a true "universal" group. If this be so, we must describe this group as supra-national, overleaping the boundaries of race and locality: and our classification should have read *Humanity*, Religion, Class in place of Nation, Religion, Class; for he may reach this lofty human plane through the internationalism of labour or science as well as through politics. But since all men are compelled to be identified with some one state, the state or nation-group persists and must be entered as a universal obligation.
- (108) Benjamin Kidd, as above (33).
- (109) Hobson, J. A., *Science of Wealth* (Home University Library), pp. 220-1, or Adam Smith, as below, No. (118).
- (110) Ministry of Reconstruction, *The Business of Government* (No. I., p. 11, in series of pamphlets issued by H.M. Stationery Office, August, 1919).
- (111) Dicey, *Law and Opinion in England* (Macmillan & Co.), 278 ff. The periods into which Dicey divided the 19th century repay attention. (See p. 285 below.)
- (112) Sorley in *Lectures on the Theory of the State* (Oxford University Press), p. 32.
- (113) Cole, G. H. D., *Self-Government in Industry* (G. Bell & Sons), and other works. Harley, *Syndicalism* (People's Library, T. C. and E. C. Jack), summarized usefully the history of the movement up to 1914. While this book is passing through the Press, the building trade has taken a step in this direction which may have momentous consequences. When I wrote what appears on p. 206, I had no conception that this novel venture was on its way.
- (114) War Office pamphlets issued at various times during the war to describe the activities of joint committees representing Trade Unions, employers, and War Office officials, to control contracts. As regards Education, consult Report of Committee on Adult Education (H.M. Stationery Office, 1919), summarized by Arthur Greenwood: *The Education of the Citizen* (Workers' Educational Association, 1920, price 6d.), Chap. V.
- (115) *Great Britain and the European Crisis* (H.M. Stationery Office, 1914, price 1d).
- (116) Harold T. Laski, *Authority in the Modern State* (Oxford University Press, 1919).
- (117) Compare Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*,

- as above, p. 128, but Perry (No. 64) holds the opposite view.
- (118) I take Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, dated 1776, as evidence. The term "rank" is frequently used, but I do not think he speaks of "class" or "middle classes."
 - (119) J. S. Mill, *Dissertations and Discussions*, various editions.
 - (120) Charles Booth, *Life and Labour of the People*, several vols. (Macmillan & Co.).
 - (121) Trotter, as above, pp. 136-7.
 - (122) Veblen, *The Leisure Class* (Macmillans).
 - (123) Giddings, *Elements of Sociology* (New York). Compare also Cooley, as above, and Bushnell, *Scientific Method in Sociology* (*American Journal of Sociology*, XXV., July, 1919), p. 53, classes by distinction not by favour. These sociologists reflect the general tone of opinion as regards classes in the New World.
 - (124) Book III. in Adam Smith, as above (118).
 - (125) Macgregor, *The Evolution of Industry* (Home University Library), or Benn, *The Trade of To-morrow* (Jarrolds), afford good examples of this current of opinion.
 - (126) George Herbert, *The Elixir*, in *English Poems*.
 - (127) Geddes and Thomson, as above, p. 225.
 - (128) Carlyle, *Past and Present*, and Ruskin, *Munera Pulveris* and *Unto this Last*, first exposed the fallacies of the "orthodox" political economy; then Arnold Toynbee, *The Industrial Revolution* (Longmans, Green & Co., 1884), challenged it from an historical basis; and Marshall, *Economics of Industry*, and later North, restated the theory. Read in this order the student gains a perspective, so far as Britain is concerned, of the conflict which opened with the Industrial Revolution.
 - (129) McKillop, *Efficiency Methods* (Routledge).
 - (130) Graham Wallas, as above, pp. 354-6.
 - (131) Described conveniently in McKillop, as above, Chap. XIV.; also in Fleming and Pearce, *Apprentice Training* (Longmans, Green & Co.). A vigorous Welfare Workers' Institute can now be consulted.
 - (132) Bushnell, as in No. 123 above, p. 53.
 - (133) Cole, as in No. 83 above.
 - (134) Robert Owen published his autobiography in 1857.
 - (135) As above, No. 122.
 - (136) Mackenzie, J. S., in *Lectures on the Theory of the State* (No. 112 above). Another view is presented by Schuster, Presidential Address, The British Association, 1914, p. 13, and see No. 18.
 - (137) Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*, Chap. XVIII.
 - (138) Burke, *Thoughts on the Present Discontents* (Oxford University Press Edition), pp. 86-90. For a more recent discussion of party (also, however, limited to political groups) see R. Michels, translated by Paul, *Political Parties* (Jarrolds).

- (139) Findlay, as above, No. 70, Chap. X. Jane Addams, *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets* (Macmillans).
- (140) Ross, *Social Control* (Macmillans), p. 290.
- (141) *The Covenant of the League of Nations* (H.M. Stationery Office, price 2d.), p. 12: and No. 107 above.
- (142) Sidney Webb, *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. xii, p. 756 (republished separately in pamphlet form by Allen and Unwin).
- (143) Pollock in *The Law Quarterly Review*, vol. xxv, Jan., 1909.
- (144) Zimmern, as above, No. 105, pp. 177-80.
- (145) Jenks, *A Short History of Politics* (Dent & Sons), pp. 130-3; also Nos. 102, 103 above.
- (146) As above, No. 39.
- (147) Graham Wallas, as above, pp. 329-30.
- (148) Ditto, Part II.
- (149) Ditto, p. 258.
- (150) Cooley, as above.
- (151) Sadler, M. T. H., *Hyssop, a Novel* (Constable & Co.).
- (152) Birrell, Augustus, *Selected Essays* (T. Nelson & Sons).
- (153) Report, published by the Teachers' Guild (9 Brunswick Square, W.C.).
- (154) H. Jephson, *The Platform* (Macmillan & Co.).
- (155) Burke, *Speech to the Electors of Bristol* (in *Collected works*, various editions).
- (156) Diblee, *The Newspaper* (Home University Library), Chap. I.
- (157) As above, No. 155.
- (158) J. S. Mill, in the Appendix to *Dissertations and Discussions*, No. 19.
- (159) Elmer Brown, *Government by Influence* (Macmillans).
- (160) Bertrand Russell, *The Road to Freedom* (Allen & Unwin).
- (161) See No. 64, especially W. J. Perry, *The Golden Age*.
- (162) Dicey, *The Law and the Constitution* (Macmillan & Co., 1885). This is well worth reading at the present day, for it shews also how the great doctrines of British politics, covering *inter alia* the rights of discussion and of journalism, were conceived by a great (conservative) lawyer in the eighties.
- (163) Burke, *On Conciliation with America*, second speech (various editions).
- (164) George Bourne, *The Ascending Effort* (Constable & Co.), Chap. II. The view of development presented in this book has helped the present writer at various points.
- (165) Bergson, as above, No. 29, pp. 144-6.
- (166) The references to McCabe and Von Hugel in No. 29 apply again. The great themes of mysticism and religious symbolism, of sign and sacrament, can only be noted here. Neither in this nor in any of the multifarious topics discussed in these chapters does the author offer a selection of the best books. This list is only a collection of footnotes, inserted for the readers' convenience

at the end of the book instead of interrupting the text. It may serve the student as a starting point for further study, but should not be taken as a comprehensive guide to standard works on the manifold themes to which it has been necessary to refer.

For a comprehensive study of sociology as pursued in Great Britain a student cannot do better than begin with the foundation of The Sociological Society (*Sociological Papers*, Macmillan & Co., 1905) and *The Sociological Review*, published monthly since that date. Along with this *The American Journal of Sociology*, maintained by a vigorous group of University teachers of the subject, should be consulted. These two journals may be depended upon between them to report on all important contributions proceeding from foreign countries.

INDEX

Only the text of this book is indexed; the additional references contained in the two Appendices are not repeated in the Index.

INDEX.

A

ACADEMIC, 253.
 Acquisition, instinct of, 40, 77.
 Adolescence, 108, 133, 136.
 Adolescence and leadership, 224.
 Alexander, S., 119, 284.
 Alter and altruism, 6.
 Altruism (American), 99.
 America and Burke, 275.
 America and King George III., 233.
 America and the League of Nations, 156.
 American society, 96 ff, 187.
 Anabolism, 72, 74.
 Analogy, 20, 42, 59.
 Animal world, 5, 60.
 Animal, man's interference with, 82.
 Anthropology, 59, 77 ff, 125.
 Appetite, 61.
 Apprentice training, 195, 201.
 Area, as a basis for community, 32.
 Area, congested, depopulated, 143.
 Aristocracy, 232.
 Army organisation, 279.
 Arnold, Thomas, 133.
 Art, evolution of, 43.
 Art, as representative, 231.
 Authority, a type of social order, 151, 158, 185.
 Authority, central and local, 159 ff.

B

BALDWIN, 84.
 Bateson, Dr. W., 38 ff, 185.

Bentham, Jeremy, 160 ff.
 Bergson, 29, 278.
 Bernhardt, 79, 185.
 Birrell, A., quoted, 256.
 Bismarck, on the platform, 261.
 Boarding School, 142.
 Booth, Charles, 182.
 Bradley, F. H., 7, 12, 178.
 Britain, social mind of, 30.
 British Association, discussion at, 258.
 Browning, Robert, quoted, 20, 60, 83, 134.
 Bryce (on American life), 96, 99.
 Burke, Edmund, 260, 262, 264, 274.

C

CARLYLE, Thomas, 222, 278.
 Caste, 178 ff, 189.
 Celibacy of clergy, 127.
 Celtic "fringe," 135.
 Change (see Variation).
 Child psychology, 59, 84.
 Children as a social group, 124.
 Church of England, representation in, 239.
 Circles of activity, 93.
 Citizenship, a type of social order (see Hobhouse), 185.
 City life, 212.
 Clan, 144.
 Class distinctions, 121, 178 ff, 189.
 Classification of groups, 34, 121.
 Club, 3 ff, 24.
 Clubs, for games, 91, 202.

Cole, R. H. D. (see Syndicalism).
 Collective, mind or will, 16.
 Collectivist, 174 ff.
 Combinations, private, 52, 267.
 Committees, 91, 94, 256 ff.
 Committees, evolution of, 232.
 Communication, 31 ff, 78, 137, 234, 255.
 Community (Maciver's definition), 22.
 Competition, 228.
 Complexes, repressed, 4, 8, 11, 25.
 Complexity, law of, 18, 62.
 Compromise, 73, 100.
 Compulsion, 100, 110 ff, 267.
 Concord, 104.
 Conflict, 56, 83, 108 ff, 139.
 Confucius, 88.
 Congested area, 143.
 Conscience, social, 128.
 Constitution, British, its basis, 276.
 Constitution of United States, 237.
 Construction, instinct of, 67.
 Content, mental, 4.
Contrat social, 222.
 Control and instinct, 74.
 Cooley, 7, 47, 48, 254.
 Co-operation, 30, 265, 267.
 Co-operative societies, 196, 204.
 Corporate life, 10.
 Corporations, morality of, 107.
 Corporations, public and private, 163 ff.
 Cosmopolitanism, 154.
 Cromwell and Civil War, 274.
 Crowd, 12, 21, 34.
 Culture, 123.
 Curiosity, instinct of, 77.
 Custom, 229.

D

DARWIN, 58, 74.
 Delegation, 116.
 Democracy, 48, 232-4, 276.
 Depopulated area, 143.
 Development, 39, 57.

Development of self-consciousness, 7, 13.
 Development, stages of, 133.
 Dialect, claims of, 141.
 Discipline, naval, 101.
 Discussion, 229, 252 ff.
 Discussion, the sequel to, 206, 253.
 D.O.R.A., 273.

E

ECONOMIC basis of society, 191.
 Education, committees, 237, 253.
 Education in politics, 162-4.
 Education, Minister of, 227.
 Education, social aspects of, 255.
 Education, and see Schooling, Schools.
 Efficiency, 94.
 Eight-hours' day, 208.
 Elections, 236.
 Enthusiasm, 106.
 Emerson, quoted, 136-7.
 Empire (British), 148-9.
 Evolution, 18, 89.

F

FAMILY, 63, 121, 125 ff, 221. 28.102
 Federations, 112, 150, 246, 265. 104.1
 Fellowship, 104. 115.74
 Feminist movement, 130.
 Fleming and Pearce, 202.
 Form, 277.
 France, elections in, 241. 1069
 Freedom, 14, 55, 95 ff.
 Free trade, 267.
 Free will, 76.
 Friends, Society of, 277.
 Friendship, 22, 63, 121, 135 ff, 211, 215, 269.
 Fusion, 116-7.

G

GALTON, Francis, 69.
 Geddes, Patrick, 144.
 Geddes and Thomson, 194.

Genesis of society, 55 *ff.*
 Germany, mentality of, 29,
 218, 219, 261.
 George, Lloyd, 26, 33, 227.
 George III., 233, 236.
 Giddings, 188.
 Gospel, diffusion of, 31.
 Gossip, 211.
 Gothic building, 13.
 Government, central and local,
 142, 149, 253, 263 *ff.*
 Government, in groups, de-
 fined, 149, 229.
 Government, in small groups,
 263.
 Government, distinctive func-
 tion of, 264.
 Government, inner spirit of,
 269.
 Grades in industry, 202.
 Greece, 36, 88.
 Grey, Sir Edward, quoted, 167.
 Gregariousness, 69 *ff.*
 Group (defined), 10, 11, 22.
 Groups, industrial, 108 *ff.*
 Groups, solidarity, 113.
 Groups, classification, 121.
 Groups, primary, 25, 123.
 Groups, universal, 123.
 Groups, self-regarding, 123.
 Groups, intermediate, 123.
 Guilds, 193.

H

HADDON, *Races of Man*.
 Hall, Stanley, 84.
 Hæckel, 63.
 Hebrews, 34, 154, 206.
 Herbert, Auberon, 161.
 Herbert, George, 194-5.
 Heredity, social, 4, 50.
 Hobhouse, L. T., 1, 19, 53, 151,
 166, 219.
 Homestead, 145.
 Humanitarianism, 154.

I

IMITATION, 68.
 Imperialism, 154.

Individual claims, 113.
 Individual and state, 159 *ff.*
 Individualism, 55, 88.
 Individuality, 7 *ff.*
 Industry, organised for war, 39.
 Industry and heredity, 50.
 Industry, reorganisation, 187,
 190 *ff.*
 Industry and politics, 243 *ff.*, 274.
 Industry, the new spirit in,
 268.
 Infancy, 39, 41, 84.
 Initiation, 84.
 Instinct, 38, 63 *ff.*
 Instinct, maternal, 126.
 Institutions, 21, 36 *ff.*
 Insurance agents, 164, 173.
 Intellectualism, 16, 280.
 Internationalism, 154.
 Intuitions, 23.
 Isolation, 46, 72, 81.

J

JAMES, William, 15.
 Japanese, 37.
 Jephson, Henry, 260.
 Journalism and speech, 262.
 Justice, local and central, 170.

K

KATABOLISM, 72, 74.
 Keller (Societal Evolution, 58.
 Key, Ellen, 126.
 Kidd, Benjamin, 157, 185.
 King (symbolic value), 15.
 King, divine right, 222, 270.
 Kinship, 144, 151.
 Knowledge, communicated, 51,
 52.

L

LABOUR Minister, 254.
 Labour representation, 239.
 Labourers, viii, 16.
Laissez faire, 161, 168.
 Lamb, Charles, 48.
 Language, 43 *ff.*, 79, 84, 278.
 Law, 229, 269.

Law, in large societies, 270.
 Law-giver, the State's supremacy, 272.
 Leadership, 28, 33, 219 ff, 270.
 League of Nations, 117, 155-6, 229.
 Leisure, 123, 189, 296 ff.
 Letters, slow diffusion, 45.
 Letter-bag as social medium, 137.
 Local government, affected by public school influence, 141
 Local government strength in Anglo-Saxon countries, 142
 Locality, influence, 122, 141 ff.
 Locality, basis for elections, 237.
 Love (New Testament), 104.
 Loyalty, 108, 110 ff.
 Luther and education, 182.

M

MCDUGALL, 15, 66 ff.
 Maciver, 15, 16, 23, 32.
 Mackenzie, J. S., 218.
 Maeterlinck, 64.
 Malthus, 27.
Manchester Guardian, quoted, 148.
 Masonic societies, 138.
 Memory (function), 83.
 Metabolism, 72, 74.
 Middle ages, 6, 14, 29, 88.
 Middle class, 181.
 Mill, J. S., 181 ff, 264.
 Milner, Lord, 52, 241.
 Military service, 101, 115.
 Mob mind, 34.
 Modern life, 25 ff.
 Monarchy in Britain, 235.
 Moore, Dr. Benjamin, 18, 62.
 Morley, John, as journalist, 262.
 Multi-cellular organisms, 61, 63
 Munitions, viii, 9, 13, 93, 94.

N

NATION, 147 ff.
 National continuity, 36.

Nationalism, Hebrew, German, etc., 150 ff.
 Nationalisation of railways, 173 ff.
 Nationalisation of industry, 205.
 Neighbourhood (see Locality).
 Newspaper (see Press).
 Nietzsche, 91.
 Nineteenth century, 25 ff.
 Non-gregarious species, 71.
 Number, 24 ff, 253.

O

OCCUPATION, 122, 189 ff.
 Occupation (special importance), viii., 17.
 Officials and office, 173-5, 221, 226 ff, 257.
 Old age, 134 ff.
 "Open country," 140.
 Organs, 65 ff.
 Organism, 21, 42, 61.
 Organisation, distinguished from organism, 22.
 Organisation, defined, 217.
 Organisation, analysed, 229.
 Organiser, 26 ff, 94ff.

P

PARADOX, 16.
 Parliament, British, growth of, 233.
 Parliament, distrusted, 159, 250.
 Parties, political, 33, 104, 222 ff.
 Pasteur, 295.
 Patriotism, test of, 150.
 Perceptual inlet, 70.
 Period, 121.
 Personal rights, 6.
 Platform, 260.
 Play, 68, 76.
 Power (social), 90 ff.
 Press, power of, 48, 261.
 Privacy, 41, 51.
 Printing, 45.

Professions, learned, 190 *ff.*, 269.
 Progress, 18, 27, 44, 56, 89, 104, 114, 250, 256, and Appendix I.
 Property, 38 *ff.*, 51, 249.
 Psycho-analysis, 83, 84.
 Psychology, 4 *ff.*
 Psychology, collective, 157.
 Psychology, directive, 108.
 Psychology, genetic, 133.
 Public opinion, 91, 160, 183, 258.
 Public spirit, 106-7, 240.
 Public man, 26, 27.
 Publicity, 41, 51, 255.
 Pugnacity, instinct of, 67, 77.

R

RACE (v. Kinship).
 Rank, 180 *ff.*
 Reconstruction of parliament, 241.
 Reconstruction, present-day problem, 267.
 Regional survey, 144.
 Religion, 175 *ff.*
 Renaissance, 14.
 Repetition work, 202.
 Representation, 220, 230 *ff.*
 Representation, in the State, 238 *ff.*
 Representation, proportional, 249, 250.
 Repression, 75.
 Resolutions, drafting of, 259.
 Revolution, the industrial, 31, 181, 243.
 Ricardo, 193.
 Rosebery, Lord, 94.
 Ross, quoted, 225.
 Routine, 95 *ff.*
 Rules, 269.
 Rhythm (of life), 72, 74.

S

SADLER, M. T. H., quoted, 255.
 St. Paul, 21, 62, 76, 178, 179.
 Schooling, purpose of, 133.

Schools and class distinctions, i., 184.
 Schools, types of, v., 133 *ff.*
 Schools, secondary, iv., 224.
 Schools, leadership in, ii., 226.
 Schools, public and local government, iii., 141.
 Scout troops, 224.
 Secrecy in property, 41.
 Secrecy in ideas, 58.
 Secret societies, 138.
 Self and society, 102.
 Self-consciousness, 4 *ff.*, 75, 83.
 Self-government in schools, 134.
 Self-regarding sentiments, 108, 122.
 Service, domestic, 194.
 Sex, 63 *ff.*, 129.
 Sex education, 132.
 Shakespeare and old age, 135.
 Simians, 78.
 Size (of unit), 24 *ff.*, 44.
 Smith, Adam, 192, 205.
 Snowden, Philip, 26.
 Social control, 29.
 Social mind, 5, 16, 23 *ff.*, 80, 81.
 Social, and unity, 103.
 Social science, 19.
 Socialism, economic, 41, 247, 249.
 Sociality, 6, 7.
 Sociality, heightened capacity for, 53, 124, 240, 250, 264 *ff.*
 Socialization of industry, 199 *ff.*
 Society, defined, 5, 10.
 Sociology (as a science), 19, 20.
 Solitary species, 69 *ff.*
 Space, 31.
 Spencer, Herbert, 19 *ff.*, 55 *ff.*, 165, 218.
 State and nation, predominance of, 56, 114, 147 *ff.*
 State and British education, 122.
 State and family, 126.
 State, function of, 160 *ff.*
 State and industry, 246.
 State as supreme law-giver, 272.
 "Station," 7.

Steam engine, invention of, 46.
 Stubbs' Select Charters, 270.
 Sub-consciousness, 4, 8, 83.
 Sublimation, 61, 83.
 Suburbs, 143.
 Suggestion, 68.
 Sully, James, 84.
 Symbols, 34, 186, 277.
 Sympathy, 68.
 Syndicalism, 164, 204, 241 *ff.*

T

TABU, 270.
 Teachers' Registration Council, 202, 238.
 Technical terms, 20, 21.
 Telepathy, 46.
 Tendencies, innate, 68.
 Testament, New, references, 106, 110, 124, 137, 176, 178, 179, 183, 219, 220, 266, 271, 285.
 Testament, Old, references, 77, 90, 110, 129, 138, 189, 209, 220, 228, 270.
 Thomas, J. H., 100.
 Thoreau, 114.
 "Ticket" in U.S. elections, 233.
 Time, 33 *ff.*, 145, 269.
The Times, quoted, 46, 241.
 Todas (Dr. Rivers' research), 84.
 Tolerance, 104, 176.
 Town councillor, 116.
 Township, 141, 145.
 Toynbee, Arnold, 192.
 Trade (see Industry).
 Trades Unions, 190 *ff.*, 236, 246, 267.
 Trotter, Dr. W., 35, 43, 58 *ff.*, 180, 185.
 Turk, the, a mediævalist, 192.
 Turkey, the press in, 261.

U

UNI-CELLULAR organisms, 61.
 Uniformity, 95 *ff.*
 Unity, 104 *ff.*, 277.
 Unity in industry, 198 *ff.*
 Unit in sociology, 11.
 University electorate, 237.

V


VARIATION, 61 *ff.*, 179, 185, 252.
 Veblen, 186, 207.
 Voluntary groups, 163 *ff.*, 250.

W

WAGES, 190 *ff.*
 Wallace, Alfred Russell, 58.
 Wallas, Graham, 19, 21, 25, 27, 105, 218, 253.
 Walpole, Hugh, 1, 119.
 War and group conflict, 109 *ff.*
 War, aftermath in civil dissension, 274.
 War, civil, in Britain, 274.
 War Office as merchant, 244.
 Ward, Lester, 63.
 Welfare work, 94, 200.
 Wells, H. G., 241.
 Wesley, John, as open-air speaker, 260.
 Whitley Council, 206.
Who's Who, 212.
 Wilkes, John, 260.
 Wilson, Woodrow, 25, 27, 48, 206, 215, 218.
 Woman in evolution, 81.
 Women as a group, 121, 129 *ff.*
 Women's Trades Unions, 203.

Y

YORKSHIRE, woollen mills in, 49.



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
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